Cited by 83Fiscal Policies and Political EconomyPolitics, Economics, and Education PolicyElectoral Systems and Political Participation

Rational ignorance, rational voter expectations, and public policy: A discrete informational foundation for fiscal illusion

Congleton, Roger D.·2001·Public Choice

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Crossref · 10.1023/a:1010337412291

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  • Most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government.

    “Therefore, most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government”

    From Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment (2021) · cites this paper as Congleton, 2001

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References 44 · Cited by 83

Authors
Congleton, R. D.
Affiliations
George Mason University (US)
Corresponding author
Congleton, Roger D.
Venue
Public Choice
Published
2001-04
Volume
107
Issue
1-2
Pages
35-64
ISSN
  • 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-7101
OpenAlex
W2151478664
Cited by
83
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 4
FWCI
3.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Public Choice (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
rational ignorance, fiscal illusion, voter expectations, public policy, electoral competition, voter information, candidate positions, marginal rate of substitution

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