The DOI matches its Crossref record; 73 of the 73 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Transitivity of preferences.
Abstract
Transitivity of preferences is a fundamental principle shared by most major contemporary rational, prescriptive, and descriptive models of decision making. To have transitive preferences, a person, group, or society that prefers choice option x to y and y to z must prefer x to z. Any claim of empirical violations of transitivity by individual decision makers requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We discuss why unambiguous evidence is currently lacking and how to clarify the issue. In counterpoint to Tversky's (1969) seminal "Intransitivity of Preferences," we reconsider his data as well as those from more than 20 other studies of intransitive human or animal decision makers. We challenge the standard operationalizations of transitive preferences and discuss pervasive methodological problems in the collection, modeling, and analysis of relevant empirical data. For example, violations of weak stochastic transitivity do not imply violations of transitivity of preference. Building on past multidisciplinary work, we use parsimonious mixture models, where the space of permissible preference states is the family of (transitive) strict linear orders. We show that the data from many of the available studies designed to elicit intransitive choice are consistent with transitive preferences.
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Cites
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
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Intransitivity of preferences.
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Cited by
Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision
Busemeyer, J. R., Wang, Z., & Pothos, E. (2015) · Oxford Handbooks Online · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199957996.013.17 · Cited by 534
Quantum Models for Psychological Measurements: An Unsolved Problem
Khrennikov, A., Basieva, I., Dzhafarov, E. N., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110909 · Cited by 123
On Consumer Beliefs about Quality and Taste
Spiller, S. A., & Belogolova, L. (2016) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1093/jcr/ucw065 · Cited by 95
Are Large Language Models Consistent over Value-laden Questions?
Moore, J., Deshpande, T., & Yang, D. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.02996 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Regenwetter, M., Dana, J., & Davis-Stober, C. P.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2011-01
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-56
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2049583279
- Cited by
- 309
- References
- 73
- FWCI
- 9.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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