Cited by 4,344Social and Intergroup PsychologyDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsElectoral Systems and Political Participation

Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs

Taber, Charles S., Lodge, Milton·2006·American Journal of Political Science

Abstract

We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased‐information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self‐select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t 2 over t 1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x

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6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Decades of research on motivated reasoning show that people tend to select and interpret factual information in a way that reinforces their identity and attitudes rather than challenging them.

    “Decades of research on motivated reasoning have shown unambiguously that people tend to select and interpret factual information in a way that reinforces their identity and attitudes rather than challenging them (e.g., Taber and Lodge, 2006).”
  • The mixed effects of manifest transparency may partly reflect motivated reasoning, in which people interpret government information to confirm prior beliefs.

    “In addition, the mixed effects of manifest transparency may be a reflection in part of processes of motivated reasoning (James & Van Ryzin, 2016); that is, people may interpret information about government in ways that simply confirm and thus strengthen their prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006).”
  • Prior work utilizes observational data to examine the relationship between domain-specific knowledge and attitude polarization.

    “Despite the causal nature of the arguments described above, prior work utilizes observational data to examine the relationship between domain-specific knowledge and attitude polarization.”

    From Factual knowledge can reduce attitude polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [17]

  • People may process information in a manner consistent with their partisan identities, prior beliefs, and motivations (motivated cognition).

    “People may process information in a manner that is consistent with their partisan identities, prior beliefs, and motivations, a process known as motivated cognition (34–37).”

    From Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media (2021) · cites this paper as [36]

  • Uncertainty may create especially fertile ground for confirmation bias and directional motivated reasoning because ambiguity, controversy, doubt, or imprecision may inherently allow for diverse interpretations.

    “Uncertainty may create especially fertile ground for confirmation bias and directional motivated reasoning (Nickerson, 1998;Taber and Lodge, 2006) because ambiguity, controversy, doubt, or imprecision may inherently allow for diverse interpretations (Chang, 2012(Chang, , 2015;;Jacques et al., 2008;McCright and Dunlap, 2003;Oreskes and Conway, 2011).”

    From A review of the effects of uncertainty in public science communication (2020) · cites this paper as Taber and Lodge, 2006

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Authors
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M.
Affiliations
Stony Brook University (US)
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2006-06-21
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
755-769
ISSN
  • 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-5907
OpenAlex
W2132490153
Cited by
4,344
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 305 · 2025: 368 · 2024: 389 · 2023: 293 · 2022: 465 · 2021: 352 · 2020: 409 · 2019: 320 · 2018: 274 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 177 · 2015: 158 · 2014: 134 · 2013: 134 · 2012: 94
FWCI
101.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
American Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
political beliefs, confirmation bias, attitude polarization, prior attitudes, counterargument, political sophistication, argument evaluation, affirmative action, gun control, democratic rationality

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