The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive.
Abstract
Base-rate neglect refers to the tendency for people to underweight base-rate probabilities in favor of diagnostic information. It is commonly held that base-rate neglect occurs because effortful (Type 2) reasoning is required to process base-rate information, whereas diagnostic information is accessible to fast, intuitive (Type 1) processing (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). To test this account, we instructed participants to respond to base-rate problems on the basis of "beliefs" or "statistics," both in free time (Experiments 1 and 3) and under a time limit (Experiment 2). Participants were given problems with salient stereotypes (e.g., "Jake lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb") that either conflicted or coincided with base-rate probabilities (e.g., "Jake was randomly selected from a sample of 5 doctors and 995 nurses for conflict; 995 doctors and 5 nurses for nonconflict"). If utilizing base-rates requires Type 2 processing, they should not interfere with the processing of the presumably faster belief-based judgments, whereas belief-based judgments should always interfere with statistics judgments. However, base-rates interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as the stereotypes interfered with statistical judgments, as indexed by increased response time and decreased confidence for conflict problems relative to nonconflict. These data suggest that base-rates, while typically underweighted or neglected, do not require Type 2 processing and may, in fact, be accessible to Type 1 processing.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Stanovich, K. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001 · Cited by 1,041
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003 · Cited by 544
Self-citation
Cited by
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Self-citationFast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014 · Cited by 346
Quilty-Dunn, J., Porot, N., & Mandelbaum, E. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002849 · Cited by 205
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.865000 · Cited by 170
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., & Thompson, V. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 544-554
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W2331725338
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 6.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/a0034887
- The paper
- Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., & Thompson, V. A. (2014). Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034887
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.