Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation.
Open accessAbstract
Mental time travel (MTT) is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process – constructive episodic simulation – and demonstrate that the ‘simulation system’ meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world; (2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf. predictive coding); and (3) is subserved by the same brain system. I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus. Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience. This proposal has some important implications for the construct of ‘MTT’, suggesting that ‘time’ and ‘travel’ may not be defining, or even essential, features. Rather, it is the ‘mental’ rendering of experience that is the most fundamental function of this simulation system, enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 105 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationreasoning
Whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation process is subserved by the same brain system.
“(3) is subserved by the same brain system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
The simulation system satisfies the three criteria for a neurocognitive system.
“I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process -constructive episodic simulation -and demonstrate that the 'simulation system' meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“Moreover, this reconceptualisation meets Schacter and Tulving's (1994) critieria for a single, shared neurocognitive system: irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schacter and Tulving's (1994)
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
- Premisecitation
Episodic retrieval involves synchronous reactivation of activation patterns in cortical areas that initially processed elements of the original experience, reconstructing the originally encoded representation.
“Furthermore, neuroimaging has provided evidence that, for instance, episodic retrieval involves synchronous reactivation of activation patterns in the cortical areas that initially processed the elements of the original experience, thereby reconstructing the originally-encoded representation of the experience (Fuster, 1997;Schacter et al., 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation process acts on the same types of information, ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser conceptual information and schemas.
“Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation process: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world;”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
- Premisecitation
Episodic memory is primarily conceived of as a constructive process.
“Episodic memory is primarily conceived of as being a constructive process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Interpretationreasoning
Memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process, namely constructive episodic simulation.
“I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process -constructive episodic simulation -and demonstrate that the 'simulation system' meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · hedged
“Instead of conceptualizing imagination as reliant on the episodic memory system, I suggest both memories and imaginings are instantations of the same neurocognitive process: constructive episodic simulation (Addis, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · hedged
- Interpretationreasoning
Whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation process is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that build a schematic scaffold, the event representation, and their dynamic interplay.
“(2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf.predictive coding);”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
- Interpretationnone given
Simulations vary in associative strength depending on the associative history of constituent details, rather than remembering and imagining taxing distinct associative processes of reintegration and recombination.
“(2) I reformulate our hypothesis that remembering and imagining tax distinct types of associative processes, namely reintegration and recombination respectively, instead suggesting that simulations vary in 'associative strength' depending on the associative history of constituent details (i.e., whether details have been previously associated);”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Memory and imagination engage the same brain networks, including the default mode network.
“Neuroimaging has revealed that memory and imagination engage the same brain networks, including the default mode network (DMN; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007;Okuda et al., 2003;Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; see Figure 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
Some apparent differences between past and future events likely reflect differences in proportional resolution rather than fundamental differences in content or mechanism.
“As I recently argued (Addis, 2018), some apparent differences between past and future events likely reflect differences in proportional resolution rather than fundamental differences in content or mechanistic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationnone given
Constructive episodic simulation applies not only to remembering and imagining, but also to perceiving events.
“(5) I suggest that constructive episodic simulation applies not only to remembering and imagining, but also to perceiving events;”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Remembered and imagined events comprise similar content.
“There is considerable evidence to support the claim that remembered and imagined events comprise similar content.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Viewing memory and imagination as the same process removes the difficulty of explaining differential deficits in future thinking within current theories of episodic memory.
“Although these findings are difficult to explain within current theories of episodic memory, viewing memory and imagination as the same process removes this difficulty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Associative schematic processes guide construction of a simulation, providing a framework and a means for iteratively refining it until an event boundary is reached.
“(3) I propose that associative schematic processes guide the construction of a simulation, providing a framework for the simulation and a means for iteratively refining it until an event boundary is reached;”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Variance in the resolution of an event representation likely reflects the resolution of its constituent elements.
“While representations may vary in resolution, I posit that this variance likely reflects the resolution of the constituent elements.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
According to Schacter and Tulving's criteria, memory and imagination are one neurocognitive system.
“My contention is that, according to these criteria, memory and imagination are indeed one neurocognitive system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“Moreover, this reconceptualisation meets Schacter and Tulving's (1994) critieria for a single, shared neurocognitive system: irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schacter and Tulving's (1994)
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
- Premisecitation
Both past and future mental time travel engage aspects of the default mode network, including medial prefrontal, medial and inferior lateral parietal, anterolateral temporal cortices, and the medial temporal lobes.
“Specifically, both forms of MTT engage aspects of the DMN (Figure 1), including medial prefrontal, medial and inferior lateral parietal, and anterolateral temporal cortices, and the medial temporal lobes (Addis et al., 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis et al., 2007 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisereasoning
The neurocognitive overlap between past and future events reflects a unidirectional contributory relationship in which episodic memory supports future simulation.
“There is, however, an asymmetry inherent in this account, in that the neurocognitive overlap between past and future events reflects a unidirectional contributory relationship whereby episodic memory supports future simulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Differential deficits in future thinking have been reported in various disorders.
“Additionally, differential deficits in future thinking have been reported in various disorders (de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, et al., 2012;Irish et al., 2012a).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, et al., 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Irish et al., 2012a
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Simulations of past and future events contain the same types of details, as shown by studies using the Autobiographical Interview.
“Irrespective of theme, simulations of past and future events contain the same types of details, as demonstrated in numerous studies utilizing the Autobiographical Interview to examine event transcripts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The relative numbers of different subtypes of episodic details are remarkably similar across past and future events.
“Additionally, the relative numbers of different subtypes of episodic details is remarkably similar (see Figure 2; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012b).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012b
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Classifying details as episodic or semantic according to the traditional definition is problematic.
“Classifying details as either episodic or semantic according to the traditional definition (Tulving, 1972) is problematic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tulving, 1972
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
These default mode network activation patterns are evident whenever one is engaged in simulation, whether spontaneous or intentional, focused on one's own past and future or someone else's, or on entirely fictional worlds.
“These activation patterns are evident whenever we are engaged in simulation, whether that simulation is spontaneous (e.g., mind-wandering; Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) or intentional, is focused on our own past and future, or someone else's (i.e., theory of mind; Buckner & Carroll, 2007), or entirely fictional worlds (Behrens et al., 2018;Hasson, Chen, & Honey, 2015;Mar,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
There is likely a minimal combination of qualities required for mental time travel into the past and future: the simulation must be nested at least within the self-schema and must contain some proportion of high-resolution elements.
“It is likely that there is a 'minimal combination' of these three qualities required to give rise to MTT into the past and future: (1) in terms of complexity, that the simulation is nested at least within the selfschema; and (2) in terms of proportional resolution, that the simulation contain some proportion of highresolution elements.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The revised constructive episodic simulation hypothesis emphasizes the role of pre-existing knowledge, including semantic, conceptual, and schematic content, in constructing both past and future events.
“(1) I emphasize the role of pre-existing knowledge, including semantic, conceptual and schematic content, in constructing both past and future events;”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Once the two requirements are met, the elaborateness of the simulation will not alter the presence or absence of mental time travel.
“Once these two requirements are met, the elaborateness of the simulation will not alter the presence or absence of MTT.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
During simulation, the contributions of associative strength and associative schematic processes vary along continuums.
“I suggest that during simulation, the contributions of both associative strength and associative schematic processes vary along continuums.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Schemas are essential to constructing event simulations regardless of temporal orientation.
“what is clear is that schemas are essential to their construction, irrespective of temporal orientation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Conceptual knowledge is unlikely to play a direct role in integrating details into an event simulation.
“While it has been suggested that conceptual knowledge may also play a direct role in integration (Irish & Piguet, 2013), it seems unlikely to be the case.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Irish & Piguet, 2013 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
When simulating novel or unusual events, conceptual expansion and spreading activation through semantic networks may be needed to expand the simulation space so disparate ideas can be incorporated into a coherent simulation.
“when simulating novel or unusual events, processes such as conceptual expansion and spreading activation through semantic networks may be required to expand the 'simulation space' so as to incorporate disparate ideas into a novel yet coherent simulation (Roberts & Addis, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Roberts & Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Relevant schemas are activated based on available information, including incoming perceptual information and internally generated information such as predictions.
“Relevant schemas are activated on the basis of available information, such as incoming perceptual and/or internally-generated information (e.g., prediction; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Schemas provide structure to event simulations in the same way whether the event is perceived, remembered, or imagined.
“I propose that schemas provide structure to event simulations in the same way irrespective of whether the event is perceived, remembered or imagined (Addis, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
- Interpretationcitation
Associative strength is likely the mechanism that underlies the fluency of event simulations.
“associative strength is the likely mechanism underlying the fluency of event simulations (cf.Michaelian, 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Michaelian, 2011 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
What has been called scaffolding in event simulation is relational reasoning.
“I propose that what has been referred to as scaffolding is relational reasoning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The hippocampus mediates associations among all elements of a simulation, whether or not those elements are scene-related.
“the hippocampus mediates the associations between all elements comprising the simulation, whether scene-related or not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Differential anterior hippocampal activity during future simulation reflects recruitment of additional associative processes, specifically recombination of details rather than reintegration of previously associated details.
“associative processes during future simulation, specifically the recombination of details, as compared to the reintegration of the previously associated details comprising past events”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Addis & Schacter, 2012 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Schacter & Addis, 2007
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
How much associative strength and schemas contribute to a simulation depends on the nature of that simulation and is perhaps most dependent on its self-relevance.
“The degree to which associative strength and/or schemas contribute to a given simulation very much depends on the nature of that particular simulation and is perhaps most dependent on its selfrelevance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Relational reasoning operates under reasoning schemas that reference current goals, contextual constraints, social norms, and rules for reasoning such as cause-and-effect, preconditions, and covariations.
“These operations occur under the guidance of 'reasoning schemas' that reference current goals, contextual constraints and social norms, and rules for the reasoning process itself (e.g., cause-and-effect, preconditions, covariations; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003;Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Hummel & Holyoak, 2003 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The constructive simulation system operates associatively, with distinct associative processes at the levels of elements, schemas, and schema-simulation interaction.
