Inaction Inertia: Foregoing Future Benefits as a Result of an Initial Failure to Act
Abstract
The circumstances under which initial inaction tends to persist were studied. Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity decreases the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. The authors studied the case in which an initial attractive action opportunity, which is not taken, is followed by another positive but somewhat less attractive action opportunity. In 6 experiments, participants were less likely to take the second action when the discrepancy in attractiveness between the initial and final action opportunities was relatively large, compared with small-discrepancy participants or control participants, who were offered only the second opportunity. This finding was obtained using both a scenario methodology and an actual experimental situation. Possible explanations for inaction inertia based on perceptual contrast, dissonance, selfperception, or commitment theories were tested but were not clearly supported. Experiment 6, however, indicated that framing the initial inaction as a loss plays an important mediating role in producing inaction inertia
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The likelihood of engaging in the same behavior in the next period increases if the consumer chose that behavior in the most recent time period and has a high overall rate of the past behavior.
“The likelihood of engaging in the same behavior in the next period increases if the consumer (a) chose that behavior in the most recent (immediately preceding) time period, and (b) has a high overall rate , or frequency, of the past behavior.”
From On or Off Track: How (Broken) Streaks Affect Consumer Decisions (2023) · cites this paper as Tykocinski et al. 1995
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References 25 · Cited by 150
- Authors
- Tykocinski, O. E., Pittman, T. S., & Tuttle, E. E.
- Affiliations
- Gettysburg College (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 1995-05
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 793-803
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2055696155
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 0.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- inaction inertia, decision-making, loss aversion, framing effects, commitment, perceived contrast, cognitive dissonance, self-perception, future benefits
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