Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment
Open accessAbstract
Does providing information improve citizens’ perception of government transparency? Does all information matter the same for shaping perceptions about the government? This article addresses these questions in the context of an online randomized survey experiment conducted in Argentina. Results show that providing information to citizens matters for shaping perceptions about transparency, and the content of that information matters for affecting the evaluation people make about the government. Those who received a treatment showing that the government was over-performing on its promises had higher trust in the government than those who received a treatment showing that the government was under-performing. The evidence highlights that the relationship between transparency and trust may be mediated by the performance of the government. Our complementary analytical discussion shows that the rules for disclosing information may be important for transparency to matter.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
An online randomized survey experiment in Buenos Aires finds that actively providing information raises perceived government transparency, and that information content about performance matters more for trust than whether the message is framed as efficiency or empathy. The results suggest transparency’s link to trust is mediated by perceived government performance.
Key findings
- Providing information about government commitments increased the perception that the government reports what it plans to do by about 8 to 9 percentage points, an increase of more than 10%.
- Framing did not significantly change trust: there were no relative differences in trust between an “efficiency-based” framing and an “empathy-based” framing.
- Performance content mattered: those shown that the government was over-performing had higher trust than those shown under-performance, with a difference equivalent to about 0.10 of a standard deviation.
- Effects were concentrated among those with no previous exposure to the commitments; about 43% of respondents were first exposed, and the treatment × first-exposure coefficient for trust was 0.300 (p < 0.01).
Methods
- Online randomized survey experiment conducted in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, between December 2017 and January 2018, with 1,999 complete interviews stratified by gender, age, socioeconomic status, and commune.
- Participants were randomized first between control and information treatment, then assigned to one of three vignettes: T1 empathy and positive results, T2 efficiency and positive results, T3 empathy and negative results.
- Analysis used OLS regressions with controls, principal component analysis to construct trust indices (competence, benevolence, honesty, confidence, and overall trust), and robustness checks including multiple-testing corrections and alternative index definitions.
Limitations
- The paper states that treatment differences were “not that stark” and respondents had to analyze figures to infer performance, so stronger cues could have larger effects; this remains an open question.
- The paper calls for future studies on optimal disclosure, rules versus endogenous disclosure, and contexts where performance does or does not matter.
- Evident from the text: the sample is from one city and relies on self-reported perceptions in an online survey, so findings may not generalize to other populations or settings.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
4 of 27 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationcitation
Performing the experiment in a country where overall levels of trust are very low expands the existing evidence and the understanding of the phenomenon.
“Performing the experiment in a country where overall levels of trust are very low expands the existing evidence and the understanding of the phenomenon (Cucciniello et al. (2017)).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Cucciniello et al. (2017) source
The sections “Replicate Studies across Different Administrative Contexts” and “Replicate Studies Using Different Methods” say that research in new contexts and experimental replication can improve understanding of transparency’s effects. They do not identify a country with very low overall trust or specifically establish low trust as the condition that makes this experiment an addition to the evidence. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Rests on an assumption: The online survey sample is representative of the adult population of the City of Buenos Aires.
- Findingown data
About 43% of respondents were uninformed (first exposure) about the government commitments despite the existence of a dedicated website and public announcement.
“Interestingly, despite the existence of a dedicated website and public announcement of commitments, plenty of people are uninformed -first exposure-about the government commitments (about 43%)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Individuals who received information that the government was over-performing on its commitments had higher trust in the government than those who received information that it was under-performing.
“Those who received a treatment showing that the government was over-performing on its promises had higher trust in the government than those who received a treatment showing that the government was under-performing.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“The group that received information where the government was over-performing on its goals showed significantly higher trust than those who received information that the government was underperforming on its goals.”
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
“The first and last bars are statistically different from each other (we don't compare the second and third because both components are changing).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
- Rests on an assumption: The online survey sample is representative of the adult population of the City of Buenos Aires.
- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Rests on an assumption: The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
- Findingown data
Citizens' perceptions about transparency increase regardless of the framing and content of the message.
“Results in those columns show that the magnitude and the significance is the same for every informative treatment (we cannot reject the hypotheses that the coefficients are the same).”
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
“That is, citizens' perceptions about transparency increase regardless of the framing and content of the message.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
- Findingown data
The content of the information about government performance affects the evaluation people make about the government.
“the content of that information matters for affecting the evaluation people make about the government”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
“differences in performance seem to matter”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“The group that received information where the government was over-performing on its goals showed significantly higher trust than those who received information that the government was underperforming on its goals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
- Rests on an assumption: The online survey sample is representative of the adult population of the City of Buenos Aires.
- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Rests on an assumption: The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
- Findingown data
Providing information about government commitments to citizens increases the perception that the government reports what it plans to do by about 8 to 9 percentage points (an increase of more than 10 percent).
“Results show that providing information to citizens matters for shaping perceptions about transparency”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“Results show that providing/disclosing information increases the perception about how transparent the government is by about 8 percentage points, which implies an increase of more than 10 percent.”
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
“Basically, an individual that is presented with the information about the government commitments is about 8 to 9 percentage points more likely to indicate that he believes that the government reports what it plans to do than an individual in the control group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The online survey sample is representative of the adult population of the City of Buenos Aires.
- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
- Findingown data
The difference in trust between the positive and negative performance treatments is equivalent to about 0.10 of a standard deviation.
“The difference is equivalent to about 0.10 of a standard deviation.”
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
“The difference between the ''positive”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
- Findingown data
There are no relative differences in trust between an efficiency-based framing and an empathy-based framing.
“Results show that there are no relative differences in trust between an ''efficiency-based”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Findingown data
Once citizens are shown the information, there is a significant increase in how they evaluate the government's transparency efforts.
“Once citizens are shown the information, there is a significant increase in how they evaluate the government's transparency efforts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The positive-performance vignette increases individuals' confidence in government.
“Individuals also have more confidence in the government.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Table B shows that after two good draws there is less updating of beliefs the smaller the priors pH.
“Table B shows that after two good draws there is less updating of beliefs the smaller the priors p H .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Citizens' trust in the government is affected the same by a message that frames the commitments in terms of efficiency or empathy.
“Results also indicate that citizens' trust in the government is affected the same by a message that frames the commitments in terms of efficiency or empathy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The vignette showing positive performance increases trust in government (composite index) by about 0.10 of a standard deviation more than the vignette showing negative performance.
“The vignette showing a positive performance increases trust in government (composite index) by about 0.10 of a standard deviation more than the vignette showing negative performance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Framing the message according to empathy or efficiency is not particularly relevant for individuals with no previous exposure.
“Importantly, framing the message according to empathy or efficiency is not particularly relevant for them either.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
More than 40 percent of respondents had never seen the website or heard about the commitments.
“More than 40 percent of respondents had never seen the website or heard about the commitments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The content of the information in terms of performance seems to matter more for how much citizens update their priors: showing good performance has a more positive effect than showing poor performance among those that see this information for the first time.
“However, the content of the information in terms of performance seems to matter more for how much citizens update their priors: showing good performance has a more positive effect than showing poor performance among those that see this information for the first time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Under full transparency with pC=pI=0.5, qC=0.8, qI=0.2, and two independent draws, observing two good results yields a much larger probability of type C (0.941) than observing two bad results (0.059).
“For these parameter values, if the information is that G comes up in both two draws, V GG , the probability of type C is much larger than if two bad results B come up, V BB : 0.882 = 0.94 1-0.059.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Under full transparency, there are two types of policymakers in terms of competence: type C with probability p_C and type I with probability p_I=1-p_C, and p_C=p_I=0.5.
