Rational ignorance, rational voter expectations, and public policy: A discrete informational foundation for fiscal illusion
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government.
“Therefore, most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government”
From Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment (2021) · cites this paper as Congleton, 2001
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 44 · Cited by 83
- Authors
- Congleton, R. D.
- Affiliations
- George Mason University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Congleton, Roger D.
- ORCID
- Congleton, Roger D.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 35-64
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2151478664
- Cited by
- 83
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 3.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Public Choice (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- rational ignorance, fiscal illusion, voter expectations, public policy, electoral competition, voter information, candidate positions, marginal rate of substitution
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review