The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Naturalism and Prescriptivity
Abstract
Statements about a person's good slip into and out of our ordinary discourse about the world with nary a ripple. Such statements are objects of belief and assertion, they obey the rules of logic, and they are often defended by evidence and argument. They even participate in common-sense explanations, as when we say of some person that he has been less subject to wild swings of enthusiasm and disappointment now that, with experience, he has gained a clearer idea of what is good for him. Statements about a person's good present themselves as being about something with respect to which our beliefs can be true or false, warranted or unwarranted. Let us speak of these features as the descriptive side of discourse about a person's good.
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Cites
Johnson, K., & Nozick, R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447864 · Cited by 7,692
Nozick, R. (2018) · Princeton Readings in Political Thought · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.69 · Cited by 6,631
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
Feldman, F., & Mackie, J. L. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184791 · Cited by 5,079
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment
Gibbard, A. (1990) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001 · Cited by 2,619
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Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays
Ramsey, F. P. (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315887814 · Cited by 1,994
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone: The Parerga, Revelation, and Grace
(2017) · Kant on History and Religion · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1w1vn7j.13 · Cited by 912
Railton, P. (1986) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185589 · Cited by 885
Self-citationSteinmann, M., & Ayer, A. J. (1973) · Leonardo · doi:10.2307/1572864 · Cited by 884
Cited by
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
(2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001 · Cited by 482
CRISP, R. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x · Cited by 282
Metadata
- Authors
- Railton, P.
- Venue
- Social Philosophy and Policy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 151-174
- ISSN
- 0265-0525 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6437
- OpenAlex
- W2096221433
- Cited by
- 325
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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