“The modus operandi of the constructive simulation system is associative, with different associative processes occurring at different levels of the simulation process: between elements, within and between schemas, and between schemas and the emergent simulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
- Interpretationreasoning
The inherent complexity of a non-personal simulation likely decreases because it is not nested within the self-schema, the most complex and multidimensional knowledge structure humans possess.
“the inherent complexity of the simulation likely also decreases because, for one, it is not nested within the self-schema -the most complex, multidimensional knowledge structure that humans possess.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
All simulations, whether remembered or imagined, vary along a continuum of associative strength determined by the prior associative history of their constituent elements.
“I recently reformulated this hypothesis (Addis, 2018), instead proposing that all simulations -whether remembered or imagined -vary along a continuum of 'associative strength' depending on the associative history of constituent elements”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
The hippocampus has a general associative role, supporting construction of both scenes and the events within them.
“we have argued that the hippocampus plays a more general associative role, supporting the construction of both scenes and the events that play out within those scenes (Roberts, Schacter, & Addis, 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Roberts, Schacter, & Addis, 2017 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Associative strength is likely lower for non-personal events because existing assemblages of pre-associated elements from one's prior experiences are less relevant.
“associative strength is likely lower for non-personal events, given that existing assemblages of pre-associated elements from one's prior experiences are less relevant, if at all.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Simulation is an iterative, dynamic process that unfolds over seconds to minutes.
“I conceive of simulation as an iterative, dynamic process that unfolds over seconds to minutes (Addis, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Relational reasoning enables prediction, constraint, and selection of possible elements and their possible associations.
“relational reasoning enables prediction, constraint and selection of possible elements (i.e., of the relevant elements specified in activated schemas) and the possible nature of their associations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In most cases, this iterative process enhances the coherence, plausibility, and relevance of the simulation to self and goals.
“The net sum is that (in most cases) the coherence, plausibility, and relevance (to self and goals) of the simulation is enhanced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
A simulation is held online and continually refined until an event boundary is reached, such as a shift in attention within the inner world or in the external world.
“The simulation is held online and continually refined until an event boundary is reached (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007); such boundaries include shifts in attention occurring both within the inner world (e.g., a change in an internally-generated event representation) and the external word”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
In perception, streams of incoming sensory information are processed and, through continual interaction with relevant schemas, integrated into an emerging simulation supported by higher-level default mode network regions.
“During perception, various streams of incoming sensory information are processed and, with continual interactions with relevant schemas, are integrated together into an emerging simulation supported by the higher-level DMN regions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
This conceptualization incorporates the understanding of whole brain networks as dynamic entities whose activity and connectivity shift with situational demands.
“this conceptualization takes into account our increasing understanding of these whole brain networks as dynamic entities, with patterns of activity and connectivity (both within-network and with other networks) shifting as required by ever-changing situational demands (Cabral, Kringelbach, & Deco, 2014;Shine et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
The self is a cognitive space in its own right.
“I would argue that the self is a cognitive space in its own right.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The self space is likely the overarching cognitive space within which schemas of all self-relevant simulations are nested.
“the 'self space' is likely the overarching cognitive space within which schemas of all self-relevant simulations are nested.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Increased schema-reliance is associated with activity in and connectivity between the anterior hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex.
“Increased schema-reliance has been associated with activity in and connectivity between anterior hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017;Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2017)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Because non-personal events rely less on self-schema and have reduced complexity, associative strength, elaborateness, and proportional resolution, imagining them is associated with lower activity in many DMN regions relative to imagining personal events.
“With lower reliance on self-schema, as well as reductions in complexity, associative strength, elaborateness and proportional resolution, it is not surprising that imagining non-personal events is associated with lower activity levels in many DMN regions relative to imagining personal events (including parahippocampal cortex, posterior cingulate, and cuneus; e.g., D' Argembeau et al., 2010;Szpunar”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Simulations can be situated within multi-dimensional cognitive spaces.
“supporting the compelling prediction that simulations can be situated within multi-dimensional cognitive space(s).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Simulations are situated within multi-dimensional cognitive spaces akin to cognitive maps.
“the proposal that simulations are situated within multi-dimensional cognitive spaces akin to cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tolman, 1948 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Projecting the self into the past, the future, or fictional worlds is only one instantiation of a general simulation capacity that also enables comprehension of the present.
“the presentinto the past, the future, or fictional worlds -might be only one instantiation of a general simulation capacity that also enables us to comprehend the present.”
- Also stated in: § 5. Summary and Conclusions · plain
“Indeed, projecting the self into the past, the future, and/or fictional worlds are only some instantiations of a general simulation capacity that also enables us to comprehend and respond to the ever-changing complexities of the present.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5. Summary and Conclusions · plain
- Interpretationown data
Associative strength has a non-linear, U-shaped relationship with DMN activity, increasing as associative strength decreases and constructive demands rise, but only up to a point.
“associative strength has a non-linear, U-shaped relationship with DMN activity, increasing as associative strength decreases and constructive demands ramp up -but only to a point.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Taken together, the two continuums can explain complex patterns of findings from cognitive neuroscience research on past and future MTT over the last decade, including results from our neuroimaging studies of future simulation.
“When taken together, these two continuums can explain the complex patterns of findings yielded by cognitive neuroscience research on past and future MTT over the last decade, including the results of our programme of neuroimaging studies examining future simulation”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Schemas guide the incorporation of pre-existing elements, such as previously perceived elements and conceptual knowledge, into the simulation of present experience, filling gaps in perception and adding deeper meaning.
“Importantly, schemas also guide the incorporation of pre-existing elements into the simulation of present experience, such as previously-perceived elements (depending on associative strength with activated elements) and conceptual knowledge, to fill in gaps in perception, provide deeper levels of meaning, and so on.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Schema-reliance has a positive linear association with involvement of anterior DMN and frontoparietal control network, supporting higher-level relational reasoning and activation of conceptual content.
“The degree of schema-reliance has a positive linear association with the involvement of anterior aspects of the DMN and frontopartietal control network to support higher-level relational reasoning processes and activation of conceptual content (Roberts & Addis, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Roberts & Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
All forms of self-relevant simulation involve self-schemas, though to differing degrees.
“all forms of simulation involve self-schemas (e.g., personal goals, trait self-knowledge, life narratives, etc.) albeit to differing degrees”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Neither 'travel' nor 'time' is essential to constructing a mental rendering of experience.
“One important implication of this hypothesis for the construct of MTT is the possibility that both 'travel' and 'time' are not essential to constructing a mental rendering of experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Imagining future events by recasting past events into the future is highly similar to remembering, using substantial chunks of content whose elements are linked by strong associations.
“imagining future events by recasting past events into the future is highly similar to remembering, again utilizing substantial chunks of content where elements are linked by strong associations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
This proposal can explain greater activity in anterior DMN regions, including the anterior hippocampus, during future relative to past events.
“this proposal can also explain greater activity in anterior DMN regions, including the anterior hippocampus, during future relative to past events (Addis, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The simulation process in perception is essentially the same as the one engaged in remembering and imagining, though the balance of incoming versus pre-existing elements probably differs.
“Essentially this simulation process is the same as that engaged during remembering and imagining, although the balance of incoming to pre-existing elements will likely differ.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The simulation, as an emergent and transient mental construction, may be underpinned by small networks ('process-specific alliances') that assemble and disassemble as needed.
“For instance, the simulation itselfas an emergent and transient mental construction -may be underpinned by small networks (or 'processspecific alliances') that assemble and disassemble as needed (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The same rules of operation govern memory and imagination.
“Second, I argued that the same rules of operation govern memory and imagination.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The simulation system is a general capacity used in the service of other forms of cognition, including perception of ongoing experience.
“I have argued that this simulation system is a general capacity that is leveraged in service of other forms of cognition, including the perception of ongoing experience, a proposal which has important implications for the concept of 'MTT'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Neural dynamics probably play an important role in supporting the ongoing interaction between schemas and the emerging simulation that enables its iterative refinement.
“It is likely that neural dynamics play an important role in supporting ongoing interactions between schemas and the emerging simulation to enable its iterative refinement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The simulation system operates on the same information: schemas and elements at various levels of resolution, from perceptual features to concepts, are used to construct simulations of past and future experiences.
“First, I have shown that this simulation system acts on the same information; schemas and elements at various levels of resolution (ranging from perceptual features to concepts) are used to construct simulations of past and future experiences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
'Time' is not an essential aspect of mental time travel, because simulations of perception reflect the present.
“Not only is 'time' a non-essential aspect of MTT given that simulations of perception reflect the present, it also obviates the need for 'travel' as simulating current experience does not remove one entirely from their present.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 55
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 30
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataOur neuroimaging studies suggest that the threshold lies between simulation of plausible future events and highly novel or implausible events; once reached, DMN activity decreases while anterior DMN and frontoparietal network activity increase.
“Our neuroimaging studies suggest that the threshold sits somewhere between the simulation of plausible future events and high novel or implausible events, and once reached, DMN activity decreases, while activity in anterior DMN and frontoparietal network increase.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationWe observed lower posterior DMN demands during simulation of future events involving incongruent relative to congruent details, as have others during simulation in unfamiliar versus familiar contexts.
“We observed this phenomenon during simulation of future events involving incongruent (relative to congruent) details (Roberts, Wiebels, et al., 2017), as have others during tasks involving simulation of events in unfamiliar (versus familiar) contexts (Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSimulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as perception of ongoing experience.
“Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
“Finally, I will suggest that simulation may be a general cognitive capacity underpinning other forms of cognition, including perception (Section 6).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEpisodic memory and imagination emerge at similar times during childhood, and in adulthood individual differences in emotion regulation and mental imagery correlate similarly with past and future events.
“Psychological research has demonstrated that episodic memory and imagination emerge at similar times during childhood (Atance & O'Neill, 2001), and that in adulthood, individual differences in emotion regulation and mental imagery abilities are correlated similarly with past and future events (D' Argembeau & van der Linden, 2006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe most fundamental function of the simulation system is the mental rendering of experience, which enables re-experiencing the past, pre-experiencing the future, and comprehending the present.
