The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERATURE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
Abstract
We provide a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature, which we characterize in terms of the view that Ellsberg choices are rational responses to ambiguity, to be explained by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. First, admitting Ellsberg choices as rational leads to behaviour, such as sensitivity to irrelevant sunk cost, or aversion to information, which most economists would consider absurd or irrational. Second, we argue that the mathematical objects referred to as “beliefs” in the ambiguity aversion literature have little to do with how an economist or game theorist understands and uses the concept. This is because of the lack of a useful notion of updating. Third, the anomaly of the Ellsberg choices can be explained simply and without tampering with the foundations of choice theory. These choices can arise when decision makers form heuristics that serve them well in real-life situations where odds are manipulable, and misapply them to experimental settings.
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Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
Jeffreys, H., Moran, P. A. P., & Chatfield, C. (1922) · Nature · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198503682.001.0001 · Cited by 7,878
(2001) · Empirical Direction in Design and Analysis · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,808
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
Gilboa, I., & Schmeidler, D. (1989) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(89)90018-9 · Cited by 4,040
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Game theory: analysis of conflict
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.29-2753 · Cited by 3,325
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization
Strotz, R. H. (1955) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2295722 · Cited by 2,834 · cited 1×
“• In the case of temptation preferences, as in the classic work of Strotz (1956), the source of temptation is psychological urges that have an independent motivation.”
BackgroundMyopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization
Strotz, R. H. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_10 · Cited by 2,743
Cited by
DECISION THEORY UNDER AMBIGUITY
Etner, J., Jeleva, M., & Tallon, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2010.00641.x · Cited by 309
Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty
Aldred, J. (2013) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.10.006 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Al-Najjar, N. I., & Weinstein, J.
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-11
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 249-284
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W2125674100
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 9.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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