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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 129 of the 131 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research

Open access
Borsboom, Denny, Cramer, Angélique O. J., Kalis, Annemarie · 2019 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion of real patterns , and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x17002266

Cites

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Citations

Cites

Show all 131 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. 2013, No dishonour in depression, Nature
  2. Kraepelin, 1927, Psychiatrie, vol. I
  3. Kalis, 2011, Failures of agency: Irrational behavior and self-understanding
  4. 2013, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders
  5. Putnam, 1967, Art, mind, and religion
  6. Cramer, 2011, Where are the genes? The implications of a network perspective on gene hunting in psychopathology, European Journal of Personality, 25, 270
  7. Epskamp, 2018, Handbook of Psychometrics, 953
  8. Solomon, 2014, The noonday demon
  9. Tabb, 2017, Philosophical issues in psychiatry IV: Nosology, 342
  10. 10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.403 · DOI · Paper page

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Borsboom, D., Cramer, A. O. J., & Kalis, A.
Affiliations
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Tilburg University (NL)
  • Utrecht University (NL)
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2018-01-24
Volume
42
Pages
e2-e2
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2735850708
Cited by
468
References
131
Citations by year
2026: 31 · 2025: 55 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 71 · 2022: 64 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 72 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 10
FWCI
66.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Tilburg University Research Portal (publishedVersion)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
  • Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Mental Health Research Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
psychopathology, symptom networks, reductionism, mental illness, biological basis of mental disorders, intentionality, cultural context, Daniel Dennett, holistic research, levels of explanation, feedback loops, psychiatric research funding

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x17002266
The paper
Borsboom, D., Cramer, A. O. J., & Kalis, A. (2019). Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x17002266

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.