The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Tirole, J., & Laffont, J. (1993) · Cited by 3,065
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400829453 · Cited by 2,144
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (2001) · Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) · Cited by 2,056
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,725
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Laffont, J., & Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261392 · Cited by 1,237
Guesnerie, R., & Laffont, J. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4 · Cited by 648
Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models
Jullien, B. (2000) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2641 · Cited by 451
Countervailing incentives in agency problems
Lewis, T. R., & Sappington, D. E. M. (1989) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5 · Cited by 430
Self-citationChapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 421
Self-citationA Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation
Loeb, M. P., & Magat, W. A. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466949 · Cited by 349
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 421
Self-citationChapter 16 Regulation of Natural Monopoly
Joskow, P. L. (2007) · Handbook of law and economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0730(07)02016-6 · Cited by 148
INCENTIVE REGULATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION NETWORKSPreprint
Joskow, P. L. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.7208/9780226138169-007 · Cited by 139
Earnings Targets and Annual Bonus Incentives
Indjejikian, R. J., Matějka, M., Merchant, K. A., & der Stede, W. A. V. (2014) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50732 · Cited by 131
Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?
Joskow, P. L. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- University of Florida (US)
- Corresponding author
- Armstrong, Mark
- Sappington, David E. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Published
- 2004-07
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-21
- ISSN
- 0922-680X (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0468
- OpenAlex
- W2082726337
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 12.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Regulatory Economics (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
- Keywords
- regulatory design, information asymmetry, limited information, regulatory models, model synthesis, regulatory economics
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