Testing two cognitive theories of insight.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver fails to see how to solve a problem and then--"aha!"--there is a sudden realization how to solve it. Two contemporary theories have been proposed to explain insight. The representational change theory (e.g., G. Knoblich, S. Ohlsson, & G. E. Rainey, 2001) proposes that insight occurs through relaxing self-imposed constraints on a problem and by decomposing chunked items in the problem. The progress monitoring theory (e.g., J. N. MacGregor, T. C. Ormerod, & E. P. Chronicle, 2001) proposes that insight is only sought once it becomes apparent that the distance to the goal is unachievable in the moves remaining. These 2 theories are tested in an unlimited move problem, to which neither theory has previously been applied. The results lend support to both, but experimental manipulations to the problem suggest that the representational change theory is the better indicator of performance. The findings suggest that testable opposing predictions can be made to examine theories of insight and that the use of eye movement data is a fruitful method of both examining insight and testing theories of insight.
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Cites
Duncker, K. (1945) · Psychological Monographs · doi:10.1037/h0093599 · Cited by 2,938
Thoughts beyond words: When language overshadows insight.
Schooler, J. W., Ohlsson, S., & Brooks, K. (1993) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.122.2.166 · Cited by 694 · cited 1×
“Schooler, Ohlsson, and Brooks (1993) suggest that impasse might involve, amongst other things, the spreading activation of memory elements that are important in the problem.”
Reasoning in humans. II. The solution of a problem and its appearance in consciousness
Maier, N. R. F. (1931) · Journal of Comparative Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0071361 · Cited by 621 · cited 1×
“Maier (1931) used a task where two pieces of string were attached to a ceiling but were far enough apart so as they could not both be held at the same time.”
The Effects of Operator Implementation Cost on Planfulness of Problem Solving and Learning
O'Hara, K. P., & Payne, S. J. (1998) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1997.0676 · Cited by 155
Cited by
Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight
Friston, K. J., Lin, M., Frith, C. D., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J. A., & Ondobaka, S. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00999 · Cited by 351
Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
Cross, F. R., Carvell, G. E., Jackson, R. R., & Grace, R. C. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568049 · Cited by 59
“It may be easy to envisage this as the test subject having a “eureka moment” in which it suddenly accepted that its efforts to go directly to the target were futile and that, in this eureka moment, it recognized a detour was a workable alternative (Jones, 2003; Chronicle et al., 2004).”
BackgroundBassok, M., & Novick, L. R. (2012) · The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0021 · Cited by 60
Visualizations at First Sight: Do Insights Require Training?
Smuc, M., Mayr, E., Lammarsch, T., Bertone, A., Aigner, W., Risku, H., & Miksch, S. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-89350-9_19 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1017-1027
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W2133106300
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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