The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Must group agents be rational? List and Pettit’s theory of judgement aggregation and group agency.
Abstract
As a writing partnership, Christian List and Philip Pettit are probably best known for a paper in Economics and Philosophy that describes and generalizes the ‘discursive dilemma’ (List and Pettit 2002). That paper is one of the main points of reference for what is now a large literature on the aggregation of judgements – a literature to which List and Pettit have continued to contribute, individually and jointly. Their new book Group Agency reviews and synthesizes that body of work, and proposes an analysis of group agency in which the aggregation of judgements plays a central role.
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Given the three requirements, there is also room for genuinely collective and organizational forms of SI, whose subjects would be fully fledged group or corporate agents rather than collaborating individuals.
“However, I contend that given our three requirements there is also room for genuinely collective and organizational forms of SI. The subjects of akrasia and self-deception would then not be collaborating individuals but fully fledged group or corporate agents (Pettit, 2003a; cf. Sugden, 2012).”
From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Sugden, 2012
Citations
Cites
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Austen‐Smith, D., & Banks, J. S. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082796 · Cited by 1,105
Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result
List, C., & Pettit, P. N. (2002) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267102001098 · Cited by 625
Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior
Sugden, R. (1993) · Social Philosophy and Policy · doi:10.1017/s0265052500004027 · Cited by 384
Self-citationKornhauser, L. A., & Sager, L. G. (1986) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/796436 · Cited by 334
Anderson, E. (2001) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267101000128 · Cited by 107
HUME'S NON-INSTRUMENTAL AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL DECISION THEORY
Sugden, R. (2006) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267106001027 · Cited by 28
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Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12
“Notice, however, that discursive dilemmas are not irrational in any of the discussed senses here; cf., however, Sugden (2012).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Sugden, R.
- Affiliations
- University of East Anglia (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Sugden, Robert
- ORCID
- Sugden, Robert
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2012-07
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 265-273
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W2157865032
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Economics and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- collective agency, judgment aggregation, discursive dilemma, rationality, group decision making, social choice
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