Cited by 173Philosophy and History of ScienceMental Health and PsychiatryMedicine, History, and Philosophy

Interventionist causal models in psychiatry: repositioning the mind–body problem

Kendler, K. S., Campbell, J.·2009·Psychological Medicine

Abstract

Background: The diversity of research methods applied to psychiatric disorders results in a confusing plethora of causal claims. To help make sense of these claims, the interventionist model (IM) of causality has several attractive features. First, it connects causation with the practical interests of psychiatry, defining causation in terms of ‘what would happen under interventions’, a question of key interest to those of us whose interest is ultimately in intervening to prevent and treat illness. Second, it distinguishes between predictive-correlative and true causal relationships, an essential issue cutting across many areas in psychiatric research. Third, the IM is non-reductive and agnostic to issues of mind–body problem. Fourth, the IM model cleanly separates issues of causation from questions about the underlying mechanism. Clarifying causal influences can usefully structure the search for underlying mechanisms. Fifth, it provides a sorely needed conceptual rigor to multi-level modeling, thereby avoiding a return to uncritical holistic approaches that ‘everything is relevant’ to psychiatric illness. Sixth, the IM provides a clear way to judge both the generality and depth of explanations. In conclusion, the IM can provide a single, clear empirical framework for the evaluation of all causal claims of relevance to psychiatry and presents psychiatry with a method of avoiding the sterile metaphysical arguments about mind and brain which have preoccupied our field but yielded little of practical benefit.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0033291708004467

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  • If the association between a risk factor and disease is causal, reducing risk factor exposure will reduce rates of disease; if the association is noncausal, altering risk factor exposure will not affect illness rates.

    “As articulated by the counterfactual/interventionist theories of causation,13–15 if the association is causal, reducing risk factor exposure will reduce rates of disease. If the association is noncausal, altering risk factor exposure will not affect illness rates.”

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Authors
Kendler, K. S., & Campbell, J.
Affiliations
  • Virginia Commonwealth University (US)
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Kendler, K. S.
Venue
Psychological Medicine
Published
2008-10-10
Volume
39
Issue
6
Pages
881-887
ISSN
  • 0033-2917 (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-8978
OpenAlex
W2102971553
Cited by
173
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
FWCI
22.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Medicine (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Medicine, History, and Philosophy
Keywords
mind-body problem, non-reductionism, causal mechanisms, multilevel modeling, psychiatric research methodology, causal inference
MeSH terms
Mental Disorders, Humans, Models, Psychological, Psychophysiology, Causality, Confounding Factors, Epidemiologic

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