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Cited by 240

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability

Fox, Justin, Shotts, Kenneth W.·2009·The Journal of Politics

Abstract

Politicians vary in both their competence and their policy preferences. We show that how voters trade off competence against ideological congruence has key implications for the type of representation incumbents provide. When voters privilege competence, they encourage trustee representation, and when voters emphasize ideological congruence, they encourage delegate representation. Selection on competence is most likely to occur when uncertainty about the policy preferences of politicians is minimal. A surprising implication of our analysis is that ideological congruence between incumbents and voters is not a necessary precondition for trustee representation to be rewarded at the ballot box.

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Metadata

Authors
Fox, J., & Shotts, K. W.
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Published
2009-10
Volume
71
Issue
4
Pages
1225-1237
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
OpenAlex
W2056091012
Cited by
240
References
1
FWCI
59.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0022381609990260
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Fox, J., & Shotts, K. W. (2009). Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability. The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381609990260

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