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The Pareto Argument for Inequality
Abstract
Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry (who themselves reject the premises that egalitarians dismiss) has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in.
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Citations
Cites
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
Rawls, J. (2001) · doi:10.2307/j.ctv31xf5v0 · Cited by 5,761
Cited by
Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice
COHEN, G. A. (1997) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.1997.tb00048.x · Cited by 825
Self-citationAmartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Social Justice in Education
(2007) · Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230604810 · Cited by 536
Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy
Hardin, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198290845.001.0001 · Cited by 318
Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing
Clayton, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199268940.001.0001 · Cited by 294
Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry
(2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490217 · Cited by 256
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, G. A.
- Venue
- Social Philosophy and Policy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1995
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 160-185
- ISSN
- 0265-0525 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6437
- OpenAlex
- W2101386627
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 21.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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