- The authors state this as an assumption: A commitment has an outcome G or B with probabilities depending on sender type; type C has q_C and type I has q_I, where q_C > q_I.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each policy commitment can be thought of as an independent draw.
- Findingown data
The effect of the treatment is driven mostly by those who had no previous exposure to the commitments made by the government.
“We find evidence suggesting that the effect we find is driven mostly by those who had no previous exposure to the commitments made by the government”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The control group had heterogeneous beliefs about government transparency, with some considering the government transparent and others not.
“These individuals clearly have heterogeneous beliefs, since some consider that the government is transparent, thereby announcing its plans, while others do not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
The effect on those exposed to this information for the first time is more than twice as large as that in Table 3.
“On the other hand, the effect on those exposed to this information for the first time is more than twice as large as that in Table 3.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
More people in the treatment group believe that the government provides information on plans and results than in the control group.
“More people in the treatment believe that the government provides information on plans and results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 4, column (1), college education is associated with lower transparency perceptions (coefficient -0.0495, p<0.05).
“College | À0.0495** | À0.0309 | À0.0728”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The difference in the distribution of answers about transparency between control and treatment groups is statistically significant.
“The difference in the distribution is statistically significant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The difference between the positive and negative treatments is equivalent to 0.10 of a standard deviation.
“The difference between the ''positive”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 3, Panel B, column (1), the empathy message (vs. efficiency message, performance constant) has no statistically significant effect on the Government Perception index (coefficient 0.00994, p>0.1).
“Empathy message | 0.00994 | 0.0204 | 0.00833 | 0.0178 | 0.0187 | 0.0279 | 0.0299 | 0.0410 | À0.0202 | À0.00949”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 3, Panel A, column (1), the positive graph treatment (vs. negative graph, framing constant) increases the Government Perception index by 0.101 standard deviations (p<0.1) without controls.
“Positive graph | 0.101* | 0.108** | 0.0992* | 0.105* | 0.105* | 0.112** | 0.0893 | 0.0958* | 0.0867 | 0.0973*”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 3, Panel A, column (2), the positive graph treatment (vs. negative graph, framing constant) increases the Government Perception index by 0.108 standard deviations (p<0.05) with controls.
“Positive graph | 0.101* | 0.108** | 0.0992* | 0.105* | 0.105* | 0.112** | 0.0893 | 0.0958* | 0.0867 | 0.0973*”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The first and last bars in Figure 3 are statistically different from each other.
“The first and last bars are statistically different from each other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 4, column (2), first exposure is associated with lower trust in government (coefficient -0.496, p<0.01).
“First Exposure | À0.145*** | À0.496*** | À0.325***”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 4, column (1), the informative treatment increases transparency perceptions (coefficient 0.0357, p<0.1).
“Treatment | 0.0357* | À0.0225 | À0.0336”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 4, column (2), the effect of the positive vs. negative treatment on trust in government is larger for first-exposure participants (interaction coefficient 0.300, p<0.01).
“Treatment  First | 0.103*** | 0.300*** | 0.111”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 4, column (1), first exposure is associated with lower transparency perceptions (coefficient -0.145, p<0.01).
“First Exposure | À0.145*** | À0.496*** | À0.325***”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Table 4, column (1), the effect of the informative treatment on transparency perceptions is larger for first-exposure participants (interaction coefficient 0.103, p<0.01).
“Treatment  First | 0.103*** | 0.300*** | 0.111”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductown data
Results remain the same with alternative index definitions.
“but results remain the same with alternative index definitions (see Table A3 in the Appendix).”
- Also stated in: § 3.2. Empirical strategy · plain
“In all cases, results remain the same.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Also stated in: § 3.2. Empirical strategy · plain
- Study design and conductown data
Randomization balance on observable characteristics between treatment arms was achieved, with only a couple of imbalances for the first experiment.
“Table 1 shows evidence of randomization balance on observable characteristics between treatment arms -there are only a couple of imbalances for the first experiment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Having information on a website does not ensure that people will learn about it.
“which is in line with the evidence that having information on a website does not ensure that people will learn about it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The relationship between transparency and trust may be mediated by the performance of the government.
“The evidence highlights that the relationship between transparency and trust may be mediated by the performance of the government.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
- Rests on an assumption: The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
- Study design and conductown data
The first principal component explains more than 80 percent of the variance regardless of the index.
“We report evidence from principal component analysis (PCA henceforth) because the first component explains more than 80 percent of the variance regardless of the index”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Heterogeneous priors help explain why additional information affects individuals very differently.
“This issue of heterogeneous priors helps to understand why additional information affects individuals very differently.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The informational value falls sharply when the government is expected to manipulate the information.
“(iii) the informational value falls sharply when the government is expected to manipulate the information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Differences in trust might not be too large when individuals believe there is a high probability of competent but dishonest types (CD) willing to fabricate fake news, always showing good results whatever the real outcome.
“However, the differences in trust might not be too large when individuals believe that there is a high probability of competent but dishonest types, CD, that are willing to fabricate fake news, always showing good results in the vignettes whatever the real outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The special case of full transparency may grossly overstate the updating of information that actually takes place.
“This special case of full transparency may grossly overstate the updating of information that actually takes place.19”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Beliefs with two bad draws are not affected by the proportion of dishonest governments, who always want to mimic the most favorable signal.
“The beliefs with two bad draws are not affected by the proportion of dishonest governments, who always want to mimic the most favorable signal.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Honest types CH and IH always reveal the results of the two random draws, while dishonest types DC manipulate the information to their advantage, revealing only good draws.
- Interpretationreasoning
Individuals trust a government that complies with its promises (CH) more than one that is as transparent but under-delivers (IH).
“That is to say, individuals trust more a government that complies with its promises, CH, than one that is as transparent but under-delivers, IH.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Because of random assignment, any variation on measures can be attributed to the vignettes.
“Because of random assignment, any variation on measures can be attributed to the vignettes (Nock & Guterbock, 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nock & Guterbock, 2010
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
In Table 5, competent governments that are honest (CH) will be trusted more than the other three types.
“Hence, in Table 5 competent governments that are honest, CH, will be trusted more than the other three types.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Vignettes can be partially informative when they work as a semi-separating signal.
“Vignettes can be partially informative when they work as a semi-separating signal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Since the effects on priors are significant and sizeable, this suggests that providing information on government performance might have long-lasting effects.
“Since the effects on priors are significant and sizeable, this suggests that providing information on government performance might have long-lasting effects.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Manipulating the selection of information may not be a solution.
“Manipulating the selection of information may not be a solution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
- Rests on an assumption: The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
- Interpretationreasoning
The framework helps explain why panel A of Table 3 shows that differences in performance, holding constant the framing (empathy), lead to significantly higher levels of trust.
“This helps to explain why panel A of Table 3 shows that differences in performance, holding constant the framing (empathy), lead to significantly higher levels of trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The value of the signal is higher when the government is expected to show the results as they are.
“(ii) the value of the signal is higher when the government is expected to show the results as they are;”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Showing good results can matter for changing citizens' priors about the quality of the government.
“In summary, we can conclude that: (i) showing good results can matter for changing citizens' priors about the quality of the government;”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Results from a survey experiment in Buenos Aires show that, though effective, it may not be enough to have information available on a website if one wants to reach all citizens.
