The perception of probability.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present a computational model to explain the results from experiments in which subjects estimate the hidden probability parameter of a stepwise nonstationary Bernoulli process outcome by outcome. The model captures the following results qualitatively and quantitatively, with only 2 free parameters: (a) Subjects do not update their estimate after each outcome; they step from one estimate to another at irregular intervals. (b) The joint distribution of step widths and heights cannot be explained on the assumption that a threshold amount of change must be exceeded in order for them to indicate a change in their perception. (c) The mapping of observed probability to the median perceived probability is the identity function over the full range of probabilities. (d) Precision (how close estimates are to the best possible estimate) is good and constant over the full range. (e) Subjects quickly detect substantial changes in the hidden probability parameter. (f) The perceived probability sometimes changes dramatically from one observation to the next. (g) Subjects sometimes have second thoughts about a previous change perception, after observing further outcomes. (h) The frequency with which they perceive changes moves in the direction of the true frequency over sessions. (Explaining this finding requires 2 additional parametric assumptions.) The model treats the perception of the current probability as a by-product of the construction of a compact encoding of the experienced sequence in terms of its change points. It illustrates the why and the how of intermittent Bayesian belief updating and retrospective revision in simple perception. It suggests a reinterpretation of findings in the recent literature on the neurobiology of decision making.
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Cites
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Uncertainty, Neuromodulation, and Attention
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Meyniel, F., & Dehaene, S. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1615773114 · Cited by 138
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Hutchinson, J., Strickland, L., Farrell, S., & Loft, S. (2023) · Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society · doi:10.1177/00187208211062985 · Cited by 32
“…to the assumption that environments outside the laboratory are non-stationary, and have been implemented in a number of models of sequential effects in decision making, including for tasks involving the estimation of future event probability (Gallistel et al., 2014; Jarvik, 1951; Nicks, 1959).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallistel, C. R., Krishan, M., Liu, Y., Miller, R., & Latham, P. E.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 121
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 96-123
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W1991628587
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 6.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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