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Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information
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Citations
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Self-citationChapter 16 Regulation of Natural Monopoly
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Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- University of Florida (US)
- Corresponding author
- Armstrong, Mark
- Sappington, David E. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Published
- 2004-07
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-21
- ISSN
- 0922-680X (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0468
- OpenAlex
- W2082726337
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 12.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Regulatory Economics (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
- Keywords
- regulatory design, information asymmetry, limited information, regulatory models, model synthesis, regulatory economics
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