“Results in this article from a survey experiment conducted in the City of Buenos Aires show that, though effective, it may not be enough to have information available on a website if one wants to reach all citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The channel between transparency and trust is mediated by several factors, including the performance of the government.
“It also indicates that the channel between transparency and trust is mediated by several factors, including the performance of the government.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Increasing transparency perceptions is more than providing information on a website.
“It highlights that increasing transparency perceptions is more than providing information on a website.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Trust can be linked with honest policymakers that are seen as competent.
“Additionally, this confirms that trust can be linked with honest policymakers that are seen as competent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Since good results are taken to reveal a better type than bad results, individuals are not dismissing the information as cheap talk.
“Since good results are taken to reveal a better type than bad results, individuals are not dismissing the information as cheap talk.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 27
- May combine two claims. 27
- The quote only partly states this claim. 3
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTrust in institutions and other people is a key factor in social and economic progress as well as democratic stability.
“Numerous studies have identified trust -both trust in institutions and trust in other people-as a key factor in social and economic progress as well as democratic stability”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Jacobsen, 1999 source
- cites Algan & Cahuc, 2014 source
The 'Future avenues: Trust and Well-Being' section says trust affects economic development and interacts with institutions, while 'Co-evolution of trust and institutions' links social capital to political accountability. These passages support much of the broad claim, but they do not establish that trust in institutions, specifically, is a key driver of democratic stability. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Bjørnskov, 2015 source
The paper reports a positive association between social trust (trust in other people) and productivity, with effects linked to the quality of economic-judicial institutions (Conclusion, p. 25). It does not establish that trust in institutions has the same role. Section 2.2 (p. 9) distinguishes democratic institutions and says the evidence for an effect of social trust on them is weaker; the paper does not establish a link to democratic stability. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe experimental setup resembles the setup with two-dimensional asymmetric information in Stein and Streb (2004).
“This setup resembles the setup with two-dimensional asymmetric information inStein and StrebStreb (2004)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Stein and StrebStreb (2004) source
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThe distribution of answers for control and treatment groups differs, with more people in the treatment group believing that the government provides information on plans and results.
“we strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality in distributions (p-value smaller than 1%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe empathy framing produces slightly better evaluations of government than the efficiency framing, but the differences are not statistically significant for every index.
“Those who were presented with the empathy framing seem to evaluate the government slightly better than those who received the efficiency one, but the differences are not statistically significant.”
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
“This is true for every index.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIndividuals with no previous exposure trusted the government less but were more influenced by the treatments.
“Those individuals trusted the government less but were more influenced by the treatments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataResults are quite consistent across the different questions.
“Results are quite consistent across the different questions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
FindingreasoningFor a prior pH=0.5, trust will be larger with two good draws (V_GG) than with two bad draws (V_BB): Pr[CH|V_GG]=0.381 > Pr[CH|V_BB]=0.059.
“For a prior p H ¼ 0:5, trust will be larger with two good draws, V GG , than with two bad draws, V BB :”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Honest types CH and IH always reveal the results of the two random draws, while dishonest types DC manipulate the information to their advantage, revealing only good draws.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Trustworthy types are identified with types CH that are both competent and honest.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe positive-performance vignette increases ratings of government competence, benevolence, and honesty compared with the negative-performance vignette.
“Again, those who receive the vignette showing compliance with the promises rate the government as being more competent, more benevolent, and more honest.”
- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
“Similar results exist across the different attributes that evaluate trust in the government (and are part of the composite index).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 3.3. Empirical results · plain
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThere are no significant effects for the empathy versus efficiency analysis on individual questions.
“There are no significant effects for the empathy versus efficiency analysis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe treatment showing overperformance has an effect between 2 and 3 percentage points, representing an increase of about 5 percent for most questions, higher than the one that shows underperformance.
“Results in the Table show that the treatment showing overperformance has an effect between 2 and 3 percentage points, which represents an increase of about 5 percent for most questions, higher than the one that shows underperformance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataIn Table 4, column (3), first exposure is associated with lower trust in government for the empathy vs. efficiency comparison (coefficient -0.325, p<0.01).
“First Exposure | À0.145*** | À0.496*** | À0.325***”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn Latin America, corruption scandals and poor performance of democracies have eroded public confidence in institutions for years.
“It is particularly true in Latin America, where corruption scandals and poor performance of democracies have eroded public confidence in institutions for years, according to data from the Latinobarometer and the Americas Barometer at LAPOP”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Latinobarómetro, 2018b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Zechmeister & Lupu, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningMost people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government.
“Therefore, most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe rules for disclosing information may be important for transparency to matter.
“Our complementary analytical discussion shows that the rules for disclosing information may be important for transparency to matter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataConclusions on statistical inference remain the same with the preferred p-value correction.
“Conclusions on statistical inference remain the same with our preferred correction.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn Argentina, less than 20 percent of the population trust other people, and only 24 percent trust the government.
“In Argentina, less than 20 percent of the population trust other people, and only 24 percent trust the government (data from Latinobarometro (2018a)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latinobarometro (2018a)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the last few decades, trust in governments has been in decline, and interpersonal trust is also very low.
“In the last few decades, trust in governments has been in decline (OECD, 2018;Keefer et al., 2020), and interpersonal trust is also very low.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites OECD, 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Keefer et al., 2020 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe content of the vignettes matters because individuals who see the government over-perform on its commitments trust it more than those who see it under-perform.
“This explains why the content of the vignettes also matters, why individuals that see that the government over-performs on its commitments trust it more than those that see it under-performs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataDifferences in performance matter for evaluating the government, while differences in the way the government frames communication do not.
“The interpretation of Table A5 leads us to the same conclusions as before: differences in performance seem to matter to evaluate the government; this is not the case for differences in the way the government frames the communication.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningIf individuals familiar with the program already incorporated most of this information into their priors, the treatment should have little or no effect.
“If individuals familiar with the program already incorporated most of this information into their priors, the treatment should have little or no effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe use of an experimental setting could help yield more light into the existence of the link and its determinants and generate usable knowledge for practitioners.
“The use of an experimental setting could help to yield more light into the existence of the link and its determinants and generate usable knowledge for practitioners”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere is less updating with intermediate transparency than with full transparency, but more than with null transparency.
“While there is less updating with intermediate transparency than with full transparency (the last line of the table), there is more than with null transparency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningTrust requires both honesty and competence.
“This is because trust requires both honesty and competence (the government is providing goods and services to the citizens whatever the framing, so benevolence is taken as a given).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Benevolence is taken as a given in the trust analysis.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataVoung tests suggest that the Zero Inflated Poisson model is a better fit than the Poisson estimates.
“Voung tests suggest ZIP is a better fit than Poisson estimates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe results of the experiment lie between separating and pooling: vignettes are not a separating signal because not all treated individuals believe the government is transparent, but not a pooling signal because the proportion believing the government is transparent rises significantly.
“The results of the experiment lie somewhere in between: vignettes are not a separating signal, because not all individuals in the treatment group believe that the government is transparent, but it is not a pooling signal either, because the proportion of individuals that believe the government is transparent rises significantly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe framework helps explain the results in Table 4, where positive performance has no significant effect on trust in individuals familiar with the program.
“This framework helps to explain the results in Table 4, where positive performance has no significant effect on trust in individuals familiar with the program.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningTransparency is relevant for trust because it indicates that the government is honest.
“Furthermore, transparency is relevant for trust because it indicates that the government is honest.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Premisenone givenTransparency requires that the information revealed by the government be true, i.e., it requires an honest government.