“Rather, it is the 'mental' rendering of experience is the most fundamental function of this simulation system enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“Although this simulation system can be co-opted to mentally traverse time and space, it is the 'mental' rendering of experience that is the key function of this system and crucial to many aspects of higher cognition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenBy forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, and the hippocampus maps any given simulation within them.
“I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“I also propose that this 'simulation system' supports the construction of multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation can be mapped by the hippocampus (Section 5).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning'Time' and 'travel' may not be defining or even essential features of the construct of mental time travel.
“This proposal has some important implications for the construct of 'MTT', suggesting that 'time' and 'travel' may not be defining, or even essential,”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
“This view has some important implications for how we understand MTT, suggesting that 'time' and 'travel' may not be defining characteristics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCognitive studies have shown that a memory may be missing elements or may contain new information, including schema-relevant or newly encountered information.
“Since the seminal work of Bartlett (1932), numerous cognitive studies have demonstrated that a memory may be missing elements and/or may contain new information (information that is schema-relevant and/or was newly encountered since the original experience; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bartlett (1932)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe brain's default network is involved not only in mental time travel into the past and future but also in other forms of mental time travel such as counterfactual thinking, and in other cognition including creativity, theory of mind, narrative comprehension, and event perception.
“However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the brain's default network is not only involved in MTT into the past and future but also engaged other forms of MTT such as counterfactual thinking (De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013), and other forms of cognition, including creativity (Roberts & Addis, 2018), theory of mind (Frith & Frith, 2003), narrative comprehension (Mar,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe exact brain regions involved in a given memory vary depending on the representational content, because episodic retrieval reactivates elements of a past experience.
“Because episodic retrieval involves reactivating the elements of a past experience, the exact brain regions involved in a given memory will vary depending on the representational content.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThe episodic memory system supports cognitive processes used during future simulation: episodic retrieval to reactivate details and relational processing to integrate details into a novel event representation.
“The episodic memory system supports the cognitive processes that are utilized during future simulation: episodic retrieval to reactivate details and relational processing to integrate details into a novel event representation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationIf people retain as few details about experiences as suggested by Misra et al. (2018), then remembered past events involve some degree of imagination, such as filling in missing details with internally generated content.
“If people actually retain as few details about their experiences as suggested by the results of a recent study (Misra, Marconi, Peterson, & Kreiman, 2018), then it is not surprising that remembered past events involve some degee of imagination, such as filling in missing details with internallygenerated content including details from related experiences, conceptual information fleshing out aspects”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenMost contemporary researchers consider memory a cognitive faculty distinct from other cognitive domains.
“As discussed in Section 2.1, most contemporary researchers appear to consider memory as a cognitive faculty distinct from other cognitive domains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningEpisodic memory provides raw materials for future imagination, and distributed storage of episodic memories as elements increases accessibility of episodic details.
“Episodic memory provides the raw materials for future imagination, and the distributed storage of episodic memories as elements heightens the accessibility of episodic details.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationConjunction errors involve recombinations of details, and there is no reason to suggest this differs from the recombination process underlying future imagination.
“For instance, conjunction errors (i.e., the integration of erroneous details into a memory) involve recombinations of details, and there is no reason to suggest this would be any different from the recombination process argued to underlie future imagination (Addis & Schacter, 2012;Schacter & Addis, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Addis & Schacter, 2012 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Schacter & Addis, 2007
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationBecause past and future representations do not differ in structure or content, the fluency of the constructive process indicates whether a given event was previously experienced.
“According to this view, because past and future representations themselves do not differ in structure or content, it is hypothesized that it is the fluency of the constructive process -an attribute of both memory and imagination -that indicates whether or not a given event was previously experienced (Perrin & Michaelian, 2017).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Perrin & Michaelian, 2017 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningContinuums of associative strength and schema-reliance provide a continuist framework that clarifies default mode network involvement and accommodates both similarities and differences between past and future events.
“(4) Continuums of associative strength and schema-reliance provide a continuist framework that clarifies the involvement of the DMN and related networks, and accommodates both similarities and differences between past and future events;”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe constructive nature of episodic memory causes distortions during retrieval, reducing memory veracity, but this is an adaptive design feature that facilitates flexible simulation of future events.
“The central tenet of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis is that although the constructive nature of episodic memory results in relatively frequently distortions during retrieval, thereby reducing the veracity of memory, it is nevertheless an adaptive 'design feature' that facilitates the flexible simulation of future events (Schacter & Addis, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schacter & Addis, 2007
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
InterpretationcitationFailures of source or reality monitoring occur because remembered and imagined events are often very similar in content and phenomenology, for instance when imagined events are elaborate, vivid, and plausible.
“By the continuist view, failures of source/reality monitoring occur because remembered and imagined events are often very similar in content and phenomenology, for instance, when imagined events are elaborate, vivid, and plausible (Devitt, Monk-Fromont, Schacter, & Addis, 2016;Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996;Johnson et al., 1993).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPast and future events tend to centre on similar themes, such as social or leisure activities, relationship episodes, successes or failures, and illnesses or accidents of self or others, and feature events from the individual's cultural life script.
“Past and future events tend to centre on similar themes, such as social/leisure activities, relationship episodes, successes/failures, illnesses/accidents of the self/others (D' Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004), and feature events from the individual's cultural life script (e.g., in Western societies, typical events include graduating, getting a job, getting married, etc.; Rasmussen & Berntsen,”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningPrevailing models of episodic memory as a distinct faculty typically characterize memory as constructive, implying memory is modifiable in ways akin to imagination.
“Interestingly, the prevailing models of episodic memory as a distinct faculty typically characterize memory as constructive, thus also implying memory is modifiable in ways akin to 'imagination'.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAcross past and future events, the numbers of episodic details are strongly correlated, as are the numbers of non-episodic details.
“Much of the literature to date has focused on whether constituent details are episodic or semantic in nature, finding that across past and future events the numbers of episodic details is strongly correlated, as are the numbers of non-episodic details (e.g., Addis et al., 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis et al., 2008 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSimulations are situated within complex cognitive spaces that code for multiple dimensions of experience, as a way of interpreting, predicting, and interacting with the world.
“(6) I hypothesize that, as a way of interpreting, predicting, and interacting with the world, simulations are situated within complex cognitive 'spaces' that code for multiple dimensions of experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf memory and imagination arise from one neurocognitive system, then the rules by which simulations are built should not differ according to whether the simulated event is remembered or imagined.
“If memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system, then the operational rules of simulation should be the same irrespective of whether the simulation being constructed is a remembered or imagined event”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIt is difficult or impossible to determine whether a detail is represented perceptually or conceptually from verbal descriptions alone, and neuroimaging has not resolved this because episodic and semantic memory engage overlapping default mode network regions.
“However, it is difficult (if not impossible) to determine whether any one detail is represented perceptually or conceptually on the basis of verbal descriptions alone, and neuroimaging profiles have not (as of yet) resolved the issue given that episodic and semantic memory engage overlapping DMN regions (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009;Burianova & Grady, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Burianova & Grady, 2007
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSchemas facilitate reconstruction of memories and modify memories to fit general understanding of the world and self.
“Furthermore, just as schemas facilitate the reconstruction of memories, schemas also modify memories to fit with our general understanding of the world (e.g., cultural schemas; Bartlett, 1932) and ourselves (e.g., self schema; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), again bringing memories into the domain of imagination.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bartlett, 1932
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationOne of the only consistent differences between a memory and a vivid imagining is a relative difference in the fluency of construction.
“Thus it may be that one of the only consistent differences between a memory and a vivid imagining is a relative difference in the fluency of construction (Michaelian, 2011), although even fluency differences can dissipate with repeated imaginings (Wiebels et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Michaelian, 2011 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Wiebels et al., 2019
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenMemory scientists have largely focused on remembering the ground truth of experience, emphasizing a direct causal link to the past that imagined events cannot possess.
“Memory scientists have, by-and-large, focused on the ability to remember the ground truth of experience, thus emphasizing a direct causal link to the past that imagined events cannot possess.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenMost cognitive neuroscience theories sit between moderate discontinuism and moderate continuism.
“Most cognitive neuroscience theories sit somewhere between moderate discontinuism to moderate continuism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAn activated schema acts as a template that predicts likely elements of the event and, when details are unavailable, guides addition of relevant conceptual content to the simulation.
“As a template, the schema provides predictions about the elements that are/were/will be likely experienced in the past/present/future event, and if those details not readily available (i.e., not currently perceived or activated), the schema guides the addition of relevant conceptual content to the simulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA schema provides predicted relations between elements; in simulations, temporal, spatial, and causal associations likely predominate because events unfold over time and space.
“the schema provides a structure in the form of predicted relations between elements; with respect to simulations, it is likely that temporal, spatial and causal associations predominate given that events that unfold over time and in space.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe hippocampus is essential for forming and retrieving associations between elements.
“the hippocampus is critical for mediating the (re)creation of associations at encoding and retrieval.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schacter et al., 1998 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAs multimodal information is accumulated and integrated with the event schema, the emerging simulation is held online in working memory and can be successively modified and refined.
“As internallygenerated and/or externally-perceived multimodal information is accumulated and integrated with the event schema, the emerging simulation is held online in working memory (cf.episodic buffer; Baddeley, 2000) enabling it to be successively modified and refined.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Baddeley, 2000 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationConcepts and categories resemble schemas but are relatively fixed because their inter-relationships are based on fixed definitions, so they lack the adaptability needed for higher-level associative processes such as relational reasoning.
“Although concepts and categories bear resemblances to schemas (e.g., being acquired gradually and organised in associative networks), their relative fixedness is a direct result of inter-relationships being based on fixed definitions (i.e., the defining features of a category; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014) and thus they lack the adaptability necessary for higher-level associative processes such as rel”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014 source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAssociative strength is a change in the weights between elements caused by those elements occurring together.
