A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference and generalization.
Abstract
The authors present a theory of how relational inference and generalization can be accomplished within a cognitive architecture that is psychologically and neurally realistic. Their proposal is a form of symbolic connectionism: a connectionist system based on distributed representations of concept meanings, using temporal synchrony to bind fillers and roles into relational structures. The authors present a specific instantiation of their theory in the form of a computer simulation model, Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA). By using a kind of self-supervised learning, LISA can make specific inferences and form new relational generalizations and can hence acquire new schemas by induction from examples. The authors demonstrate the sufficiency of the model by using it to simulate a body of empirical phenomena concerning analogical inference and relational generalization.
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Relational reasoning supports flexible reorganization of schemas and elements to construct new schemas and provides structure and coherence to experience.
“relational reasoning facilitates the flexible reorganization of schemas and elements to construct new schemas (Holyoak, 2012;Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), and provides structure and coherence (e.g., temporal structure, causal structure, etc.) to our experience.”
From Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation. (2020) · cites this paper as Hummel & Holyoak, 2003
Relational reasoning operates under reasoning schemas that reference current goals, contextual constraints, social norms, and rules for reasoning such as cause-and-effect, preconditions, and covariations.
“These operations occur under the guidance of 'reasoning schemas' that reference current goals, contextual constraints and social norms, and rules for the reasoning process itself (e.g., cause-and-effect, preconditions, covariations; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003;Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).”
From Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation. (2020) · cites this paper as Hummel & Holyoak, 2003
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Chapter 2 Design for a Working Memory
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- Authors
- Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 220-264
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W1986787497
- Semantic Scholar
- b8d9ed504f70e38f9674df05bf3aadf729b5d379
- Cited by
- 567
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 49 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 41
- FWCI
- 9.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Neural Networks and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › AI-based Problem Solving and Planning
- Keywords
- relational inference, temporal synchronization, relational structures, schemas, analogical inference, self-supervised learning, inductive learning, cognitive architecture, distributed representations
- MeSH terms
- Generalization, Psychological, Humans, Memory, Models, Psychological, Symbolism, Neural Networks, Computer
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