“The vignettes by themselves do not assure transparency: transparency requires that the information revealed by the government be true, i.e., it requires an honest government.17”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTrust requires that the government be seen as competent and benevolent.
“Hence, trust also requires that the government be seen as competent and benevolent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisecitationTrust is a multidimensional concept.
“Trust is a multidimensional concept.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grimmelikhuijsen (2012b)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningAggregating outcomes into indices improves statistical power to detect effects consistent across specific outcomes and reduces the chance of false positives.
“The aggregation improves statistical power to detect effects that are consistent across specific outcomes when these specific outcomes also have idiosyncratic variation.”
- Also stated in: § 3.2. Empirical strategy · plain
“Focusing on the indices helps us to reduce the number of statistical tests performed so as to reduce the chance of false positives”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 3.2. Empirical strategy · plain
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEvidence about the connection between transparency and outcomes is still scant, particularly regarding the strength of the link between the content of the information (performance) and the framing of the information, and the particular conditions under which transparency fosters trust.
“Evidence about the connection between transparency and outcomes is still scant (Fukuyama, 2015;Bauhr, Czibik, de Fine Licht, & Fazekas, 2019), particularly regarding the strength of the link between the content of the information (performance) and the framing of the information, and the particular conditions under which transparency fosters trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Fukuyama, 2015 source
- cites Bauhr, Czibik, de Fine Licht, & Fazekas, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWhile the posteriors of all individuals improve in the example, only those whose beliefs cross the threshold that makes the binary transparency variable jump from 0 to 1 change their views on transparency.
“While the posteriors of all individuals improve in this example, only those individuals whose beliefs cross the threshold that makes the binary transparency variable jump from 0 to 1 change their views on transparency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationPerceptions of trust were evaluated using a multidimensional approach including competence, benevolence, and honesty.
“For evaluating perceptions of trust we use a multidimensional approach that includes the many components of trust: competence, benevolence, and honesty (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIf politicians only report the best results out of a large sample, the value of the signal that good performance provides drops.
“If politicians only report the best results out of a large sample, the value of the signal that good performance provides drops.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
- Rests on an assumption: The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenIf citizens learn about deception (fake news), they will not trust government-provided information any longer and the value of any posterior signal disappears.
“As to lying (providing 'fake news'), if citizens learn about the deception, they will not trust government-provided information any longer and the value of any posterior signal disappears.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
- Rests on an assumption: The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningOne would expect the priors to be smaller among the individuals exposed to this information for the first time.
“One would also expect the priors to be smaller among the individuals exposed to this information for the first time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe existence of more information and positive citizen perceptions of government transparency does not necessarily go hand in hand.
“However, the existence of more information and positive citizen perceptions of government transparency does not necessarily go hand in hand (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a;Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe survey experiment randomly assigned participants to treatment/control and to vignettes.
“Participants were assigned to randomized treatments twice during the survey”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“First, participants were allocated at random with equal probability to receive information about a series of commitments the government had made to the citizens of Buenos Aires.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“Second, participants were randomly allocated to a vignette that highlighted the government pledge to efficiency and good management or to a vignette that highlighted an empathetic message”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataQualitative results do not change across the different tables.
“Qualitative results do not change across the different tables.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningInformation matters in shaping public perceptions and voting choices, but it cannot sit idle in a website; it must be delivered to citizens.
“while information matters in shaping public perceptions and voting choices, that information cannot sit idle in a website but rather be delivered to citizens”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPresenting partial information (a few results out of a large set) reduces the value of the signals unless there is a clear obligation to present them without manipulation.
“First, it shows that presenting partial information (a few results out of a large set) reduces the value of the signals unless there is a clear obligation to present them without manipulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn the context of verifiable reports, manipulating information would eventually reduce trust in the government, and eliminate the informational value of transparency.
“In the context of verifiable reports, manipulating information would eventually reduce trust in the government, and eliminate the informational value of transparency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningCitizen's perceptions regarding why and what information the government presents, and its ability to manipulate it matter too.
“Importantly, citizen's perceptions regarding why and what information the government presents, and its ability to manipulate it matter too.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataTo increase trust it is not only necessary to provide information, but also to show good performance.
“Again, the results show that in order to increase trust it is not only necessary to provide information, but also to show good performance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf citizens believe only the best results are shown, or that there may be 'fake news', the value of the signals falls and may even disappear altogether.
“If citizens believe only the best results are shown, or that there may be 'fake news', the value of the signals falls and may even disappear altogether.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationThe survey items were adapted from Grimmelikhuijsen (2012b).
“Items adapted from Grimmelikhuijsen (2012b).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grimmelikhuijsen (2012b)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenAll regressions include comuna fixed effects and controls for age, gender, education, labor status, socio-economic level, commune, and prior knowledge of the policy.
“All regressions include comuna fixed effects and the following controls: age, gender, education, labor status, socio-economic level, commune, and a factor variable that indicates if the participant knew about the policy before the survey.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The information about government commitments and performance presented in the vignettes is accurate and credible.
“Each vignette describes the policy commitments made by the government, gives specific examples of the commitments, and shows how well the government has been doing in the implementation of the policy according to the benchmarks and objectives it had established at the beginning of the mandate.”
“These commitments, made by the mayor when he took office, are tracked and results are publicly available on the webpage of the city government.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The online survey sample is representative of the adult population of the City of Buenos Aires.
“A total of 1,999 complete interviews were carried out by a company that specializes in collecting online survey data.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Participants in the treatment group read and understood the information in the vignettes as intended.
“The vignette presents a short and simple message to keep the attention of the participant but at the same time provides enough information for understanding the initiative.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The government's performance relative to its commitments is a valid indicator of government competence, benevolence, and honesty.
“Additionally, individuals received information showing either that the government was over-performing on its commitments or that the government was under-performing.”
“For evaluating perceptions of trust we use a multidimensional approach that includes the many components of trust: competence, benevolence, and honesty (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Government incumbents differ in competence and honesty.
“In our setup, government incumbents differ in competence and honesty.18 .”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Governments can either be competent (C) with probability p_C or incompetent (I) with probability p_I = 1 - p_C.
“In regard to competence, we assume that governments can either be competent, C, with PrGnf ½C ¼ p C , or incompetent, I, with Pr½I ¼ p I ¼ 1 À p C .”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Governments can either be honest (H) with probability p_H or dishonest (D) with probability p_D = 1 - p_H.
“In regard to honesty, they can either be honest, H, with PrGnf ½H ¼ p H , or dishonest, D, with Pr½D ¼ p D ¼ 1 À p H .”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Responses to the binary transparency variable can be associated with priors on honesty p_H if an individual switches from believing the government is not transparent to believing it is when priors exceed a certain threshold.
“The responses regarding the binary variable transparency in Table 2, which takes values 0 and 1, can be associated with the priors on honesty p H in Table 5 if an individual switches from believing that the government is not transparent to believing that it is when priors exceed a certain threshold.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Priors p_H vary by individual.
“Priors p H , which can take any value between 0 and 1, must thus vary by individual (we omit the subindices i for individuals),”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Vignettes can be sent not only by honest types H with probability q_H=1, but also by some dishonest types D with probability q_D, 0<q_D<1.
“Suppose that vignettes can be sent not only by honest types H with probability Pr½VjH ¼ q H ¼ 1, but also by some of the dishonest types D with probability Pr½VjD ¼ q D ; 0 < q D < 1.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
All dishonest but competent types CD can provide vignettes (whether true or false), but dishonest and incompetent types ID cannot.