“Associative strength reflects a change in the weights between elements that occurs simply by virtue of those elements occuring together (cf.Hebb, 1949).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hebb, 1949
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationEpisodic memories are collections of associated elements that are reconstructed during retrieval.
“episodic memories are sets of associated elements that are reconstructed at retrieval (Schacter et al., 1998)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schacter et al., 1998 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAssociative strength can explain why past events are constructed more fluently and quickly than imagined events, because remembered events have higher associative strength.
“associative strength can explain findings that past events are constructed more fluently and quickly than imagined events (Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012;Wiebels et al., 2019), given that associative strength is higher for remembered events.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Wiebels et al., 2019
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSome hippocampal regions are engaged during both remembering and imagining, whereas the anterior hippocampus is more active during imagination than remembering.
“while some regions of the hippocampus are commonly engaged by remembering and imagining, the anterior hippocampus has been found to be more active when imagining versus remembering (Addis & Schacter, 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis & Schacter, 2012 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMultiple schemas are activated during simulation, including event schemas, other relevant schemas such as the self-schema, and reasoning schemas that adjust, bias, or integrate other schemas.
“Multiple schema will be activated including relevant 'event' schemas, each specifying elements and relations to be incorporated in the simulation, other relevant schemas (e.g., higher-order schemas, such as the self-schema, in which the event schema is nested), as well as 'reasoning schemas' that guide how other activated schemas are (consciously or unconsciously) adjusted, biased and/or integrate”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe cognitive flexibility provided by schemas and relational reasoning may be key to the adaptive nature of simulation.
“the cognitive flexibility afforded by schema and relational reasoning may be the key to the adaptive nature of simulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationHigher-level relational reasoning, such as analogy and inference, involves mapping correspondences and creating higher-order relations between schemas.
“Higher-level forms of relational reasoning, such as analogy and inference, involve mapping correspondences and creating higher-order relations between schemas (i.e., relations between relations; Gentner, 1983;Holyoak, 2012).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSchemas shape not only the content of simulations but also how people reason about past, present, and future and how they situate events relative to self and life.
“schemas not only shape the content of simulations, but also how we reason about the past, present, and future, and how we situate events more broadly with respect to our self and our lives”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe anterior hippocampal imagination effect is stronger for specific future simulations, for simulations built de novo, and for especially novel events.
“This effect is more apparent when the future simulations are specific (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011), are constructed de novo (van Mulukom, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2013) and are especially novel (e.g., implausible future events; Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe iterative nature of simulation allows schemas to be modified or created in response to the emerging simulation and to fill in, adjust, reorganize, or rework the simulation.
“the iterative nature of the simulation process enables associative schematic processes to play out: it allows schemas to be modified or created in response to the emerging simulation, and for schemas to fill-in, adjust, reorganize, or completely rework the simulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationWhen imagining non-personal events, self-schema involvement decreases linearly with psychological closeness to the protagonist, as does engagement of ventromedial prefrontal regions mediating self-schemas.
“When imagining non-personal events (i.e., events that do not feature the self), the involvement of self-schemas decreases linearly with psychological closeness to the protagonist (de Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012) as does the engagement of ventromedial prefrontal regions mediating self-schemas (e.g., D' Argembeau et al., 2010;Szpunar et al., 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationRelational reasoning supports flexible reorganization of schemas and elements to construct new schemas and provides structure and coherence to experience.
“relational reasoning facilitates the flexible reorganization of schemas and elements to construct new schemas (Holyoak, 2012;Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), and provides structure and coherence (e.g., temporal structure, causal structure, etc.) to our experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationElements within schemas are distributions of possible values for a detail, based on cumulative experience, allowing generation of a most likely or default value when needed.
“Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest that elements within schemas are distributions of all possible values of that detail (based on cumulative experience), enabling generation of the most likely or typical 'default' value when necessary”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rumelhart and Ortony (1977)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenDifferent levels of reliance on schemas may explain some apparent differences between types of simulation.
“differing levels of reliance on schemas may explain some of the apparent differences between different types of simulation”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe hippocampus serves to localize a given past or future simulation within the relevant multi-dimensional cognitive space or spaces.
“Although speculative, I hypothesize that the role of the hippocampus is the localization of a given past or future simulation in relevant multi-dimensional cognitive space(s).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The hippocampus has reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningCells that look spatial, such as place cells, may carry mapping functions that can be used within any activated cognitive space.
“This hypothesis therefore implies that cells that appear to be spatial in nature (e.g., place cells, etc.) may have putative mapping functions that can be utilized within any activated cognitive space(s).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationCraik and Lockhart's Levels of Processing theory proposed that what is called memory is actually the processing of information, including perception of incoming information.
“In their Levels of Processing theory, Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed that what we think of as memory is actually the processing of information, including the perception of incoming information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Craik and Lockhart (1972) source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNesting within the self space is one of the necessary conditions of MTT, along with the simulation having a sufficient proportion of high-resolution elements.
“this nesting is one of the necessary conditions of MTT I suggest in Section 4.1 (along with the simulation having a sufficient proportion of high resolution elements).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenDuring remembering, schemas contribute at the lower end of the continuum but still organize activated elements, identify inaccurate, irrelevant, or missing content, guide corrections or gap filling, and support relational reasoning between the event schema and other schemas such as the self.
“Although the contribution of schemas during remembering is at the lower end of the continuum, schemas nevertheless play a number of roles, including (but not limited to) organizing activated elements, the identification of inaccurate, irrelevant, or missing content, guiding corrections or the filling of gaps, and relational reasoning between the event schema and other relevant schemas such as the”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationAlthough the DMN is active during remembering, it is not maximally active, as studies show greater activity during future simulation than during remembering.
“although the DMN is active, it is not maximally so, as indicated by studies showing activity during future simulation exceeds that during remembering (e.g., Addis et al., 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis et al., 2007 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationHigher-level DMN regions may accumulate activated elements and hold the emerging simulation online, while iterative interactions with schemas refine the simulation.
“it may be that higher-level DMN regions (e.g., angular gyrus, posterior cingulate) accumulate activated elements and hold the emerging simulation online, while iterative interactions with schemas serve to refine the simulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAlthough schema-reliance and associative strength vary across the spectrum of simulation tasks, neither process is unique to past or future simulation, and both remembering and imagining involve coupling of the DMN and frontoparietal control network.
“although schema-reliance and associative strength vary across this spectrum of simulation tasks, from past events through to novel or implausible future events, neither process is unique to the simulation of past or future events, and both remembering and imagining is associated with coupling of the DMN and frontoparietal control network (Dixon et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Dixon et al., 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe hippocampus does not itself build simulations; instead it situates the emergent simulation within broader knowledge structures.
“By this account, the hippocampus does not construct simulations per se, but rather contextualizes the emergent simulation within broader knowledge structures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The hippocampus has reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPerception involves the schema-guided construction of an internal simulation of experience, a process no different in kind from remembering or imagining events, and is underpinned by the same neurocognitive system as memory and imagination.
“I have previously suggested that perception is associated with the schema-guided construction of an internal simulation of experience -a process that is fundamentally no different to remembering or imagining events (Addis, 2018).”
- Also stated in: § 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity · plain
“In other words, perception is underpinned by the same neurocognitive system as memory and imagination.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis, 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe overall proportional resolution of non-personal simulations is likely lower, with a greater proportion of lower-resolution elements such as general semantic knowledge.
“The overall proportional resolution of non-personal simulations is also likely lower, with a greater proportion of lower-resolution elements such as general semantic knowledge (Szpunar et al., 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Szpunar et al., 2007 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationNeisser viewed memory as not distinct from other aspects of cognition and perception.
“Neisser (1976) also viewed memory as non-distinct from other aspects of cognition and perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Neisser (1976)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe continuums are based on findings that reflect the average of multiple simulations, but individual simulations can diverge from this pattern.
“These continuums have been constructed on the basis of findings that reflect the average of multiple simulations, but individual simulations can diverge from this pattern.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThis proposal may help lessen the tension between spatial/relational and mnemonic/prospective accounts of hippocampal function.
“this idea could help to reduce the tension between spatial/relational, and mnemonic/prospective accounts of hippocampal function.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThese findings fit the notion that brain networks functionally couple and uncouple according to task demands, and studies report DMN-frontoparietal control network connectivity increases as flexible or creative thinking is needed.
“Such findings fit with the notion that brain networks functionally couple and uncouple as required by task demands, and a number of studies report connectivity between DMN and frontoparietal control network as the need for flexible or creative thinking increases (e.g., Beaty, Benedek, Barry Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015;Roberts & Addis, 2018;Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPre-experiencing vivid future events is not by itself enough to produce the sense that an event will occur in one's future; contextualization with high-level autobiographical knowledge is required, and comparable results hold for remembered past events.
“Their results demonstrate that pre-experiencing vivid future events (i.e., future MTT) is not sufficient to convey the sense that the event will actually occur in one's future without this contextualization with autobiographical knowledge; similar findings are reported for remembered past events (Scoboria et al., 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ernst, Scoboria, and D'Argembeau (2019)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Scoboria et al., 2014 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPast events on average contain a higher proportion of strongly associated elements than most future events and are therefore constructed more fluently.
“past events will, on average, contain a higher proportion of strongly-associated elements than most future events and are therefore constructed more fluently.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningOver a lifetime of experience and reflection, people construct and continually refine distributions of aspects of the self, making the self the most elaborate knowledge structure we possess.
“Over a lifetime of experience and reflection, we construct and continually refine distributions of various aspects of the self (e.g., one's life story, trait self-knowledge, etc.), meaning that the self is the most elaborate knowledge structure we possess.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningHolding a larger collection of singular elements online is more intensive than holding a few chunks of associated elements, so future events place greater demands on the DMN.
“holding a larger collection of singular elements online (as is more likely the case with future events) is a more intensive operation than holding a few chunks of associated elements (as is more likely for past events), thus placing greater demands on the DMN.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationNo neuroimaging study has directly examined recast events, but the phenomenon has been observed in semantic dementia patients who can recall and recast past events into the future yet cannot imagine future events, showing the similarity of remembering and recasting.
