Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 2,619

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment

Gibbard, Allan·1990

Abstract

`Choices can be wise or foolish, and feelings can be apt or off the mark.' Since this is how we judge, it would be good to know what content these normative judgements carry. Gibbard offers an answer, and elaborates it. His theory explores what is at issue in narrowly moral questions, and in questions of rational thought and conduct in general. It helps to explain why normative thought and talk so pervade human life, and why our highly social species might have evolved to be gripped by these questions. Gibbard asks how, if his theory is right, we can interpret our normative puzzles, and thus proceed toward finding answers to them. What claims to objectivity could we make for these answers, if once we had them? Gibbard maintains that normative philosophical inquiry is a refinement of a central human activity: working out in discussion how to live, and how to feel about things in our lives and in the lives of others. Not available from OUP in the USA, Canada or the Phillippines.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 2,619

Metadata

Authors
Gibbard, A.
Published
1990-05-17
OpenAlex
W3127139465
Cited by
2,619
References
0
FWCI
33.18
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001
The paper
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.