“By reference to Table 5, we will specifically assume that all dishonest but competent types CD can provide vignettes (whether true or false), but that dishonest and incompetent types ID can't.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Benevolence is taken as a given in the trust analysis.
“(the government is providing goods and services to the citizens whatever the framing, so benevolence is taken as a given)”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Under full transparency, there are two types of policymakers in terms of competence: type C with probability p_C and type I with probability p_I=1-p_C, and p_C=p_I=0.5.
“Under full transparency, let there be two types of policymakers (senders) in terms of competence: type C, with Pr½C ¼ p C ,Gnf and type I, with Pr½I ¼ p I ¼ 1 À p C , and let p C ¼ p I ¼ 0:5 as before.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
A commitment has an outcome G or B with probabilities depending on sender type; type C has q_C and type I has q_I, where q_C > q_I.
“Furthermore, let a 'commitment' have an outcome that can take the values G (good) and B (bad) with probabilities that depend on the type of sender.Say type C has PrGnf ½GjC ¼ q C while type I has Pr½GjI ¼ q I , where q C > q I .”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Each policy commitment can be thought of as an independent draw.
“We can think of each policy commitment as an independent draw.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Honest types CH and IH always reveal the results of the two random draws, while dishonest types DC manipulate the information to their advantage, revealing only good draws.
“Honest types CH and IH always reveal the results of the two random draws, while dishonest types DC manipulate the information to their advantage, which in the examples below means revealing only good draws.20”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Trustworthy types are identified with types CH that are both competent and honest.
“Trustworthy types are identified with types CH that are both competent and honest.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
A transparent government always shows a vignette (Pr[V|H]=1), while a non-transparent one shows it half the time (Pr[V|D]=1/2).
“Notes: Assumption is that a transparent government always shows a vignette (Pr½VjH ¼ 1), while a non-transparent one shows it half the time (Pr½VjD ¼ 1=2).”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Reported trust comparison is called significant despite a p-value of 0.150
MajorThe first and last groups are the positive-empathy and negative-empathy treatments. Table A4 reports p = 0.150 for their trust-in-government comparison, which does not support the statement that those bars are statistically different at conventional significance levels.
“The first and last bars are statistically different from each other”
“Trust in Government 0.035 0.025 À0.066 0.627 0.150”
Several reported medians are not above the midpoint
MinorThe perception variables are standardized from zero to one, so their midpoint is 0.50. Table A2 reports medians of exactly 0.50 for several variables, including Competence4, contradicting the claim that every median is above the midpoint.
“In every case, the median response was above the mid-point of the indicator.”
“Competence4 1999 0.46 0.32 0 1 0.17 0.50 0.67”
Cites
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555475 · Cited by 7,484 · see citing works
A sharper Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of significance
HOCHBERG, Y. (1988) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/75.4.800 · Cited by 4,829 · see citing works
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293 · see citing works
An economic theory of political action in a democracy
Downs, A. (1957) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257897 · Cited by 3,300 · see citing works
Rectangular Confidence Regions for the Means of Multivariate Normal Distributions
Šidák, Z. (1967) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1967.10482935 · Cited by 2,904 · see citing works
Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00609 · Cited by 2,742 · see citing works
Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects
Kling, J. R., Liebman, J. B., & Katz, L. F. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00733.x · Cited by 2,719 · see citing works
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silane, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5864 · Cited by 2,485 · see citing works
Bertot, J. C., Jaeger, P. T., & Grimes, J. M. (2010) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2010.03.001 · Cited by 2,451 · see citing works
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01408.x · Cited by 2,247 · see citing works
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554926 · Cited by 2,211 · see citing works
Political Trust and Trustworthiness
Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.475 · Cited by 2,190 · see citing works
Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange? *
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2009) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1095 · Cited by 2,125 · see citing works
Rectangular Confidence Regions for the Means of Multivariate Normal Distributions
Šidák, Z. (1967) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2283989 · Cited by 1,455 · see citing works
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 · Cited by 1,319 · see citing works
Linking citizen satisfaction with e-government and trust in government
Welch, E. W. (2004) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui021 · Cited by 1,222 · see citing works
The Effects of E‐Government on Trust and Confidence in Government
Tolbert, C. J., & Mossberger, K. (2006) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00594.x · Cited by 1,092 · see citing works
Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2008) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.07.002 · Cited by 787 · see citing works
The Organization of Firms Across Countries*
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Reenen, J. M. V. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qje029 · Cited by 740 · see citing works
The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism
Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., & Passari, E. (2017) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.2017.0015 · Cited by 693 · see citing works
The Effect of Transparency on Trust in Government: A Cross‐National Comparative Experiment
Grimmelikhuijsen, S., Porumbescu, G. A., Hong, B., & Im, T. (2013) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12047 · Cited by 616 · see citing works
Public Service Performance and Trust in Government: The Problem of Causality
de Walle, S. V., & Bouckaert, G. (2003) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1081/pad-120019352 · Cited by 587 · see citing works
Democracy and decision: the pure theory of electoral preference
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-1189 · Cited by 561 · see citing works
Indignation or resignation: The implications of transparency for societal accountability
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2014) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12033 · Cited by 524 · see citing works
25 Years of Transparency Research: Evidence and Future Directions
Cucciniello, M., Porumbescu, G. A., & Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2017) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12685 · Cited by 512 · see citing works
Trust, growth, and well-being: New evidence and policy implications
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2014) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00002-2 · Cited by 454 · see citing works
Editor's Choice The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital
Bottazzi, L., Rin, M. D., & Hellmann, T. F. (2016) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw023 · Cited by 423 · see citing works
Trust and economic growth: a robustness analysis
Beugelsdijk, S. (2003) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/56.1.118 · Cited by 412 · see citing works
Chong, A. E., O, A. L. D. L., Karlan, D., & Wantchekon, L. (2014) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/678766 · Cited by 407 · see citing works
Linking transparency, knowledge and citizen trust in government: an experiment
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2012) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/0020852311429667 · Cited by 389 · see citing works
Grimmelikhuijsen, S., & Welch, E. W. (2012) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02532.x · Cited by 343 · see citing works
Andrews, R., & de Walle, S. V. (2012) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2012.725757 · Cited by 339 · see citing works
Murtin, F., Fleischer, L., Siegerink, V., Aassve, A., Algan, Y., Boarini, R., González, S., Lonti, Z., Grimalda, G. F., Hortalà-Vallvé, R., et al. (2018) · OECD statistics working papers · doi:10.1787/869ef2ec-en · Cited by 311 · see citing works
Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?
Winters, M. S., & Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2013) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041513x13815259182857 · Cited by 282 · see citing works
Martínez, V. P., Torres, L., & Royo, S. (2007) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00654.x · Cited by 263 · see citing works
Interpreting E-government and Development: Efficiency, Transparency or Governance at a Distance?
Ciborra, C. U. (2009) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230250611_5 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
(2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813146 · Cited by 230 · see citing works
Why is democracy performing so poorly?
Fukuyama, F. (2015) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0017 · Cited by 223 · see citing works
Dearmon, J., & GRIER, K. B. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.011 · Cited by 211 · see citing works
Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?
