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Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

Abstract

While they usually should, people do not revise their beliefs more to expert (economist) opinion than to lay opinion. The present research sought to better understand the factors that make it more likely for an individual to change their mind when faced with the opinions of expert economists versus the general public. Across five studies we examined the role that overestimation of knowledge plays in this behavior. We replicated the finding that people fail to privilege the opinion of experts over the public across two different (Study 1) and five different (Study 5) economic issues. We further find that undermining an illusion of both topic-relevant (Studies 2–4) and -irrelevant knowledge (Studies 3 and 4) leads to greater normative belief revision in response to expert rather than lay opinion. We suggest one reason that people fail to revise their beliefs more in response to experts is because people think they know more than they really do.

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. 10.1037/0022-3514.61.6.923 · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.6.923 · Paper page

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Metadata

Authors
Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J.
Affiliations
University of Waterloo (CA)
Corresponding author
Meyers, Ethan A.
Venue
Judgment and Decision Making
Published
2020-11
Volume
15
Issue
6
Pages
909-925
ISSN
1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2974363303
Cited by
23
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3
FWCI
2.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Judgment and Decision Making (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • UWSpace (University of Waterloo) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
belief revision, expert opinion, economists, overconfidence, illusion of knowledge, trust in experts, economic forecasting

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s1930297500008135
The paper
Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2020). Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion. Judgment and Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008135

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.