The Demos and Its Critics
Abstract
The “demos paradox” is the idea that the composition of a demos could never secure democratic legitimacy because the composition of a demos cannot itself be democratically decided. Those who view this problem as unsolvable argue that this insight allows them to adopt a critical perspective towards common ideas about who has legitimate standing to participate in democratic decision-making. We argue that the opposite is true and that endorsing the demos paradox actually undermines our ability to critically engage with common ideas about legitimate standing. We challenge the conception of legitimacy that lurks behind the demos paradox and argue that the real impossibility is to endorse democracy without also being committed to significant procedure-independent standards for the legitimate composition of the demos. We show that trying to solve the problem of the demos by appeal to some normative conception of democratic legitimacy is a worthwhile project that is not undermined by paradox.
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Neither the conservative nor the radical response to the boundary problem is wholly satisfactory.
“Neither of these responses seems wholly satisfactory, however”
From Reconceiving the democratic boundary problem (2020) · cites this paper as Maltais, Rosenberg and Beckman, 2019
Cites
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens
Benhabib, S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790799 · Cited by 2,180 · see citing works
Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives
GOODIN, R. E. (2007) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00098.x · Cited by 1,157 · see citing works
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Reconceiving the democratic boundary problem
Miller, D. (2020) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12707 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
- Authors
- Maltais, A., Rosenberg, J. H., & Beckman, L.
- Venue
- The Review of Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 435-457
- ISSN
- 0034-6705 (ISSN-L)
- 1748-6858
- OpenAlex
- W2963109381
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 4.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Politics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Education › Critical Theory and Political Philosophy
- Keywords
- democratic legitimacy, democratic participation, procedural democracy
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