Winters, M. S., & Weitz‐Shapiro, R. (2013) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041513806933583 · Cited by 206 · see citing works
Interpreting e‐government and development
Ciborra, C. (2005) · Information Technology and People · doi:10.1108/09593840510615879 · Cited by 193 · see citing works
The Impact of Crime and Insecurity on Trust in Democracy and Institutions
Blanco, L., & Ruiz, I. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.3.284 · Cited by 165 · see citing works
On Adjusting P-Values for Multiplicity
Westfall, P. H., Young, S. S., & Wright, S. P. (1993) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2532216 · Cited by 160 · see citing works
Dincer, O. C., & Uslaner, E. M. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9473-4 · Cited by 157 · see citing works
Transparency of Public Decision‐Making: Towards Trust in Local Government?
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2010) · Policy & Internet · doi:10.2202/1944-2866.1024 · Cited by 146 · see citing works
Bjørnskov, C., & Méon, P.-G. (2015) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.01.015 · Cited by 138 · see citing works
Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12432 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
IS E‐GOVERNMENT LEADING TO MORE ACCOUNTABLE AND TRANSPARENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS? AN OVERALL VIEW
Martínez, V. P., Torres, L., & Royo, S. (2010) · Financial Accountability and Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0408.2009.00488.x · Cited by 130 · see citing works
Crime and Erosion of Trust: Evidence for Latin America
Corbacho, A., Philipp, J., & Ruiz‐Vega, M. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.04.013 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
Trust, Growth and Well-Being: New Evidence and Policy ImplicationsPreprint
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2290462 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
Bouwman, R., & Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2016) · International Journal of Public Sector Management · doi:10.1108/ijpsm-07-2015-0129 · Cited by 95 · see citing works
Transparency and trust: An experimental study of online disclosure and trust in government
Grimmelikhuijsen, S., Management, U. L. R. U. P. M. P. G. A., Bestuurkunde, L., Matters, U. L. R. U. P., Bovens, M., & Meijer, A. J. (2014) · Bestuurskunde · doi:10.5553/bk/092733872014023002011 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Congleton, R. D. (2001) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1010337412291 · Cited by 83 · see citing works
Elections and the timing of devaluations
Stein, E. H., & Streb, J. M. (2004) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00040-0 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
Self-citationA good man but a bad wizard. About the limits and future of transparency of democratic governments
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2012) · Information Polity · doi:10.3233/ip-2012-000288 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Cash transfers increase trust in local government
Evans, D. K., Holtemeyer, B., & Kosec, K. (2018) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.020 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Rational ignorance and voting behavior
Martinelli, C. (2006) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0051-4 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Does trust favor macroeconomic stability?
Sangnier, M. (2012) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2012.10.002 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Cai, M., Liu, P., & Wang, H. (2019) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104687 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Democracy and decision: The pure theory of electoral preference
Binet, O. (1995) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(95)90013-6 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
A Test for the Rational Ignorance Hypothesis: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Brazil†
de Leon, F. L. L., & Rizzi, R. (2014) · American Economic Journal Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.4.380 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying
Cruz, C., Keefer, P. E., & Labonne, J. (2016) · doi:10.18235/0000493 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Multiple Testing of General Contrasts
Westfall, P. H., & Tobias, R. D. (2007) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1198/016214506000001338 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of PopulismPreprint
Algan, Y., Papaioannou, E., Passari, E., & Guriev, S. M. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3128274 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Trust in political-administrative relations: The case of local authorities in norway and tanzania
Jacobsen, D. I. (1999) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(99)00032-7 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Keefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2012) · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-5952 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Evil is the Root of all Money (Clarendon Lectures 1)Preprint
Kiyotaki, N., & Moore, J. (2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying
Cruz, C., Keefer, P., & Labonne, J. (2016) · doi:10.18235/0011746 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Mullainathan, S., Washington, E., & Azari, J. R. (2010) · Political Representation · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813146.014 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“Wish you were here” confianza en la administración pública en Latinoamérica
Güemes, C. (2019) · Revista de Administração Pública · doi:10.1590/0034-761220180230 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Voter Preferences, Electoral Promises, and the Composition of Public Spending
Keefer, P., Scartascini, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2020) · doi:10.18235/0002434 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Self-citationGingerich, D., & Scartascini, C. (2018) · doi:10.18235/0001519 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Self-citationKeefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1978998 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Shortchanging the Future: The Short-Term Bias of Politics
Keefer, P., Scartascini, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2018) · doi:10.18235/0014380
Self-citationKiyotaki, N., & Moore, J. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802320189014
Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2007) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.997867
Voter Preferences, Electoral Promises, and the Composition of Public Spending
Keefer, P., Scartascini, C. G., & Vlaicu, R. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3581006
Self-citationA good man but a bad wizard. About the limits and future of transparency of democratic governments
Stephan, G. (2013) · Innovation and the Public Sector · doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-244-8-83
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2007) · doi:10.67929/ecgi-fin-170-2007
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Chong, 2015, Does corruption information inspire the fight or quash the hope? A field experiment in mexico on voter turnout, choice, and party identification, The Journal of Politics, 77, 55, 10.1086/678766 · DOI
- Keefer, P., Rojas M, A. M., Scartascini, C., & Valle L, J. (2020). Trust to Advance Inclusive Growth. In: Nuguer, V., Powell, A. (Eds.), Inclusion in Times of Covid-19. Inter-American Development Bank. pp. 41–52.
- Nock, 2010, Survey experiments, Handbook of Survey Research, 2, 837
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in New Zealand
OECD (2023) · Building trust in public institutions · doi:10.1787/948accf8-en · Cited by 196 · see citing works
Bicchieri, C., Fatás, E., Aldama, A., et al. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0252892 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
Beyond contact-tracing: The public value of eHealth application in a pandemic
Gerli, P., Arakpogun, E. O., Elsahn, Z., Olan, F., & Prime, K. S. (2021) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2021.101581 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Does information about citizen participation initiatives increase political trust?
