An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A search is under way for a theory that can accommodate our intuitions in population axiology. The object of this search has proved elusive. This is not surprising since, as we shall see, any welfarist axiology that satisfies three reasonable conditions implies at least one of three counter-intuitive conclusions. I shall start by pointing out the failures in three recent attempts to construct an acceptable population axiology. I shall then present an impossibility theorem and conclude with a short discussion of how it might be extended to pluralist axiologies, that is, axiologies that take more values than welfare into account.
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“Similar problems have been modelled for ethical choices that involve various levels of welfare and population size (Arrhenius 2000).”
From Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020) · cites this paper as Arrhenius 2000
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Cites
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What Should We Do About Future Generations?: Impossibility of Parfit's Theory X
Ng, Y.-K. (1989) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100002406 · Cited by 236
Critical-Level Utilitarianism and the Population-Ethics Dilemma
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., & Donaldson, D. J. (1997) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s026626710000448x · Cited by 157
Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics
Carlson, E. (1998) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100003862 · Cited by 130 · cited 3×
“For a discussion of this issue in connection with the Repugnant Conclusion, see Fehige (1998), TaÈnnsjoÈ (1998) and Arrhenius (1999).”
BackgroundGoodness is Reducible to Betterness: The Evil of Death is the Value of Life
Broome, J. (1993) · Ethical economy · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-78584-9_4 · Cited by 115
Cited by
Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment
Gabriel, I. (2020) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09539-2 · Cited by 896
“Similar problems have been modelled for ethical choices that involve various levels of welfare and population size (Arrhenius, 2000).”
BackgroundBroome, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/019924376x.001.0001 · Cited by 511
The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism
Eggleston, B., Miller, D. E., Eggleston, B., Bykvist, K., Crimmins, J. E., Crisp, R., Driver, J., Heathwood, C., Heydt, C., Hooker, B., et al. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139096737 · Cited by 205
Huemer, M. (2008) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzn079 · Cited by 200
“2See Anglin 1977; Sikora 1978; 1981; Ng 1990, pp. 191–3; Attfield 1991, pp. 127–30; Ryberg 1996; Fotion 1997; Tännsjö 2002; and Broome 2004, pp. 210–14.”
Chapter 11 Utilitarianism and the theory of justice
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., & Donaldson, D. J. (2002) · Handbook of social choice and welfare · doi:10.1016/s1574-0110(02)80015-7 · Cited by 175
“More general impossibility results are reported in Arrhenius (1997), Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey (1998), Blackorby and Donaldson (1991), Carlson (1998) and Ng (1989).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Arrhenius, G.
- Affiliations
- Uppsala University (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Arrhenius, Gustaf
- ORCID
- Arrhenius, Gustaf
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 247-266
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W2172065445
- Semantic Scholar
- a6d598dc002f8f25fbacdb5a17845be1b3f7ed92
- Cited by
- 260
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 5.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Economics and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- welfarism, impossibility theorem, counterfactual reasoning, population ethics, axiomatic foundations
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- The paper
- Arrhenius, G. (2000). An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies. Economics and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100000249
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