The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Computational models and empirical constraints
Abstract
It is argued that the traditional distinction between artificial intelligence and cognitive simulation amounts to little more than a difference in style of research - a different ordering in goal priorities and different methodological allegiances. Both enterprises are constrained by empirical considerations and both are directed at understanding classes of tasks that are defined by essentially psychological criteria. Because of the different ordering of priorities, however, they occasionally take somewhat different stands on such issues as the power/generality trade-off and on the relevance of the sort of data collected in experimental psychology laboratories. Computational systems are more than a tool for checking the consistency and completeness of theoretical ideas. They are ways of empirically exploring the adequacy of methods and of discovering task demands. For psychologists, computational systems should be viewed as functional models quite independent of (and likely not reducible to) neurophysiological systems, and cast at a level of abstraction appropriate for capturing cognitive generalizations. As model objects, however, they do present a serious problem of interpretation and communication since the task of extracting the relevant theoretical principles from a large complex program may be formidable. Methodologies for validating computer programs as cognitive models are briefly described. These may be classified as intermediate state, relative complexity, and component analysis methods. Compared with the constraints imposed by criteria such as sufficiency, breadth, and extendability, these experimentally based methods are relatively weak and may be most useful after some top-down progress is made in the understanding of methods sufficient for relevant tasks - such as may be forthcoming from artificial intelligence research.
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Citations
Cites
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2 · Cited by 4,479
Dennett, D. C., & The Journal of Philosophy, I. (1971) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025382 · Cited by 994
Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity
McDermott, D. (1976) · ACM SIGART Bulletin · doi:10.1145/1045339.1045340 · Cited by 323
Cited by
Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00002053 · Cited by 1,217
Self-citationMental imagery in the motor context
Jeannerod, M. (1995) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/0028-3932(95)00073-c · Cited by 1,146
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (1998) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x98001769 · Cited by 912
From meta-processes to conscious access: Evidence from children's metalinguistic and repair data
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1986) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(86)90040-5 · Cited by 723
Ullman, S. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0000546x · Cited by 493
Metadata
- Authors
- Pylyshyn, Z. W.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-03
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 91-99
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2065207408
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 48.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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