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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Abstract
John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Generative AIs are not intrinsically intentional systems, but they possess derived-intentionality, like other human creations (from simple utterances to complex technologies).”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Searle, 1983
In the citing paper
“Some other representations, in contrast, have a “world‐to‐mind” direction of fit: they do not describe how the world is, but prescribe how the world is supposed to be.”
From Conative Dissonance (2026) · cites this paper as Searle, 1983
In the citing paper
“Representations of this kind have a “mind‐to‐world” direction of fit.”
From Conative Dissonance (2026) · cites this paper as Searle, 1983
In the citing paper
“- (6)Intentionality (aboutness) (e.g., Brentano, 1874; Searle, 1983; Freeman, 2000, 2003). There are processes of representation/referral; inputs from the body and the world are “mapped” onto dynamic perception and action models that are necessary for the constitution of phenomenal consciousness.”
From The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning (2016) · cites this paper as Searle, 1983
In the citing paper
“UAL, which necessitates and encompasses such modeling, ties the models with the organism’s goals, as reflected by its bodily states and motor activities, and is therefore intentional par excellence”
From The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning (2016) · cites this paper as Searle, 1983
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Cited by
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness
Panksepp, J., & Modell, A. H. (2000) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2000.10773287 · Cited by 3,393
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Gallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery
Jeannerod, M. (1994) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00034026 · Cited by 2,569
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 · Cited by 2,166
Metadata
- Authors
- Searle, J. R.
- Corresponding author
- Searle, John R.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1983-05-31
- OpenAlex
- W4298300174
- Cited by
- 4,575
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 136 · 2025: 221 · 2024: 204 · 2023: 125 · 2022: 151 · 2021: 131 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 442 · 2018: 162 · 2017: 180 · 2016: 146 · 2015: 138 · 2014: 94 · 2013: 115 · 2012: 95
- FWCI
- 39.49
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- intentionality, John Searle, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, speech acts, perception, action, causality, meaning, reference, mind-body problem
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139173452
- The paper
- Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173452
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.