From an Ontological Point of View
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Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates applying truthfully to objects, for instance, are taken to name properties of those objects possessed by every object to which the predicates apply. Such a principle might be thought to follow from a more general ‘truth‐making’ requirement (truths require truth‐makers) together with the idea that truth‐makers entail truths. I argue that truth‐making is not entailment and that the Picture Theory should be jettisoned and replaced by an attitude of ontological seriousness. Freed of constraints imposed by the Picture Theory, we are in a position to see our way through metaphysical difficulties associated with contemporary philosophy of mind. Following Locke (and C. B. Martin), I endorse a conception of properties as modes (or tropes): ways particular objects are. Modes are simultaneously qualities and powers: powerful qualities. Application of this thesis to familiar issues in the philosophy of mind yields surprising results.
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None of the other proposals in the literature for how to account for nothing-over-and-aboveness in the absence of identity is satisfactory.
“There are other proposals in the literature for how to account for nothing-over-and-aboveness in the absence of identity; I have argued elsewhere that none is satisfactory.16”
From Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation (2019) · cites this paper as [16]
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The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409 · see citing works
White, B. W., Saunders, F. A., Scadden, L., Bach-Y-Rita, P., & Collins, C. C. (1970) · Perception & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/bf03210126 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 · Cited by 508 · see citing works
Did the universe design itself?
Goff, P. (2019) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-018-9692-z · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Banks, E. C. (2010) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515081003690418 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation
Goff, P. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-13 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
- Authors
- Heil, J.
- Affiliations
- Davidson College (US)
- Corresponding author
- Heil, John
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-05-01
- OpenAlex
- W1602276411
- Cited by
- 888
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 42 · 2025: 53 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 74 · 2018: 56 · 2017: 50 · 2016: 43 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 7.69
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Keywords
- truthmaking, ontological commitment, tropes, ontology of mind, John Locke, metaphysics of properties
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