Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Abstract
While they usually should, people do not revise their beliefs more to expert (economist) opinion than to lay opinion. The present research sought to better understand the factors that make it more likely for an individual to change their mind when faced with the opinions of expert economists versus the general public. Across five studies we examined the role that overestimation of knowledge plays in this behavior. We replicated the finding that people fail to privilege the opinion of experts over the public across two different (Study 1) and five different (Study 5) economic issues. We further find that undermining an illusion of both topic-relevant (Studies 2–4) and -irrelevant knowledge (Studies 3 and 4) leads to greater normative belief revision in response to expert rather than lay opinion. We suggest one reason that people fail to revise their beliefs more in response to experts is because people think they know more than they really do.
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“For example, people tend to confidently overestimate how much they know about various phenomena - such as how a zip fastener works, how snow forms or how a helicopter takes flight - and become aware of their lack of knowledge only after failing to explain the phenomenon 61-64 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [63]
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“In a series of studies, people overestimated their self- reported knowledge of a policy less after writing a detailed explanation of how that policy works, thereby recognizing that their knowledge of the policy was less complete than they originally thought (overcoming the 'illusion of understanding') 63,121,122 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [63]
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Cited by
Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility
Porter, T., Elnakouri, A., Meyers, E. A., Shibayama, T., Jayawickreme, E., & Grossmann, I. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00081-9 · Cited by 248
Self-citationKnowledge overconfidence is associated with anti-consensus views on controversial scientific issues
Light, N., Fernbach, P. M., Rabb, N., Geana, M., & Sloman, S. A. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abo0038 · Cited by 119
“This has been shown to reduce subjective knowledge ( 33 , 44 ) and increase deference to experts ( 45 ).”
Lackner, S., Francisco, F., Mendonça, C., Mata, A., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2023) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-023-01677-8 · Cited by 49
Welker, K. M., Duong, M., Rakhshani, A. C., Dieffenbach, M. C., Coleman, P. T., & Haidt, J. (2023) · Journal of Social and Political Psychology · doi:10.5964/jspp.10651 · Cited by 29
“After being prompted to write a detailed explanation of how a topic works, participants were less likely to overestimate their own knowledge of that topic (Fernbach et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2016; Meyers et al., 2020).”
BackgroundIs political extremism supported by an illusion of understanding?
Sloman, S. A., & Vives, M. (2022) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105146 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Waterloo (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Meyers, Ethan A.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2020-11
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 909-925
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2974363303
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3
- FWCI
- 2.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Judgment and Decision Making (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- UWSpace (University of Waterloo) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- belief revision, expert opinion, economists, overconfidence, illusion of knowledge, trust in experts, economic forecasting
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- Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2020). Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion. Judgment and Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008135
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.