Ardanaz, M., Otálvaro-Ramírez, S., & Scartascini, C. (2023) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106132 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Self-citationCrepaz, M., & Arikan, G. (2024) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12555 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Financial transparency, trust and willingness to pay in local governments of sub-Saharan Africa
Krah, R. Y., & Mertens, G. (2023) · Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial Management · doi:10.1108/jpbafm-06-2022-0110 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Does being informed about government transparency boost trust? Exploring an overlooked mechanism
Ripamonti, J. P. (2024) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2024.101960 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Transparency and trust in the public sector: Target and benchmarks to ensure macroeconomic stability
Vasylieva, T., Kasperowicz, R., Tiutiunyk, I., & Lukács, E. (2023) · JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES · doi:10.14254/2071-8330.2023/16-4/8 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
In Science we (should) trust: expectations and compliance during the COVID-19 pandemicPreprint
Bicchieri, C., Fatás, E., Aldama, A., et al. (2020) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-106840/v1 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Alhur, M., Caamaño-Alegre, J., & Reyes-Santías, F. (2024) · Digital Health · doi:10.1177/20552076241272567 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
How can we improve air pollution? Try increasing trust first
Hoffmann, B., Scartascini, C., & Cafferata, F. G. (2021) · Environment and Development Economics · doi:10.1017/s1355770x2100036x · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Self-citationPublic sector transparency and sustainable development: A focus on Sub‐Saharan Africa
Erin, O. A., Adegboye, A., & Uwuigbe, U. (2023) · Journal of Public Affairs · doi:10.1002/pa.2885 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Gingerich, D., & Scartascini, C. (2022) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x21000246 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Self-citationZhou, Y. J., Zhang, A., Liu, X., Tan, X., Miao, R., Zhang, Y., & Wang, J. (2023) · Frontiers in Public Health · doi:10.3389/fpubh.2023.1142230 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Extracting Human Levels of Trust in Human–Swarm Interaction Using EEG Signals
Orozco, J. A., & Artemiadis, P. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Human-Machine Systems · doi:10.1109/thms.2024.3356421 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
The role of the village government performance and transparency in influencing village public trust
Husni, M., Damayanti, R. A., & Indrijawati, A. (2023) · Journal of Accounting and Investment · doi:10.18196/jai.v24i2.17114 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Jannat, A., Islam, M. M., & Aruga, K. (2025) · Sustainable Futures · doi:10.1016/j.sftr.2025.100483 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Wetton, J. D., Santilli, M., Gitau, H., Muindi, K., Zimmermann, N., Michie, S., & Davies, M. (2025) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs15020133 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Asomah, J. Y., Dim, E. E., & Li, Y. (2024) · Journal of Asian and African Studies · doi:10.1177/00219096241228786 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“There's a little bit of mistrust”: Red River Métis experiences of the H1N1 and COVID‐19 pandemics
Driedger, S. M., Maier, R., Capurro, G., Jardine, C., Tustin, J. L., Chartrand, F., Sanguins, J., & Kloss, O. (2024) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/risa.14274 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Auchynnikava, A., Habibov, N., Lyu, Y., et al. (2025) · Discover Public Health · doi:10.1186/s12982-025-00501-0 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Li, L., Qi, Y., Li, J., et al. (2025) · Cities · doi:10.1016/j.cities.2025.105955 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Zeng, R., Yang, L., Zhang, W., Evans, R., & Luo, J. (2025) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2025.2566457 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Public understanding of Electoral Spending: Evaluating UK Transparency Mechanisms
Power, S., Dommett, K., Macintyre, A., et al. (2023) · Representation · doi:10.1080/00344893.2023.2207170 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Mosqueira, E., & Alessandro, M. (2023) · Inter-American Development Bank eBooks · doi:10.18235/0005052 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Self-citationЛазор, О. Я., Лазор, О. Д., Zubar, I. V., Zabolotnyi, A., & Yunyk, I. (2024) · Pakistan Journal of Criminology · doi:10.62271/pjc.16.2.357.374 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Inclusion in Times of Covid-19
Nuguer, V., & Powell, A. P. (2020) · Inter-American Development Bank eBooks · doi:10.18235/0002529 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Visual nudges: How deterrence and equity shape tax attitudes and behaviour in Rwanda
Santoro, F., & Mascagni, G. (2023) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2023.102118 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Schiaroli, V., & Fraccascia, L. (2025) · Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions · doi:10.1016/j.eist.2025.101044 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Li, P., Zhong, Y., & Yan, H. S. (2026) · Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2026.100539 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Loefflad, C., & Großklags, J. (2024) · ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) · doi:10.1145/3630106.3658986 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Influence of Factors in Consumer Sustainable Auto-Enrolment Pensions
Śwıecka, B., Kowalczyk-Rólczyńska, P., Pieńkowska-Kamieniecka, S., Śledziowski, J., & Terefenko, P. (2025) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su17031340 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Liu, T., Lin, S., & Chen, Y. (2023) · Ocean & Coastal Management · doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2023.106850 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Ziaja, S., Geray, M., Sebudubudu, D., & von Schiller, A. (2024) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12893 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Compliance with COVID-19 preventive policies and governmental transparency: an experimental analysis
Chiang, L.-C., Tai, K.-T., & Lee, I. P. (2024) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2024.2335231 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
In transparency we trust an experimental study of reputation, transparency, and signaling
Borzino, N., Fatás, E., & Peterlé, E. (2023) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2023.102061 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
How Can We Improve Air Pollution?: Try Increasing Trust First
Cafferata, F. G., Hoffmann, B., & Scartascini, C. (2021) · doi:10.18235/0003453 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Self-citationLiu, Y., & Zhao, X. (2025) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs15070962 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Bejarano, C. A. P., Pérez, J., de Andrés, J. M., Hidalgo-Carvajal, D., Gustafsson, J., Summers, J. L., & Abánades, A. (2024) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en17184745 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Daoudi, O., Gainous, J., Wagner, K. M., & Buckles, G. (2025) · Online Information Review · doi:10.1108/oir-06-2023-0296 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Strategic Public Relations for Strengthening Public Trust in Government
Kurniawan, A., & Wijoyo, S. (2025) · International Research Journal of Business Studies · doi:10.21632/irjbs.18.1.43-51 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
GAMARRA, E. (2026) · ESPACIOS · doi:10.48082/espacios-a26v47n02r01 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Consumer Attitudes to Combined Sustainability and Nutrition Labelling of Foods: An Exploratory Study
Collins, O., Higgins, K., Karbo, R. T.-V., Clark, B., Sari, N. H., Raley, M. E., Fu, R., Areal, F., Thomas, E., Vlajic, J. V., et al. (2025) · International Journal of Consumer Studies · doi:10.1111/ijcs.70139 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Deeod, P., & Kiettikunwong, N. (2026) · Public Organization Review · doi:10.1007/s11115-026-00985-7 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Vandercruysse, L., D’Hauwers, R., & Bourgeus, A. (2023) · Journal of Innovation Management · doi:10.24840/2183-0606_011.003_0002 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Pratama, A. B. (2024) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2024.2368253 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Economic Drivers of Food Security in Latin America: A Composite Indicator Analysis
Pérez, N. H., Castillo‐Díaz, F. J., Domínguez, A. P. Y. S., & Ureña, L. J. B. (2025) · Sustainable Development · doi:10.1002/sd.70051 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
LINKING DISTRUST OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR TO AWARENESS OF COVID-19: THE COVID DISSIDENCE PHENOMENON
Дмитриева, Н., Styrin, E. M., Лаврентьев, Н., et al. (2021) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2021-0-6-24-48 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Enhancing Institutional Trust: Evidence from an Experimental Study with Adolescents in Italy
Sestini, E., Muscillo, A., Lombardi, G., Garbin, F., & Pin, P. (2025) · Social Indicators Research · doi:10.1007/s11205-024-03507-4 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
The implementation of spiritual and financial accountability in Islamic boarding school
Wati, R. K., Ardini, L., & Fidiana, F. (2022) · al-Uqud Journal of Islamic Economics · doi:10.26740/aluqud.v6n1.p84-95 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Martínez, L. M., & Sayago, J. T. (2021) · doi:10.18235/0003827 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Ardanaz, M., Otálvaro-Ramírez, S., & Scartascini, C. (2022) · doi:10.18235/0004008 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Self-citationHabibov, N., & Auchynnikava, A. (2025) · World Medical & Health Policy · doi:10.1002/wmh3.70045 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
A User-Centred E-Government Service Design Framework to Enhance Public Trust in Sustainable Policies
Suradi, A., Purnomo, H. D., & Hendry (2026) · Engineering Technology & Applied Science Research · doi:10.48084/etasr.14851 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Sesinando, A. D., Urbaneja, J. S., & Teixeira, M. C. (2026) · Frontiers in Sports and Active Living · doi:10.3389/fspor.2026.1751428 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Xia, S., & Zhang, C. (2026) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2026.2632703 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Ramasamy, R., & Baniamin, H. M. (2022) · Contemporary South Asia · doi:10.1080/09584935.2022.2110570 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Center of Government, Revisited: A Decade of Global Reforms
Shostak, R., Alessandro, M., Diamond, P. A., et al. (2023) · Inter-American Development Bank eBooks · doi:10.18235/0004994 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Self-citationMalaysian Local Authorities: Are They Transparent?
