Decision makers conceive of their choices as interventions.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Causal considerations must be relevant for those making decisions. Whether to bring an umbrella or leave it at home depends on the causal consequences of these options. However, most current decision theories do not address causal reasoning. Here, the authors propose a causal model theory of choice based on causal Bayes nets. The critical ideas are (a) that people decide using causal models of the decision situation and (b) that people conceive of their own choice as an intervention. Four corroborating experiments are reported. The first 2 experiments showed that participants chose on the basis of the causal structure underlying a choice scenario rather than the statistical relation among actions and outcomes. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that participants treated choices and interventions similarly. They also suggest that decision makers use causal models to derive inferences about expected outcomes. Boundary conditions on causal decision making and examples of faulty causal inferences in choice (e.g., self-deception) are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).
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Cites
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Fault trees: sensitivity of estimated failure probabilities to problem representation
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1978) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.4.2.330 · Cited by 708
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677 · cited 4×
“Second, we show that causal Bayes nets (see, e.g., Glymour, 2001; Pearl, 2000; Sloman, 2005; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 1993) provide the means to model reasoning and decision making in a way that is sensitive to causal structure.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationSeeing Versus Doing: Two Modes of Accessing Causal Knowledge.
Waldmann, M. R., & Hagmayer, Y. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.216 · Cited by 190
Self-citationMeek, C., & Glymour, C. (1994) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/45.4.1001 · Cited by 159 · cited 1×
“Along with many philosophers (e.g., Joyce, 1999; Lewis, 1981; Meek & Glymour, 1994; Nozick, 1969, 1993; Skyrms, 1980), we consider the distinction between causal relations and merely evidential correlations to be critical for good decision making (not all philosophers agree; see Levi, 2000).”
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Cited by
Sloman, S. A., & Lagnado, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135 · Cited by 210
“Consider the following example from Hagmayer & Sloman (2009): Recent research has shown that of 100 men who help with chores, 82 are in good health, whereas only 32 of 100 men who do not help with chores are in good health.”
MethodSelf-citationConviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
Johnson, S. G. B., Bilovich, A., & Tuckett, D. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22001157 · Cited by 131
Hagmayer, Y., & Engelmann, N. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01303 · Cited by 38
“The causal model theory of choice predicts that people choose their actions based on a causal model of the given situation (Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006; Hagmayer and Sloman, 2009).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hagmayer, Y., & Sloman, S. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 22-38
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2088744066
- Cited by
- 92
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 4.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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