Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on. Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events into which the state space was subjectively divided. This bias was diminished among participants more confident in what they learned, was strong and insensitive to level of confidence when ignorance priors were especially salient, and required ignorance priors to be salient only when probabilities were elicited (not during encoding).
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Citations
Cites
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167205282152 · Cited by 554 · cited 1×
“Indeed, just as highly accessible, externally provided anchors can contaminate judgments of even the most confident experts ( Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Wright & Anderson, 1989), particularly salient ignorance priors may contaminate likelihood judgments of even the most confident or…”
BackgroundPsychological probability as a function of experienced frequency.
Attneave, F. (1953) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0057955 · Cited by 197 · cited 2×
“…for proportions less than 1/2, whereas underestimation predominated for proportions greater than 1/2 (for similar results, see Attneave, 1953; Erlick, 1964; Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994; Fox & Tversky, 1998, Study 2; Parducci & Wedell, 1986; Sheridan & Ferrell, 1974; Wickens,…”
Background
Cited by
Zhang, H., & Maloney, L. T. (2012) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00001 · Cited by 679
Teacher immediacy, confidence testing, and the measurement of cognitive learning
King, P., & Witt, P. (2009) · Communication Education · doi:10.1080/03634520802511233 · Cited by 86
Known Unknowns: A Critical Determinant of Confidence and Calibration
Walters, D. J., Fernbach, P. M., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2580 · Cited by 62
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Metadata
- Authors
- See, K. E., Fox, C. R., & Rottenstreich, Y. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2006
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1385-1402
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W2112357056
- Cited by
- 93
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 2.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- See, K. E., Fox, C. R., & Rottenstreich, Y. S. (2006). Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.32.6.1385
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