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“Decisions from experience” = sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004)
Open accessAbstract
According to prospect theory, people overweight low probability events and underweight high probability events. Several recent papers (notably, Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004) have argued that although this pattern holds for “description-based” decisions, in which people are explicitly provided with probability distributions over potential outcomes, it is actually reversed in “experience-based” decisions, in which people must learn these distributions through sampling. We reanalyze the data of Hertwig et al. (2004) and present a replication to determine the extent to which their phenomenon can be attributed to sampling error (a statistical rather than psychological phenomenon) versus underestimation of rare events (i.e., judgmental bias) versus actual underweighting of judged probabilities. We find that the apparent reversal of prospect theory in decisions from experience can be attributed almost entirely to sampling error, and are consistent with prospect theory and the two-stage model of decision under uncertainty (Fox & Tversky, 1998).
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Cited by
The description–experience gap in risky choice
Hertwig, R., & Erev, I. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.09.004 · Cited by 911
New paradoxes of risky decision making.
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.2.463 · Cited by 386
Neural Response to Reward Anticipation under Risk Is Nonlinear in Probabilities
Hsu, M., Krajbich, I., Zhao, C., & Camerer, C. F. (2009) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.5296-08.2009 · Cited by 280
Are Probabilities Overweighted or Underweighted When Rare Outcomes Are Experienced (Rarely)?
Ungemach, C., Chater, N., & Stewart, N. (2009) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02319.x · Cited by 276
Lessons for artificial intelligence from the study of natural stupidity
Rich, A. S., & Gureckis, T. M. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0038-z · Cited by 94
Metadata
- Authors
- Fox, C. R., & Hadar, L.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-11
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 159-161
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2145103288
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 6.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Fox, C. R., & Hadar, L. (2006). “Decisions from experience” = sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004). Judgment and Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500002370
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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