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Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result
Open accessAbstract
Suppose that the members of a certain group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions. And imagine that the group itself now has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that difficulty illustrates. Our paper describes this impossibility result and provides an exploration of its significance. The result naturally invites comparison with Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem (Arrow, 1963 and 1984; Sen, 1970) and we elaborate that comparison in a companion paper (List and Pettit, 2002).
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Cited by
Unpredictability of AI: On the Impossibility of Accurately Predicting All Actions of a Smarter Agent
Yampolskiy, R. V. (2020) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s2705078520500034 · Cited by 42
The New Ochlophobia?: Populism, Majority Rule, and Prospects for Democratic Republicanism
McCormick, J. P. (2019) · Republicanism and the Future of Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108630153.008 · Cited by 15
(2011) · RUCforsk (Roskilde University) · Cited by 5
Must group agents be rational? List and Pettit’s theory of judgement aggregation and group agency.
Sugden, R. (2012) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267112000181 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- List, C., & Pettit, P.
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002-03-14
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 89-110
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W2162359459
- Cited by
- 619
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 29.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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