The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy
Open accessAbstract
Gridlock in the multilateral climate negotiations has created growing scholarly and practical interest in the use of minilateral forums. A large variety of climate club proposals have been developed in recent years, which promise more effective bargaining among the main climate powers, better incentives to encourage mitigation efforts and discourage free-riding, and new ways to align international power asymmetries with the interests of the global climate regime. I investigate the three dominant rationales that underpin minilateralist proposals. I offer a critical review of their potential as well as their limitations in promoting global climate action. I argue that minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious international climate agreement. However, climate clubs can enhance political dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and can provide a more conducive environment for great power bargaining. They can create club benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and help reduce the dangers of free-riding for so-called coalitions of the willing. And they can help re-legitimate the global climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations.
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Cites
Crutzen, P. J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415023a · Cited by 4,788
The Regime Complex for Climate Change
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592710004068 · Cited by 2,047
Advantages of a polycentric approach to climate change policy
Cole, D. H. (2015) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate2490 · Cited by 345
A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big Difference in Addressing Climate Change?
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Cited by
Governing Climate Change: Polycentricity in Action?
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Cooperation and discord in global climate policy
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2016) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate2937 · Cited by 401
A Polycentric Approach to Global Climate Governance
Dorsch, M. J., & Flachsland, C. (2017) · Global Environmental Politics · doi:10.1162/glep_a_00400 · Cited by 257
A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Angelsen, A., Baranzini, A., Botzen, W. J. W., Carattini, S., Drews, S., Dunlop, T., Galbraith, E., Gsottbauer, E., Howarth, R. B., et al. (2020) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2020.1797618 · Cited by 50
Equity and Justice in Polycentric Climate Governance
Okereke, C. (2018) · Governing Climate Change · doi:10.1017/9781108284646.019 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Falkner, R.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2016-03
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87-101
- ISSN
- 1537-5927 (ISSN-L)
- 1541-0986
- OpenAlex
- W2231144501
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 43.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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