“To my knowledge, no neuroimaging study has directly examined recast events, however, this phenomenon has been observed in patients with semantic dementia who can recall past events and recast past events into the future, but are unable to imagine future events (Irish et al., 2012a), exemplifying the similarity of remembering and recasting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Irish et al., 2012a
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAs the simulation is iteratively constructed, each version would need to be situated in relevant cognitive spaces by the hippocampus for latent inferences to be used in refining the simulation.
“Moreover, as the simulation is iteratively constructed, each version would need to be situated in relevant cognitive spaces by the hippocampus if latent inferences are to be leveraged in refining the simulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA predictive error signal occurs when a schema fails to provide an adequate model, after which the schema is switched or modified through relational reasoning.
“Moreover, 'predictive error' signals when a schema fails to provide an adequate model and is then either switched or modified via relational reasoning processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNeisser's approach and the author's own proposal can both be regarded as variants of predictive coding theory.
“Interestingly, Neisser's (1976) approach, and my own proposal herein, can also be considered variants of predictive coding theory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMemory and imagination are served by the same neurocognitive system, the default mode network, with dynamic involvement of the frontoparietal control network and the salience network interfacing the two as required.
“Third, memory and imagination are subserved by the same neurocognitive system: the DMN, with the dynamic involvement of the frontoparietal control network (with the salience network interfacing the two) as required.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSimulation is the ongoing process of interpreting and understanding one's own reality; an individual's experiential history modifies their schemas and their corpus of previously encountered elements and shapes the multidimensional cognitive spaces in which simulations are situated.
“Simulation is the ongoing process of interpreting and understanding our own realities; each individual's unique experiential history modifies their schemas as well as their idiosyncratic corpus of previouslyencountered elements (including the associative strength between said elements), and moulds the multidimensional cognitive spaces in which these simulations are situated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe author's proposal rests on predictive coding principles: an ongoing, dynamic, bidirectional interaction between schemas and the emergent simulation, in which schemas shape the simulation and the simulation modifies schemas.
“My proposal is built on predictive coding principles: an ongoing, dynamic bidirectional interactivity between schemas (models of prior experience) and the emergent simulation whereby schemas shape the simulation of experience, and the simulation modifies schemas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning'Travel' is not needed for mental time travel, because simulating current experience does not remove one entirely from the present.
“Not only is 'time' a non-essential aspect of MTT given that simulations of perception reflect the present, it also obviates the need for 'travel' as simulating current experience does not remove one entirely from their present.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMemory and imagination are the same process, underpinned by the same neurocognitive system.
“My reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis argues for a more continuist position than we have done previously by arguing that memory and imagination are the same process underpinned by the same neurocognitive system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationPredictive coding posits interactions between an internal model of experience and actual experience, with the discrepancy between them (prediction error) used to revise the model and improve its predictive power later.
“Predictive coding proposes interactions between an internal model of experience and actual experience, with the difference between the two ('prediction error') used to revise the model thus improving its predictive power during subsequent experiences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Dayan, Hinton, & Neal, 1995 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSimulation is an inherently constructive process governed by associative processes at different scales, including associations between elements, associative schematic processes, and the dynamic interplay between schemas and the simulation.
“Simulation is an inherently constructive process governed by associative processes operating at different scales: associations (of varying strength) between elements; associative schematic processes that enable construction of a suitable schema (e.g., relational reasoning), as well as the dynamic interplay between schemas and the simulation itself (cf.predictive coding)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenSimulations differ in proportional resolution, elaborateness, and complexity.
“Simulations vary in proportional resolution (i.e., the balance of elements at various resolutions), elaborateness, and complexity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
“If memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system”
The paper relies on this without support.
The hippocampus has reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain.
“Indeed, the hippocampus has the reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain, positioning it anatomically to play such a role.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Dreams leverage fragments of past memory in constructing imagined scenarios that anticipate future events, much as described in waking cognition.
“This suggests that dreams leverage fragments of past memory in constructing imagined scenarios that anticipate future events, much as described in the case of waking cognition [2, 3, 6].”
From Constructive episodic simulation in dreams (2022) · cites this paper as [2]
Section 4.1 describes remembered and imagined future events as assemblages of elements, supporting the comparison with waking cognition. Our copy does not establish that dreams use memory fragments to construct scenarios anticipating future events; searches for “dream” and “sleep” found no passage addressing that extension. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Cognitive-spaces section is misnumbered in the introduction
MinorThe introduction directs readers to Section 5 for cognitive spaces, but that discussion is headed Section 4.4; Section 5 is the summary.
“I also propose that this 'simulation system' supports the construction of multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation can be mapped by the hippocampus (Section 5).”
“## 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces”
Perception section is misnumbered in the introduction
MinorThe introduction assigns the discussion of perception to Section 6, but it appears in Section 4.5. The paper ends with Section 5.
“Finally, I will suggest that simulation may be a general cognitive capacity underpinning other forms of cognition, including perception (Section 6).”
“## 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity”
Cites
Levels of processing: A framework for memory research
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(72)80001-x · Cited by 9,566 · see citing works
(1978) · UA Campus Repository (The University of Arizona) · Cited by 8,010 · see citing works
The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?
Baddeley, A. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01538-2 · Cited by 7,359 · see citing works
Cognitive maps in rats and men
Tolman, E. C. (1948) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0061626 · Cited by 6,641 · see citing works
Saliency, switching, attention and control: a network model of insula function
Menon, V., & Uddin, L. Q. (2010) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-010-0262-0 · Cited by 5,592 · see citing works
The Organization of Behavior; A Neuropsychological Theory.
Attneave, F., B., M., & Hebb, D. O. (1950) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1418888 · Cited by 5,146 · see citing works
Tulving, E. (1985) · Canadian Psychology / Psychologie canadienne · doi:10.1037/h0080017 · Cited by 4,638 · see citing works
The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory
(1950) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.1950.02910470083028 · Cited by 4,271 · see citing works
The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.2.261 · Cited by 4,089 · see citing works
Binder, J. R., Desai, R. H., Graves, W. W., & Conant, L. L. (2009) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp055 · Cited by 4,060 · see citing works
(2007) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.4135/9781446212967.n15 · Cited by 3,749 · see citing works
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3 · Cited by 3,392 · see citing works
Kronenfeld, D. B. (1978) · Language · doi:10.2307/412850 · Cited by 3,094 · see citing works
Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures
Hunt, E. B., Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1979) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1421499 · Cited by 2,967 · see citing works
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 · Cited by 2,691 · see citing works
Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive psychology
Neisser, U. (1976) · Cited by 2,471 · see citing works
Remembering the past to imagine the future: the prospective brain
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2213 · Cited by 2,394 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map
Ranck, J. B. (1979) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/ajp.136.10.1353 · Cited by 2,373 · see citing works
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306 · see citing works
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016 · Cited by 1,949 · see citing works
Self-citationThe cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: remembering the past and imagining the future
Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2087 · Cited by 1,836 · see citing works
Self-citationAging and autobiographical memory: dissociating episodic from semantic retrieval
Levine, B., Svoboda, E., Hay, J. F., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (2002) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037/0882-7974.17.4.677 · Cited by 1,521 · see citing works
Schooling and the Acquisition of Knowledge
Marshall, S. P., Cotton, J. W., Anderson, R. C., Spiro, R. J., & Montague, W. E. (1978) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1421522 · Cited by 1,459 · see citing works
Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.88.1.67 · Cited by 1,454 · see citing works
Patients with hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0610561104 · Cited by 1,414 · see citing works
Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework
Christoff, K., Irving, Z. C., Fox, K. C. R., Spreng, R. N., & Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.113 · Cited by 1,376 · see citing works
Atance, C. M., & O'Neill, D. K. (2001) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01804-0 · Cited by 1,300 · see citing works
Spreng, R. N., Stevens, W. D., Chamberlain, J. P., Gilmore, A. W., & Schacter, D. L. (2010) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.06.016 · Cited by 1,256 · see citing works
Deconstructing episodic memory with construction
Hassabis, D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.05.001 · Cited by 1,229 · see citing works
Event structure in perception and conception.
Zacks, J. M., & Tversky, B. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.1.3 · Cited by 1,208 · see citing works
Dayan, P., Hinton, G. E., Neal, R. M., & Zemel, R. S. (1995) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.1995.7.5.889 · Cited by 1,207 · see citing works
Event perception: a mind-brain perspective
Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., Swallow, K. M., Braver, T. S., & Reynolds, J. R. (2007) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.2.273 · Cited by 1,148 · see citing works
What Is a Cognitive Map? Organizing Knowledge for Flexible Behavior
Behrens, T. E. J., Muller, T. H., Whittington, J. C. R., Mark, S., Baram, A. B., Stachenfeld, K. L., & Kurth-Nelson, Z. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.10.002 · Cited by 1,055 · see citing works
Discovering Event Structure in Continuous Narrative Perception and Memory
Baldassano, C., Chen, J., Zadbood, A., Pillow, J. W., Hasson, U., & Norman, K. A. (2017) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2017.06.041 · Cited by 952 · see citing works
Shine, J. M., Bissett, P. G., Bell, P. T., Koyejo, O., Balsters, J. H., Gorgolewski, K. J., Moodie, C. A., & Poldrack, R. A. (2016) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.09.018 · Cited by 886 · see citing works
THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY
Schacter, D. L., Norman, K. A., & Koutstaal, W. (1998) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.289 · Cited by 827 · see citing works
Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy
GENTNER, D. (1983) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/s0364-0213(83)80009-3 · Cited by 816 · see citing works
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007 · Cited by 792 · see citing works
Neural substrates of envisioning the future
Szpunar, K. K., Watson, J. M., & McDermott, K. B. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0610082104 · Cited by 784 · see citing works
Hierarchical process memory: memory as an integral component of information processing
Hasson, U., Chen, J., & Honey, C. J. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.04.006 · Cited by 749 · see citing works
Neurobiology of Schemas and Schema-Mediated Memory
Gilboa, A., & Marlatte, H. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.04.013 · Cited by 742 · see citing works
Default and executive network coupling supports creative idea production
Beaty, R. E., Benedek, M., Barry Kaufman, S., & Silvia, P. J. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep10964 · Cited by 705 · see citing works
Age-Related Changes in the Episodic Simulation of Future Events
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2008) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02043.x · Cited by 660 · see citing works
Self-citationImagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred
Garry, M., Manning, C. G., Loftus, E. F., & Sherman, S. J. (1996) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03212420 · Cited by 648 · see citing works
Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex Involvement in Relational Integration during Reasoning
Kalina Christoff, A., Prabhakaran, V., Dorfman, J., Zhao, Z., Kroger, J. K., Holyoak, K. J., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2001) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0922 · Cited by 645 · see citing works
Thinking of the future and past: the roles of the frontal pole and the medial temporal lobes
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., Kawashima, R., Fukuda, H., Itoh, M., & Yamadori, A. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00179-4 · Cited by 607 · see citing works
Addis, D. R., Pan, L., Vu, M.-A. T., Laiser, N., & Schacter, D. L. (2008) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.026 · Cited by 600 · see citing works
Self-citationDixon, M. L., De La Vega, A., Mills, C., Andrews-Hanna, J., Spreng, R. N., Cole, M. W., & Christoff, K. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1715766115 · Cited by 595 · see citing works
The proactive brain: memory for predictions
Bar, M. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0310 · Cited by 583 · see citing works
A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference and generalization.
