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Cited by 16Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophical Ethics and Theory

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

X. Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception

Mele, Alfred R.·2003·Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
DOI 10.1017/s1358246100007955
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Abstract

According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceivers intentionally deceive others into believing something,p, and there is a time at which the deceivers believe that p is false while their victims falsely believe that p is true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something,p, and there is a time at which they believe that p is false while also believing that p is true.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1017/s1358246100007955

Cites

37 of 37 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Trivers, 1985, Social Evolution
  2. Schwarz, 1990, Handbook of Motivation and Cognition, 2
  3. Nisbett, 1980, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement
  4. Mele, 1987, Irrationality
  5. Bower, 2000, Cognition and Emotion

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Metadata

Authors
Mele, A. R.
Corresponding author
Mele, Alfred R.
ORCID
Mele, Alfred R.
Venue
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2003-03
Volume
52
Pages
163-179
ISSN
  • 1358-2461 (ISSN-L)
  • 1755-3555
DOI
10.1017/s1358246100007955
OpenAlex
W1997028290
Cited by
16
References
37
Citations by year
2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2013: 1
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 2505 d)
Locations
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
self-deception, emotions, desire, intentional deception, interpersonal deception, false belief, self-knowledge

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