Mahmud, R., Azhari, N. K. M., Aripin, R. M., et al. (2023) · Accounting and Finance Research · doi:10.5430/afr.v12n3p46 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Exploring Trust in Health Insurers: Insights from Enrollees’ Perceptions and Experiences
van der Hulst, F. J. P., Huijgen, S., Brabers, A. E. M., & de Jong, J. D. (2025) · Journal of Market Access & Health Policy · doi:10.3390/jmahp13020029 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Mabillard, V., & Caron, D. J. (2022) · Canadian Public Administration · doi:10.1111/capa.12487 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Visual Nudges: How Deterrence and Equity Shape Tax Compliance Attitudes and Behaviour in RwandaPreprint
Santoro, F., & Mascagni, G. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4176811 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Visual Nudges: How Deterrence and Equity Shape Tax Compliance Attitudes and Behaviour in Rwanda
Santoro, F. (2022) · doi:10.19088/ictd.2022.011 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Benites, A. (2021) · Argumentos · doi:10.46476/ra.v2i2.116 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Wu, J., Talley, P. C., Xiao, S.-W., & Kuo, K.-M. (2024) · SAGE Open · doi:10.1177/21582440241306844 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Ya-bin, D., Yang, K., Duan, S., & Cao, J. (2025) · International Public Management Journal · doi:10.1080/10967494.2025.2516555 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Alomari, K. M., & El-khateeb, A. I. (2025) · Problems and Perspectives in Management · doi:10.21511/ppm.23(4).2025.31 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Mariscal, G., Cáceres-Tello, J., & Galán-Hernández, J. J. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1723942 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Dorsey, J., & Moffett, L. (2026) · Yearbook of international humanitarian law · doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-727-4_5 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
From transparency to accountability: Determinants of village financial governance
Syamsul, Nurlailah, & Nurhadi (2026) · Multidisciplinary Science Journal · doi:10.31893/multiscience.2026575 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Building trust through messaging and new e-government services in Kenya
Chen, N., Kombo, S., Rabb, N., Waweru, L., Zomer, A., & Tsai, L. L. (2026) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2026.102161 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Zheng, Y., & Farhan, M. (2026) · Technology in Society · doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103445 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Dampak Tata Pemerintahan yang Baik terhadap Kepercayaan Masyarakat Kabupaten Pasaman
Nurhatika, N., & Deviani, D. (2023) · JURNAL EKSPLORASI AKUNTANSI · doi:10.24036/jea.v5i4.1082 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Rabih, L., Husson, J., & Bentahar, O. (2024) · Logistique & Management · doi:10.1080/12507970.2024.2426583 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The Implementation of Spiritual and Financial Accountability in Islamic Boarding School
Wati, R. K., Ardini, L., & Fidiana, F. (2022) · al-Uqud Journal of Islamic Economics · doi:10.26740/aluqud.v6n1.p101-114 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work?Preprint
Mayskaya, T., & Nikandrova, A. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3855663
Open Government & Open Data as a feasible solution?
Vogt, T., & Wurzbach, E. (2022) · Central and Eastern European eDem and eGov Days · doi:10.24989/ocg.v.342.5
Analysis of Local Culture Actualization on Village Fund Management
Jeliastiva, J. (2022) · Journal of Social Commerce · doi:10.56209/jommerce.v2i3.36
Post-electoral Promises and Trust in Government: A Survey Experiment on Signaling
Otálvaro-Ramírez, S., Scartascini, C., & Streb, J. M. (2023) · doi:10.18235/0004811
Self-citationJuan, A. D., Hofman, P., & Koos, C. (2023) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.35188/unu-wider/2023/365-9
The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works
Mayskaya, T., & Nikandrova, A. (2023) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105699 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Tengco, D. M., Fernandez, R. E. J., Torres, K. C., & Vidallo, M. F. M. (2023) · Cosmos Journal of Engineering & Technology · doi:10.46360/cosmos.et.620231003
تعزيز الشفافية الإدارية في ضوء التحول الرقمي بالمدارس الثانوية العامة بمحافظة الغربية
لاشين, ك. م. (2023) · مجلة کلیة التربیة فى العلوم التربویة · doi:10.21608/jfees.2023.312235
CONFLICT OF INTEREST, POLICY EFFECTIVENESS, AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY EXPERIMENT
Sedashov, E., & Krikunov, K. A. (2023) · Вестник Пермского университета Политология · doi:10.17072/2218-1067-2023-1-30-38
Tay, E. H., Shafie, S., Shahwan, S., et al. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4678235
Wati, I. M., Tamrin, M. H., & Arieffiani, D. (2024) · JKMP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Manajemen Publik) · doi:10.21070/jkmp.v12i1.1773
Feng, X., Liu, Y., Guo, H., et al. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4860286
Stalebrink, O. J. (2024) · Public Administration Quarterly · doi:10.1177/07349149241274890
Khezri, E., & Tatarko, A. N. (2024) · Population and Economics · doi:10.3897/popecon.8.e107719
Public Sector Performance Reforms in Developing Countries
Shahda, E. A. (2023) · Contemporary Arab Affairs · doi:10.1163/17550920-bja00020
Nível de transparência sobre as audiências públicas orçamentárias em grandes municípios
Mesquita, T. S., & de Azevedo, R. R. (2024) · Advances in Scientific and Applied Accounting · doi:10.14392/asaa.2024170207
LUȚAI, R. (2025) · Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Historia · doi:10.24193/subbhist.2024.1.07
E-Government and Public Trust: An Evidence in Worldwide Level
Ramadhan, M. R. (2024) · International Conference on Informatics, Multimedia, Cyber and Information System (ICIMCIS) · doi:10.1109/icimcis63449.2024.10957501
Jin, B., & Li, Z. (2025) · Applied Economics Letters · doi:10.1080/13504851.2025.2518330
Impact of Institutional Capability on Political Development in Nigeria from 2015 to 2023
Olalekan, J. F., & Albert, M. (2025) · Journal of African Resilience and Advancement Research · doi:10.70382/hujarar.v8i2.006
Kowalik, I., Młotkowska, K., & Pleśniak, A. (2025) · Place Branding and Public Diplomacy · doi:10.1057/s41254-025-00401-9
Crafting Policies Together: Citizen Preferences After Crisis
Clerici, P., Cyr, J., Suárez-Cao, J., et al. (2025) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2025.10014
Personal Incentives vs. Institutional Trust: Evidence from the 2009 MEP Pay HarmonisationPreprint
Urzay-Gómez, S., Correa-Lopera, G., & Medina-Rodríguez, D. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5378280
Gholamnia, M., Moslem, S., & Pilla, F. (2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-33740-6.00018-9
- Authors
- Alessandro, M., Cardinale Lagomarsino, B., Scartascini, C., Streb, J., & Torrealday, J.
- Affiliations
- Inter-American Development Bank (US)
- Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (AR)
- Universidad de Buenos Aires (AR)
- Corresponding author
- Scartascini, Carlos
- ORCID
- Scartascini, Carlos
- Venue
- World Development
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2021-02
- Volume
- 138
- Pages
- 105223
- ISSN
- 0305-750X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2915464736
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 39.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- World Development (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › E-Government and Public Services
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Keywords
- government transparency, public trust in government, information disclosure, public perception, government performance, promise fulfillment, disclosure requirements, Argentina
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-06.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-06.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review