The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem
Open accessAbstract
The apparent conceivability of a zombie — a physically indistinguishable duplicate of a conscious person that nevertheless lacks consciousness — seems to show that the relation between brain processes and conscious experience is contingent. But this is probably an illusion of contingency, due to the limitations of our current concepts and tricks of the first-person imagination. The mental is at present conceptually irreducible to the physical, but the strict supervenience of the former on the latter suggests the presence of a concealed necessary connection, which could become transparent to us only through a third type of concept that we would have to create — as part of a theory that yields the necessary connection between the mental and the physical as a logical consequence. Such conceptual creations have been important elsewhere in the development of science.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
From an Ontological Point of View
Heil, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199259747.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Public and Private Spaces of the City
Madanipour, A. (2003) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203402856 · Cited by 610
Koslicki, K. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001 · Cited by 379
Metadata
- Authors
- NAGEL, T.
- Venue
- Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-07
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 337-352
- ISSN
- 0031-8191 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-817X
- OpenAlex
- W2143522940
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0031819198000035
- The paper
- NAGEL, T. (1998). Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819198000035
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.