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2003) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.110.2.220 · Cited by 567 · see citing works
What is a memory schema? A historical perspective on current neuroscience literature
Ghosh, V. E., & Gilboa, A. (2014) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.11.010 · Cited by 529 · see citing works
Coping and the Simulation of Events
Taylor, S. E., & Schneider, S. K. (1989) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.1989.7.2.174 · Cited by 524 · see citing works
Fuster, J. M. (1997) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(97)01128-4 · Cited by 516 · see citing works
The neuropsychology of narrative: story comprehension, story production and their interrelation.
Mar, R. (2004) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.12.016 · Cited by 502 · see citing works
Brewin, C. R. (2014) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0033722 · Cited by 492 · see citing works
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2006) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.001 · Cited by 490 · see citing works
What Are the Memory Systems of 1994?
(1994) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4545.003.0002 · Cited by 422 · see citing works
Considering the role of semantic memory in episodic future thinking: evidence from semantic dementia
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. R., & Piguet, O. (2012) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/aws119 · Cited by 405 · see citing works
Self-citationAnalogy and Relational Reasoning
Holyoak, K. J. (2012) · The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0013 · Cited by 394 · see citing works
Recollective qualities modulate hippocampal activation during autobiographical memory retrieval
Addis, D. R., Moscovitch, M., Crawley, A. P., & McAndrews, M. P. (2004) · Hippocampus · doi:10.1002/hipo.10215 · Cited by 383 · see citing works
Self-citationEvent memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.
Rubin, D. C., & Umanath, S. (2015) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0037907 · Cited by 379 · see citing works
Exploring the network dynamics underlying brain activity during rest
Cabral, J., Kringelbach, M. L., & Deco, G. (2014) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2013.12.005 · Cited by 351 · see citing works
The Pivotal Role of Semantic Memory in Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future
Irish, M., & Piguet, O. (2013) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00027 · Cited by 345 · see citing works
Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory
Mahr, J. B., & Csibra, G. (2017) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17000012 · Cited by 339 · see citing works
Kensinger, E. A., Garoff-Eaton, R. J., & Schacter, D. L. (2006) · Journal of Memory and Language · doi:10.1016/j.jml.2006.05.004 · Cited by 306 · see citing works
The Hippocampus and Imagining the Future: Where Do We Stand?
Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2012) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00173 · Cited by 285 · see citing works
Self-citationCommon and Unique Neural Activations in Autobiographical, Episodic, and Semantic Retrieval
Burianová, H., & Grady, C. L. (2007) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.9.1520 · Cited by 218 · see citing works
Role of the hippocampus in remembering the past and imagining the future
Squire, L. R., van der Horst, A. S., McDuff, S. G. R., Frascino, J. C., Hopkins, R. O., & Mauldin, K. N. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1014391107 · Cited by 206 · see citing works
Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking
Brigard, F. D., Addis, D. R., Ford, J. H., Schacter, D. L., & Giovanello, K. S. (2013) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015 · Cited by 203 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Neural Basis of Personal Goal Processing When Envisioning Future Events
D'Argembeau, A., Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S., Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Feyers, D., Maquet, P., & Salmon, E. (2010) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21314 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Are episodic memories special? On the sameness of remembered and imagined event simulation
Addis, D. R. (2018) · Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand · doi:10.1080/03036758.2018.1439071 · Cited by 193 · see citing works
Self-citationRoediger, H. L., Dudai, Y., & Fitzpatrick, S. M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310443.001.0001 · Cited by 187 · see citing works
Unitization and grouping mediate dissociations in memory for new associations.
Graf, P., & Schacter, D. L. (1989) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.15.5.930 · Cited by 183 · see citing works
Hippocampal contributions to the episodic simulation of specific and general future events
Addis, D. R., Cheng, T., P. Roberts, R., & Schacter, D. L. (2011) · Hippocampus · doi:10.1002/hipo.20870 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
Self-citationUnitization and grouping mediate dissociations in memory for new associations.
Graf, P., & Schacter, D. L. (1989) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037//0278-7393.15.5.930 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
Memory Systems, Processing Modes, and Components: Functional Neuroimaging Evidence
Cabeza, R., & Moscovitch, M. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612469033 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Michaelian, K. (2011) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.559623 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Rasmussen, A. S., & Berntsen, D. (2013) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-012-0260-y · Cited by 162 · see citing works
Sheldon, S., McAndrews, M. P., & Moscovitch, M. (2011) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.04.021 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
The role of the hippocampus in memory and mental construction
Sheldon, S., & Levine, B. (2016) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.13006 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
Predicting the phenomenology of episodic future thoughts
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2012) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.004 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
Chen, J., Honey, C. J., Simony, E., Arcaro, M. J., Norman, K. A., & Hasson, U. (2016) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhv155 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
Contextual Processing in Episodic Future Thought
Szpunar, K. K., Chan, J. C. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2009) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn191 · Cited by 132 · see citing works
Future thinking in Parkinson's disease: An executive function?
Vito, S. D., Gamboz, N., Brandimonte, M. A., Barone, P., Amboni, M., & Sala, S. D. (2012) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.03.001 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
The associative structure of memory for multi-element events.
Horner, A. J., & Burgess, N. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0033626 · Cited by 109 · see citing works
The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.
Scoboria, A., Jackson, D. L., Talarico, J., Hanczakowski, M., Wysman, L., & Mazzoni, G. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0034110 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
Exploring the content and quality of episodic future simulations in semantic dementia
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. R., & Piguet, O. (2012) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.09.012 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Self-citationWeiler, J. A., Suchan, B., & Daum, I. (2010) · Hippocampus · doi:10.1002/hipo.20695 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Robins, S. K. (2016) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1113245 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Perrin, D., & Michaelian, K. (2017) · The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory · doi:10.4324/9781315687315-19 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Gilboa, A., & Moscovitch, M. (2017) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2016.10.008 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Asymmetries in Subjective Time
Perrin, D. (2016) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0003 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
The time travelling self: Comparing self and other in narratives of past and future events
Grysman, A., Prabhakar, J., Anglin, S. M., & Hudson, J. A. (2013) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.010 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Michaelian, K. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01857 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
What differentiates episodic future thinking from complex scene imagery?
Vito, S. D., Gamboz, N., & Brandimonte, M. A. (2012) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.01.013 · Cited by 68 · see citing works
Do strategic processes contribute to the specificity of future simulation in depression?
Addis, D. R., Hach, S., & Tippett, L. J. (2016) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjc.12103 · Cited by 68 · see citing works
Self-citationWebb, C. E., Turney, I. C., & Dennis, N. A. (2016) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.09.023 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Anderson, R. J., Dewhurst, S. A., & Nash, R. A. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/a0025451 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Processing of different spatial scales in the human brain
Peer, M., Ron, Y., Monsa, R., & Arzy, S. (2019) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.47492 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Defaulting to Fiction: Neuroscience Rediscovers the Romantic Imagination
Richardson, A. (2011) · Poetics Today · doi:10.1215/03335372-1459845 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
An fMRI investigation of the relationship between future imagination and cognitive flexibility
Roberts, R. P., Wiebels, K., Sumner, R. L., van Mulukom, V., Grady, C. L., Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2017) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.11.019 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Self-citationRe-imagining the future: repetition decreases hippocampal involvement in future simulation
van Mulukom, V., Schacter, D. L., Corballis, M. C., & Addis, D. R. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069596 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Self-citationSelf-agency and self-ownership in cognitive mapping
Arzy, S., & Schacter, D. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.04.003 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
Verfaellie, M. H., Knoff, A. A. W., Reid, A. G., Race, E., & Keane, M. M. (2019) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2019.01.028 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Michaelian, K. (2016) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0004 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Scene Construction and Relational Processing: Separable Constructs?
Roberts, R. P., Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2017) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhx081 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Self-citationBayesian Filtering with Multiple Internal Models: Toward a Theory of Social Intelligence
Isomura, T., Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01239 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Minimal memory for details in real life events
Misra, P., Marconi, A., Peterson, M., & Kreiman, G. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-33792-2 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Conscious Perception: Time for an Update?
