A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 512 of the 518 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
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In the citing paper
“Like Hurley's proposal, this theory implies that learning a model of output-input contingencies and using this model in perception is a necessary condition for consciousness.”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as O'Regan & Noë 2001
In the citing paper
“Some of these properties are emphasized by many theories; for example, sensorimotor [45], active inference [ 46], neurorepresentationalist [ 47], and midbrain [48 ] theories all emphasize l inks between agency and conscio usness.”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [45]
In the citing paper
“O'Regan and Noë (2001) further argued that perception is not something that happens to an organism but something the organism actively does.”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as O'Regan and Noë (2001)
In the citing paper
“This formulation is reminiscent of certain action-oriented or enactive appro aches to consciousness, such as sensorimotor contingency theory (O'Regan, 2011; O'Regan & Noë, 2001; see also Seth, 2014).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as O'Regan & Noë, 2001
In the citing paper
“This also ties in with a recent observation that the strong illusion of being in the place depicted by the virtual reality [24] occurs when sensorimotor contingencies for perception [25], [26] are similar to those of physical reality, that is, when a participant can use their body for perception in much the same way as normally [27].”
From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [26]
Citations
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REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
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Cited by
The Neural Basis of Decision Making
Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.113038 · Cited by 3,764
“First investigators continue to develop”
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000103 · Cited by 3,091
Place illusion and plausibility can lead to realistic behaviour in immersive virtual environments
Slater, M. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0138 · Cited by 2,691
“shifting head and gaze direction in order to see underneath something (O'Regan and Noë 2001; O'Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004).”
BackgroundGlenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196313 · Cited by 2,361
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201
Metadata
- Authors
- O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- University of California, Santa Cruz (US)
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 939-973
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2109995759
- Cited by
- 3,126
- References
- 518
- Citations by year
- 2026: 96 · 2025: 102 · 2024: 99 · 2023: 124 · 2022: 120 · 2021: 167 · 2020: 201 · 2019: 189 · 2018: 150 · 2017: 155 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 148 · 2014: 143 · 2013: 137 · 2012: 137
- FWCI
- 30.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- visual awareness, sensorimotor contingencies, internal representations, sensorimotor adaptation, visual stability, change blindness, sensory substitution, color perception, sensory modality differences
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Environment, Humans, Mental Processes, Vision, Ocular
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.