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Cited by 1,302Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsSocial and Intergroup PsychologyClimate Change Communication and Perception

Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection

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Kahan, Dan M.·2013·Judgment and Decision Making
DOI 10.1017/s1930297500005271
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Abstract

Decision scientists have identified various plausible sources of ideological polarization over climate change, gun violence, national security, and like issues that turn on empirical evidence. This paper describes a study of three of them: the predominance of heuristic-driven information processing by members of the public; ideologically motivated reasoning; and the cognitive-style correlates of political conservativism. The study generated both observational and experimental data inconsistent with the hypothesis that political conservatism is distinctively associated with either unreflective thinking or motivated reasoning. Conservatives did no better or worse than liberals on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), an objective measure of information-processing dispositions associated with cognitive biases. In addition, the study found that ideologically motivated reasoning is not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic or intuitive forms of reasoning generally. On the contrary, subjects who scored highest in cognitive reflection were the most likely to display ideologically motivated cognition. These findings corroborated an alternative hypothesis, which identifies ideologically motivated cognition as a form of information processing that promotes individuals’ interests in forming and maintaining beliefs that signify their loyalty to important affinity groups. The paper discusses the practical significance of these findings, including the need to develop science communication strategies that shield policy-relevant facts from the influences that turn them into divisive symbols of political identity.

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  • The negative influence/backfire effect is elusive, with limited relevance for politics outside the laboratory; while we may be less influenced by political opponents, we are unlikely to be negatively influenced by them.

    “This has brought researchers to conclude that negative influence effect is elusive, with limited relevance for politics outside the laboratory (88, 90, 93–95): while we may be less influenced by our political opponents, we are unlikely to be negatively influenced by them.”

    From How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting (2022) · cites this paper as [94]

    Section 5.1 reports ideologically motivated reasoning in an experiment, and Section 3.3 discusses how biased assessment of evidence might polarize beliefs. Neither passage addresses whether messages from political opponents cause a negative influence or backfire effect, or whether such an effect is rare outside the laboratory. Searches for those terms and for opposing-message effects found no passage settling the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)

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Authors
Kahan, D. M.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Corresponding author
Kahan, Dan M.
ORCID
Kahan, Dan M.
Venue
Judgment and Decision Making
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2013-07
Volume
8
Issue
4
Pages
407-424
ISSN
1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1017/s1930297500005271
OpenAlex
W175458479
Cited by
1,302
References
110
Citations by year
2026: 128 · 2025: 123 · 2024: 125 · 2023: 120 · 2022: 122 · 2021: 111 · 2020: 125 · 2019: 118 · 2018: 110 · 2017: 81 · 2016: 70 · 2015: 45 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 1
FWCI
33.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Judgment and Decision Making (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (0922714)
  • Yale University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
Keywords
ideological polarization, motivated reasoning, cognitive reflection, political conservatism, heuristic reasoning, cognitive biases, group loyalty, science communication, climate change, gun violence, national security, political identity

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