Salti, M., Harel, A., & Marti, S. (2018) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_01343 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
A Common Mode of Processing Governing Divergent Thinking and Future Imagination
Roberts, R. P., & Addis, D. R. (2018) · The Cambridge Handbook of the Neuroscience of Creativity · doi:10.1017/9781316556238.013 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Self-citationFactors that influence the generation of autobiographical memory conjunction errors
Devitt, A. L., Monk-Fromont, E., Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2016) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658211.2014.998680 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Self-citationWiebels, K., Addis, D. R., Moreau, D., van Mulukom, V., Onderdijk, K. E., & Roberts, R. P. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/xlm0000831 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Self-citationAgainst discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events
Michaelian, K. (2016) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Ernst, A., Scoboria, A., & D’Argembeau, A. (2019) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1177/1747021819855621 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Urmson, J. O. (1967) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lxxvi.301.83 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Urmson, J. O. (1971) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lxxx.320.607 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
The Role of Hierarchical Dynamical Functions in Coding for Episodic Memory and Cognition
Dannenberg, H., Alexander, A. S., Robinson, J. C., & Hasselmo, M. E. (2019) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_01439 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Squire, L. R., Rolls, E. T., Johnson, M. K., et al. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310443.003.0016 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Part 3. Coding and representation
Treves, A., McIntosh, A. R., Tulving, E., et al. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310443.003.0004 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Hasselmo, M. E., Craik, F. I. M., & Davachi, L. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310443.003.0007 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
3 of the 123 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Bartlett, F.C. 1932. Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Why the COVID-19 pandemic is a traumatic stressor
Bridgland, V. M. E., Moeck, E. K., Green, D. M., Swain, T. L., Nayda, D. M., Matson, L. A., Hutchison, N. P., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0240146 · Cited by 501 · see citing works
Moscovitch, M., & Gilboa, A. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/yxbrs · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Mapping the Imaginative Mind: Charting New Paths Forward
Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., & Grilli, M. D. (2021) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721420980753 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
McCarroll, C. J., Michaelian, K., & Nánay, B. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00629-4 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Mnemicity: A Cognitive Gadget?
Mahr, J. B., Bergen, P. V., Sutton, J. D., Schacter, D. L., & Heyes, C. M. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221141352 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
Imagination and social cognition in childhood
Kushnir, T. (2022) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1603 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
Radicalizing simulationism: Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past
Michaelian, K. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2082934 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Mnemonic construction and representation of temporal structure in the hippocampal formation
Bellmund, J. L. S., Deuker, L., Montijn, N. D., & Doeller, C. F. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-30984-3 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind
O’Connor, B. B., & Fowler, Z. (2022) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/10888683221114215 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Moscovitch, D. A., Moscovitch, M., & Sheldon, S. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221141351 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
A Model of Semantic Completion in Generative Episodic Memory
Fayyaz, Z., Altamimi, A., Zoellner, C., Klein, N., Wolf, O. T., Cheng, S., & Wiskott, L. (2022) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01520 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Imagining the past reliably and unreliably: towards a virtue theory of memory
Michaelian, K. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03125-4 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
“…events as well as laboratory material and that subjects judge that they 7 Neither this research nor the research on memory as a form of mental time travel to which the antinecessity argument appeals will be reviewed here; for reviews, see Addis (2018,2020), Michaelian (2011, 2016c).”
BackgroundDivergent thinking and constructing future events: dissociating old from new ideas
Thakral, P. P., Yang, A. C., Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2021) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658211.2021.1940205 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Self-citationLangland-Hassan, P. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03635-9 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Beyond the episodic–semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations
Addis, D. R., & Szpunar, K. K. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0408 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Self-citationEpisodic mindreading: Mentalizing guided by scene construction of imagined and remembered events
Gaesser, B. (2020) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104325 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
“…established a tight link between episodic memory and episodic simulation, suggesting that they draw on a shared cognitive-neural system in order to “replay” past events and “preplay” future events in one's mind (see Addis, 2020; Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter, Addis, & Szpunar, 2017 for review).”
BackgroundIs remembering constructive imagining?
Sant’Anna, A. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04338-5 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Narrative thinking lingers in spontaneous thought
Bellana, B., Mahabal, A., & Honey, C. J. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-32113-6 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Why the COVID-19 pandemic is a traumatic stressorPreprint
Bridgland, V. M. E., Moeck, E. K., Green, D. M., et al. (2020) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2020.09.22.307637 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Mental Time Travel as Self-Affirmation
Stephan, E., & Sedikides, C. (2023) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/10888683231203143 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
“In her literature review, Addis (2020) concluded that memory and imagination are essentially the same process involving constructive episodic simulation.”
BackgroundThe role of self-reference and personal goals in the formation of memories of the future
Jeunehomme, O., & D’Argembeau, A. (2021) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-021-01150-9 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Constructive episodic simulation in dreams
Wamsley, E. J. (2022) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0264574 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Stability and malleability of emotional autobiographical memories
Wardell, V., & Palombo, D. J. (2024) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-024-00312-1 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
“Malleable memory systems do more than shape remembering; they adaptively allow one to extract content from past episodes and use that content to imagine, plan for and predict future experiences 196–200 .”
A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away: How temporal are episodic contents?
Mahr, J. B., Greene, J. D., & Schacter, D. L. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103224 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Moscovitch, D. A., White, K., & Hudd, T. (2023) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/21677026231195792 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Law, K. F., Syropoulos, S., & Young, L. (2023) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su152416732 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“In other words, longtermists are not simply mental time travelers (see [78,79]) with a keen ability to vividly represent the future, but optimistic mental time travelers, with an elevated capacity to imagine a future that is better than today.”
BackgroundJourneying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?
Trakas, M. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1260458 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
“…acquired in the last years, particularly regarding theories that blur or do not clearly differentiate between imagination and memory (Michaelian, 2016; Addis, 2018, 2020), it becomes imperative to carefully examine what it really means to conceive memory as a form of mental time travel to the past.”
BackgroundMental imagery skill predicts adults’ reading performance
Suggate, S. P., & Lenhard, W. (2022) · Learning and Instruction · doi:10.1016/j.learninstruc.2022.101633 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Simulating the best and worst of times: the powers and perils of emotional simulation
Wardell, V., Grilli, M. D., & Palombo, D. J. (2022) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658211.2022.2088796 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Episodic thought in development: On the relation between memory and future thinking
Nyhout, A., & Mahy, C. E. V. (2023) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2023.101103 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“If memory and future thinking are indeed the same process with the same underlying components, as in Addis ’ (2020) single system view, then we would not expect differential relations between DMN functional connectivity and quality of past remembering and quality of future thinking.”
BackgroundInfluentialReference in remembering: towards a simulationist account
Openshaw, J., & Michaelian, K. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04508-z · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“First,itpromises tobeapplicabletocasesofepisodicfuturethinking(§5.1),inaccordancewiththe continuistideathatrememberingandvariousformsofconstructiveimaginingare underpinnedbymechanismsoffundamentallythesamekind(e.g.,Addis(2020)).”
InfluentialEpisodic representation: A mental models account
Andonovski, N. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.899371 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination
Sant’Anna, A. (2021) · Estudios de Filosofía · doi:10.17533/udea.ef.n64a04 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Cults, Conspiracies, and Fantasies of Knowledge
Munro, D. (2023) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2022.55 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Exploring mental time travel experiences and their influence on behavioral intentions and learning
Barhorst, J. B., Krey, N., & McLean, G. (2023) · Psychology and Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21828 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Kang, K., Su, Y., Yang, P., et al. (2024) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.125140 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
The temporal compression of events during episodic future thinking
Jeunehomme, O., Leroy, N., & D’Argembeau, A. (2020) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104416 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?
Langland‐Hassan, P. (2021) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2020.28 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Andonovski, N. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04801-x · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“Despite a number of interim developments, the system-centric view and the centrality of the notion of autonoetic consciousness—as well as the closely associated mental time travel —have remained core features of contemporary episodic memory science (Addis, 2020 ; Ranganath, 2022 ).”
Andonovski, N., Sutton, J. D., & McCarroll, C. J. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0413 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“These, however, are differences in degree and not in kind [25,26,33,38,39].”
Editorial: Memory as Mental Time Travel
Sant’Anna, A., Michaelian, K., & Perrin, D. (2020) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-020-00484-8 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Effects of past and future autobiographical thinking on the working self-concept
D’Argembeau, A., & Jimenez, C. G. (2023) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658211.2023.2269324 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Suggate, S. P. (2024) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-024-02496-z · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“Further overlaps exist between memory and imagery (with perception, Addis, 2020).”
How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity
Mahr, J. B. (2023) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12646 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Situated Affects and Place Memory
Sutton, J. D. (2024) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-024-10053-8 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., Mah, A. Y. J., & Young, L. (2024) · BMC Psychology · doi:10.1186/s40359-024-01690-0 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Memory, Future Thinking, and the Self. In Honour of Martial Van Der Linden
D’Argembeau, A. (2021) · Psychologica Belgica · doi:10.5334/pb.1074 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Jordan, K., Zajac, R., Bernstein, D., Joshi, C., & Garry, M. (2022) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.211977 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Repeated simulation increases belief in the future occurrence of uncertain events
Jimenez, C. G., Mazzoni, G. A. L., & D’Argembeau, A. (2023) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-023-01414-6 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“…that different forms of episodic simulation rely on similar constructive processes, regardless of whether the simulation refers to the personal future or is atemporal, counterfactual, or purely imaginary (Addis, 2020; De Brigard & Parikh, 1 3 2019; Mullally & Maguire, 2014; Schacter et al., 2012).”
BackgroundValue shapes the structure of schematic representations in the medial prefrontal cortexPreprint
Paulus, P. C., Charest, I., & Benoit, R. G. (2020) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2020.08.21.260950 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Epistemic Agency in the Age of Large Language Models: Design Principles for Knowledge-Building AI
Woodruff, E., & Hewitt, J. (2026) · AI · doi:10.3390/ai7030099 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“Sustained simulation is the ability to hold representations in abeyance and explore their implications over time, running “what-if” scenarios without immediate commitment to action or belief [45,46].”
Distinct mechanisms and functions of episodic memory
Cheng, S. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0411 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Law, K. F., Syropoulos, S., Coleman, M. B., & Young, L. (2024) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2024.112915 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“For decades, considerable research in psychology on the science of prospection has been dedicated to investigating how people think about their own personal futures (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2020; Strathman et al., 1994).”
