The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
Abstract
It might seem at first sight that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same and that there is no reason to distinguish them or to say that one is more fundamental than the other. This chapter shows that the fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness, and offers an analysis of the concept of justice from this point of view. It argues that it is the aspect of justice for which utilitarianism, in its classical form, is unable to account, but which is expressed, even if misleadingly, by the idea of the social contract. The chapter develops a particular conception of justice by stating and commenting upon two principles which specify it and by considering the circumstances and conditions under which they may be thought to arise. It considers justice only as a virtue of social institutions, or what is called as practices.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Thus, even without agreement about the fundamental nature of morality, people may still come to a principled agreement about values and standards that are appropriate for a given subject matter or domain.”
From Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020) · cites this paper as Rawls 2001, 32
In the citing paper
“this is based on moral and ethical considerations such as the need for mutual recognition, respect, and reciprocity (which in turn enhances deliberation), as well as fairness.”
From Deepfakes and Democracy (Theory): How Synthetic Audio-Visual Media for Disinformation and Hate Speech Threaten Core Democratic Functions (2022) · cites this paper as Rawls, 2001
In the citing paper
“If α → 0 and αg → 1, we instead minimize the largest group risk (2) [30, 57], which aligns with the maximin principle [58].”
From Improving Fairness in Deepfake Detection (2024) · doi:10.1109/wacv57701.2024.00459 · cites this paper as [58]
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Cited by
Sen, A., & Foster, J. (1973) · doi:10.1093/0198281935.001.0001 · Cited by 3,429
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change
Galanter, M. (1974) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053023 · Cited by 2,799
Braveman, P., & Gruskin, S. (2003) · Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health · doi:10.1136/jech.57.4.254 · Cited by 1,826
Roemer, J. E. (2008) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_493 · Cited by 1,396
Achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals: An enabling role for accounting research
Bebbington, J., & Unerman, J. (2018) · Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal · doi:10.1108/aaaj-05-2017-2929 · Cited by 1,022
Metadata
- Authors
- Rawls, J.
- Corresponding author
- Rawls, John
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Published
- 2001-05-16
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 13-164
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2320528271
- Cited by
- 5,761
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 372 · 2025: 379 · 2024: 379 · 2023: 295 · 2022: 267 · 2021: 318 · 2020: 269 · 2019: 555 · 2018: 251 · 2017: 190 · 2016: 246 · 2015: 230 · 2014: 223 · 2013: 204 · 2012: 199
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Harvard University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- SAGE Publications Ltd eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies
- Keywords
- justice, fairness, utilitarianism, social contract, principles of justice, social institutions, justice as virtue, political philosophy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/j.ctv31xf5v0
- The paper
- Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv31xf5v0
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.