The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective preferences, obligations, and rational choice.
Abstract
Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?
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“In such cases, there is room for “rational deviation” (Gilbert, 2001) from the collective goals and preferences.”
From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Gilbert, 2001
Citations
Cites
Convention: A Philosophical Study.
Llewelyn, J. E., & Lewis, D. K. (1970) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2218418 · Cited by 3,119
Aumann, R. J. (1976) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654 · Cited by 2,502
Gilbert, M. (1989) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 856
Self-citationGilbert, M. (1987) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485446 · Cited by 503
Self-citationSociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory
Gilbert, M. P. (2000) · Cited by 364
Self-citationAgreements, Coercion, and Obligation
Gilbert, M. P. (1993) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/293548 · Cited by 225
Self-citationGilbert, M. (1981) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf01064466 · Cited by 71
Self-citationReconsidering the “Actual Contract” Theory of Political Obligation
Gilbert, M. P. (1999) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233895 · Cited by 46
Self-citationMe, you, and us: Distinguishing “egoism,” “altruism,” and “groupism”
Gilbert, M. (1994) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00036256 · Cited by 8
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12
“It was analyzed by the social psychologist Irving Janis in terms of a paradigmatic instance of what he famously coined “groupthink” 13Cf. also Gilbert (2001), who convincingly argues against Sugden (2000) for the stronger claim that “collective preferences” give sufficient normative reasons for the…”
BackgroundMethod
Metadata
- Authors
- Gilbert, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Connecticut (US)
- Corresponding author
- Gilbert, Margaret
- ORCID
- Gilbert, Margaret
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 109-119
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W3125087393
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 19.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Economics and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- group preferences, collective choice, rational choice, obligation, teams, collectivity, individual preferences, family preferences, preference aggregation
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