InfluentialImagination: A New Foundation for the Science of Mind
Asma, S. T. (2022) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-022-00410-4 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Mourning a death foretold: memory and mental time travel in anticipatory grief
McCarroll, C. J., & Yan, K. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-09956-z · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Systems Consolidation, Transformation, and Reorganization
Moscovitch, M., & Gilboa, A. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190917982.013.43 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Matijevic, S., Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., Knoff, A. A. W., Ryan, L., & Grilli, M. D. (2021) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2021.108138 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Law, K. F., Syropoulos, S., O’Connor, B. B., & Young, L. (2024) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672241303993 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“Put differently, distal futures are hard to predict (Addis, 2020; D’Argembeau & Garcia Jimenez, 2020; Orwig et al., 2023), and existential challenges the future may face are often speculative and uncertain (Bostrom, 2002; Karger et al., 2022).”
Hoffman, P., & Bair, M. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106214 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Wei, J., & Xia, L. (2023) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci14010043 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“PCC and aMPFC, as core hubs of the DMN, are involved in both remembering past and imagining future personal events [30,38].”
BackgroundPeters, S. L., & Sheldon, S. (2020) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2020.112911 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Lalla, A., & Sheldon, S. (2021) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/emo0001050 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Erll, A. (2025) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197767733.001.0001 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Simulationism and Memory Traces
Brigard, F. D. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192882547.003.0009 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Matsumoto, N., & Hallford, D. J. (2023) · Cognition & Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699931.2023.2195617 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“Simplistically, associative learning of cues and specific memories may be occurring in these instances because direct retrieval is an associative process (Addis, 2018, 2020).”
BackgroundCasadio, C., Patané, I., Candini, M., Lui, F., Frassinetti, F., & Benuzzi, F. (2024) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-024-06806-x · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“This aligns with the recent proposal by Addis (2020) of a single “simulation system”.”
Just Simulating? Linguistic Support for Continuism About Remembering and Imagining
Liefke, K. (2024) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-024-00751-y · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“A lot of recent work in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy discusses the question whether episodic remembering is a special kind of imagining (Perrin 2016; see e.g. Perrin and Michaelian 2017; Schacter and Addis 2020; Langland-Hassan 2021; dos Santos et al. 2022).”
Memory as Sensory Modality, Perception as Experience of the Past
Barkasi, M. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00598-7 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Williams, K., Snytte, J., & Sheldon, S. (2022) · Journal of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapy · doi:10.1016/j.jbct.2022.02.002 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory
Sant’Anna, A., & Barkasi, M. (2022) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2022.9192 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Mental time travel for self and others in individuals with a high level of schizotypy
Ye, J., Qin, X., Cui, J., Jia, L., Shi, H., Yang, T., Lui, S. S. Y., Wang, Y., & Chan, R. C. K. (2023) · PsyCh Journal · doi:10.1002/pchj.626 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Fenerci, C., & Sheldon, S. (2022) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658211.2022.2032178 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Role of Memory Science in the Philosophy of Memory
Robins, S. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12880 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Bellmund, J. L. S., Deuker, L., Montijn, N. D., & Doeller, C. F. (2021) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2021.04.23.440002 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Hallford, D. J., Seydavi, M., & Akbari, M. (2024) · Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy · doi:10.1002/cpp.2978 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Episodic recombination and the role of time in mental travel
Mahr, J. B., & Schacter, D. L. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0409 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“This formulation of the idea extends earlier ones that emphasized the primacy of episodic memory retrieval for episodic imagination [26] or the primacy of association as the only principle of composition ([12]; see [43] for criticism).”
InfluentialMemory, Sleep, Dreams, and Consciousness: A Perspective Based on the Memory Theory of Consciousness
Budson, A. E., & Paller, K. A. (2025) · Nature and Science of Sleep · doi:10.2147/nss.s522975 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“48 Memory can, however, be dissociated from perception.”
The cognitive neuroscience of memory representations
Rugg, M. D., & Renoult, L. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106417 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Neural correlates of mental time travel in individuals with high level of schizotypy
Ye, J., Qin, X., Cui, J., Shi, H., Liu, J.-L., Huang, J., Wang, Y., Yang, T., Lui, S. S. Y., Wang, Y., et al. (2023) · Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2023.110734 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Capturing the conspiracist’s imagination
Munro, D. (2023) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02038-x · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Consequently, we’re able to imagine events in more detail when they better resemble prior experiences (Addis, 2020; Arnold et al., 2011; Chang, 2013; van Mulukom et al., 2016).”
Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism?
Keven, N. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04560-9 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Theorizing the function and evolution of the core cognitive system is in its infancy in cognitive sciences (see Addis, 2020 for a recent example), and the default network itself remains an enigma in neuroscience (Braga & Buckner, 2017).”
Caravà, M. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_53-1 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Hoffman, P., & Bair, M. B. (2024) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2024.07.11.603079 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“…termed situation models (Fernandino and Binder, 2024; Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012; Yeshurun et al., 2021), schemas (Gilboa and Marlatte, 2017), perceptually-decoupled cognition (Smallwood et al., 2013), mental time travel (Addis, 2020) or simply imagination (Andrews-Hanna and Grilli, 2021).”
The benefits of elaborative encoding over retrieval practice for associative learning
Jaeger, A., Martins, T. H. P. G., Rodrigues, J. P. P., Muniz, B. F. B., Fonseca, A. L. S. D. S., & Gonçalves, A. D. O. (2024) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-024-01671-z · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Retrieval and imagination, therefore, are characterized as instantiations of the same constructive process, with highly overlapping neural substrates (Addis, 2018, 2020; Schacter & Addis, 2020).”
Yazdi, B. G., & Razlighi, Q. R. (2025) · Journal of Translational Medicine · doi:10.1186/s12967-025-06721-x · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Mental time travel in animals: the ‘when’ of mental time travel
Latham, A. J., Miller, K., & Pedersen, R. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0398 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Moreover, Addis [2] argues that the ability to project the self beyond the present (whether into the past, the future or counterfactual worlds) might be a particular instance of a more general capacity that allows us to perceive and understand the present.”
BackgroundFunctional Brain Networks Underlying Autobiographical Event Simulation: An Update
Momeni, A., Addis, D. R., Feredoes, E. A., Klepel, F., Rasheed, M., Chinchani, A. M., Koussis, N. C., & Woodward, T. S. (2025) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_02305 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Self-citationSelf-Defining Future Projections Throughout Adulthood
Fritsch, A., Voltzenlogel, V., & Cuervo-Lombard, C.-V. (2023) · Imagination Cognition and Personality · doi:10.1177/02762366221147849 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Matsumoto, N. (2024) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-024-01541-8 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“This assumption is grounded in the theory that direct (associative) retrieval constitutes a primary process in memory retrieval (Addis, 2018, 2020; Uzer & Brown, 2017; Uzer et al., 2012).”
Perroy, B., Velasco, P. F., Gurchani, U., & Casati, R. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/k8p5c · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Law, K. F., Syropoulos, S., & Young, L. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/qybfu · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Mapping the Personality of (Exceptional) Intergenerational ConcernPreprint
Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., Amormino, P., et al. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/8ucfe · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Carving Stories at their Natural JointsPreprint
Dubourg, E., Thouzeau, V., Beuchot, T., Bonard, C., Boyer, P., Chevallier, C., Clasen, M., Boon-Falleur, M., Fiorio, G., Fitouchi, L., et al. (2024) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/me6bz · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Engrams and causal specificity
Najenson, J. (2025) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2475173 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“It is not always clear how to differentiate one memory vehicle from another, particularly given the distributed nature of memory storage and the reconstructive processes involved in memory retrieval (Addis, 2020; De Brigard, 2014a; Michaelian, 2016a).”
Situation models and the default mode network
Barnett, A. J., & Bellana, B. (2025) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2025.101593 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Reimagining pain: the role of mental imagery in pain experience
Todd, J., Sharpe, L., Ji, J. L., Pickup, B., Rooney, T., & Holmes, E. A. (2025) · Pain · doi:10.1097/j.pain.0000000000003863 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“1,63 As such, mental imagery of emotional experiences can evoke emotional and motivational responses at subjective and neurophysiological levels.”
Interpreting continuism as a mechanistic thesis
Camillo, J. C. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-04989-6 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“For certain research purposes, such as investigating the mechanisms of mental time travel or the mechanisms underlying mental simulation, it may be the most effective approach (Addis, 2020; Robins, 2020).”
InfluentialWhen is memory more reliable? Scientific findings, theories, and myths
İkier, S., Dönerkayalı, C., Halıcı, Ö. S., Gülseren, Z. A. K., Göksal, H., & Akbaş, B. (2022) · Applied Neuropsychology Adult · doi:10.1080/23279095.2022.2107928 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
McCarroll, C. J., & Kirby, A. (2023) · Memory Mind & Media · doi:10.1017/mem.2023.1 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Of course, this tripartite model is complicated somewhat by processes of consolidation and reconsolidation, questions of how in fact memories are integrated and stored for later retrieval (Andonovski 2021; Aronowitz 2019), and theories that recognise the constructive nature of remembering and the importance of retriev…”
BackgroundRemembering and relearning: against exclusionism
Céspedes, J. F. Á. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“On the one hand, research on memory as a form of mental time travel (Addis, 2020) suggests that remembering and episodic thinking—such as episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking—are underwritten by the same neurocognitive system.”
- Authors
- Addis, D. R.
- Affiliations
- University of Auckland (NZ)
- Corresponding author
- Addis, Donna Rose
- ORCID
- Addis, Donna Rose
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2020-04-30
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 233-259
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W3022976905
- Semantic Scholar
- e34e3c84cb89095da12f0b5771f58be049f83055
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 37 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 5
- FWCI
- 10.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion)
- TSpace (University of Toronto) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Canadian Network for Research and Innovation in Machining Technology, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- mental time travel, event simulation, episodic memory, mental imagery, simulation theory, schemas, predictive coding, hippocampus, time perception, neurocognitive model
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-07.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-07.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
