Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Behavioral-finance research identifies mechanisms and regularities that motivate interpretable operationalizations of risk response, experience, memory, and reference dependence (Tversky and Kahneman 1992;Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001;Malmendier andNagel 2011, 2016;Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2020;Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2018;Cohn et al. 2015).”
From FinPerMA: A Theory-Informed, Event-Grounded Personalized-Memory Benchmark for LLM Agents (2026) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman 1992
In the citing paper
“According to the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), consumers’ purchase intention is based on a full comparison of various decision-making factors.”
From How Live Streaming Features Impact Consumers’ Purchase Intention in the Context of Cross-Border E-Commerce? A Research Based on SOR Theory (2021) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman, 1992
In the citing paper
“In the “cross-border e-commerce + live streaming” environment, consumers’ immersive shopping experience and the rich information provided by sellers are all subtly affecting consumers’ perception, which will increase the overall perceived value and reduce the overall perceived uncertainty of consumers.”
From How Live Streaming Features Impact Consumers’ Purchase Intention in the Context of Cross-Border E-Commerce? A Research Based on SOR Theory (2021) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman, 1992
In the citing paper
“Prospect theory explains that people value gains and losses differently, placing more weight on perceived gains versus perceived losses.”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [87]
In the citing paper
“Prospect Theory suggests that uncertainty (or risk) is not considered independently but together with the expected outcome [61,125].”
From Uncertainty as a Form of Transparency: Measuring, Communicating, and Using Uncertainty (2021) · cites this paper as [125]
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Self-citationProspect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Self-citation“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
(2001) · Empirical Direction in Design and Analysis · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,808
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
Self-citationLoss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432 · cited 3×
“Essentially the same condition was used by Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) in the analysis of preference reversal, and by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) in the characterization of constant loss aversion.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationJudgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Self-citationKahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2013) · World Scientific Handbook in Financial Economics Series · doi:10.1142/9789814417358_0016 · Cited by 5,320
Self-citationMoffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Wakker, Peter P. (1990). ?Separating Marginal Utility and Risk Aversion.? Unpublished manuscript, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Cited by
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Self-citationA perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
“…sharply kinked at the reference point and loss averse—steeper for losses than for gains by a factor of about 2–2.5 (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); and (d) several studies suggest that the functions in the two domains are fairly well approximated by power functions…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationIndividual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 2,762
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Published
- 1992-10
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 297-323
- ISSN
- 0895-5646 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0476
- OpenAlex
- W2041946752
- Cited by
- 15,467
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 693 · 2025: 865 · 2024: 887 · 2023: 855 · 2022: 893 · 2021: 945 · 2020: 841 · 2019: 972 · 2018: 827 · 2017: 743 · 2016: 658 · 2015: 764 · 2014: 624 · 2013: 601 · 2012: 549
- FWCI
- 25.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Keywords
- cumulative prospect theory, decision weights, uncertainty, risky prospects, value function, weight functions, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion, risk preferences, gain and loss, axiomatic analysis
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/bf00122574
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- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.