The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation
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In the citing paper
“In this feedback loop, the agent aims toward a more coherent understanding of the situation, the maximal grip (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). In this process, the agent continually adjusts its posture, attention, and movements to bring the situation into sharper focus, both perceptually and motorically.”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002
In the citing paper
“In other words, it serves to constrain the vast space of possible generalizations: in a world where everything could resemble everything else in countless ways, the agent's goals and needs filter which similarities are relevant (Dreyfus, 2002).”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002
In the citing paper
“In this way, the body does not simply constrain what can be perceived, but provides a structure for understanding the world in terms of action-relevant similarities (Dreyfus, 2002).”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002
In the citing paper
“These refinements are not guided by explicit reasoning but by a bodily sense of tension when the current state deviates from an optimal relation, and by the felt relief that comes with moving closer to that optimal state.”
From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002
Citations
Cites
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1982) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203981139 · Cited by 11,945
Warnock, M., Merleau-Ponty, M., & Smith, C. (1964) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2217780 · Cited by 3,175
Dreyfus, H. L., Dreyfus, S. E., Athanasiou, E., & Tom (1986) · Cited by 1,567
Self-citationFreeman, W. J. (1991) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0291-78 · Cited by 905
Hubert Dreyfus, what computers still can't do
McCarthy, J. (1996) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(95)00086-0 · Cited by 381
Macdonald, G., Lepore, E., & Gulick, R. V. (1994) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2219752 · Cited by 102
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Husserl, E. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Collected Works: Volume 3. The Hague: Kluwer Academic.
- Todes, S. 2001. Body and Word. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 · Cited by 1,324
A Rich Landscape of Affordances
Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2014) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1080/10407413.2014.958035 · Cited by 1,160
Embodied Cognition: A field guide
Anderson, M. L. (2003) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(03)00054-7 · Cited by 1,184
The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
Niedenthal, P. M., Wood, A., & Rychlowska, M. (2014) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315775845 · Cited by 934
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation
Fuchs, T. A. E., & Jaegher, H. D. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9136-4 · Cited by 833
Metadata
- Authors
- Dreyfus, H. L.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Dreyfus, Hubert L.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2002-12
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 367-383
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W324585127
- Cited by
- 569
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 24
- FWCI
- 2.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology of perception, mental representation, embodied cognition, skill acquisition, learning, scientific explanation, artificial neural networks, Walter Freeman, brain dynamics, perception and action, body and world
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