The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis
Abstract
For individuals to enter mutually beneficial exchange relationships they have to recognise them as such and they have to be able to commit to fulfil their contractual obligations. The ways in which a society's institutions mitigate this fundamental problem of exchange determine its efficiency and distribution. This article calls attention to the need, ability, and promise of studying the historical evolution of institutions that mitigated the fundamental problem of exchange. It elaborates on the essence of this problem and the related institutions, and demonstrates the ability and importance of studying them by drawing on various studies of historical institutions. Our understanding of the different economic performances and evolutions of various societies over time can be greatly enhanced by studying how they mitigated the fundamental problem of exchange.
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Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Munger, M. C., & North, D. C. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060065 · Cited by 24,871
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Self-citationContract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition
Greif, A. (1993) · American Economic Review · Cited by 2,192
Self-citationReputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders
Greif, A. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009475 · Cited by 1,420
Self-citationCoordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. R. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261953 · Cited by 1,220
Self-citation
Cited by
BROADBERRY, S., & GUPTA, B. (2006) · The Economic History Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0289.2005.00331.x · Cited by 372
Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model
Orr, R. J., & Scott, W. R. (2008) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400370 · Cited by 369
Legacies of violence: trust and market development
Cassar, A., Grosjean, P., & Whitt, S. (2013) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-013-9091-3 · Cited by 313
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?
Greif, A., & Kingston, C. (2011) · Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8_2 · Cited by 270
Self-citationMedieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution *
Cantoni, D., & Yuchtman, N. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju007 · Cited by 221
Metadata
- Authors
- Greif, A.
- Venue
- European Review of Economic History
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-12-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 251-284
- ISSN
- 1361-4916 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0044
- OpenAlex
- W2100304815
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 6.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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