The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Choices, values, and frames.
Abstract
This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Loss aversion has been well documented in the laboratory and in many field settings (2), including high-stakes game show decisions (3), financial markets (4), politics (5), trade policy for declining industries (6), rate of organ donation for transplant cases (7) and has also been evident in monkey behavior (8).”
From Amygdala damage eliminates monetary loss aversion (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm
Entman, R. M. (1993) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x · Cited by 16,203
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Self-citationThe weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 · Cited by 7,678
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.
- Affiliations
- University of British Columbia (CA)
- Venue
- American Psychologist
- Published
- 1984-04
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 341-350
- ISSN
- 0003-066X (ISSN-L)
- 1935-990X
- OpenAlex
- W3123340585
- Cited by
- 6,544
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 164 · 2025: 226 · 2024: 229 · 2023: 228 · 2022: 265 · 2021: 254 · 2020: 332 · 2019: 304 · 2018: 325 · 2017: 261 · 2016: 287 · 2015: 281 · 2014: 274 · 2013: 278 · 2012: 236
- FWCI
- 17.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Psychologist (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- prospect theory, utility theory, decision making under risk, Amos Tversky, legal compensation, equity premium puzzle, framing effects, rational choice, judgment under uncertainty
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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