The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Prospects for a cognitive ethology
Abstract
Ethologists and comparative psychologists have found that the social behavior, discrimination learning, and especially the communicative behavior of many animals are sufficiently versatile to call into question the customary denial that animals have mental experiences comparable to our own. Many of their behavior patterns suggest that animals have mental images of objects, events, or relationships remote from the immediate stimulus situation, as well as self-awareness and intentions concerning future actions. Our behavioristic Zeitgeist has inhibited investigation of such possibilities, but reopening these long-neglected questions requires no departure from the materialistic approach to biological and behavioral science. The basic question at issue involves a comparison of those aspects of human and nonhuman brain function that sometimes lead to what we call mental experiences, at least in our own species. It seems more feasible to devise objectively verifiable tests for the existence of these general categories of mental experiences than for that of many others. While many other kinds of evidence could well be used (with appropriate caution and all possible controls) to weigh the likelihood that animals sometimes know what they are doing, the experimental use of communicative behavior seems especially promising, because the latter could serve a function analogous to human language, which provides our best evidence about the mental experiences of our fellow men.
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Searle, J. R. (1969) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173438 · Cited by 11,718
Ryle, G. (2006) · Theories of Mind · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,809
Skinner, B. F. (1957) · doi:10.1037/11256-000 · Cited by 5,759
Wilson, E. O. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,756
The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees
Frisch, K. V. (1993) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674418776 · Cited by 2,563
Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-61891-8 · Cited by 2,196
Learning and Instinct in Animals
Kennedy, J. S., & Thorpe, W. H. (1964) · The Journal of Animal Ecology · doi:10.2307/2644 · Cited by 1,593
Snowdon, C. T. (1978) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/0003-3472(78)90127-6 · Cited by 1,239
Galaburda, A. M., LeMay, M., Kemper, T. L., & Geschwind, N. (1978) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.341314 · Cited by 856
Griffin, D. R., & Lindsay, R. B. (1958) · Cited by 855
Self-citation
Cited by
Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The “Panglossian paradigm” defended
Dennett, D. C. (1983) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00016393 · Cited by 1,046
Tactical deception in primates
Whiten, A., & Byrne, R. W. (1988) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00049682 · Cited by 860
The evolution of self-control.
MacLean, E. L., Hare, B., Nunn, C. L., Addessi, E., Amici, F., Anderson, R. C., Aureli, F., Baker, J. M., Bania, A. E., Barnard, A. M., et al. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1323533111 · Cited by 819
Maximization theory in behavioral psychology
Rachlin, H., Battalio, R., Kagel, J., & Green, L. (1981) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00009407 · Cited by 582
Ullman, S. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0000546x · Cited by 493
Metadata
- Authors
- Griffin, D. R.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-12
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 527-538
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W1999771250
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 39.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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