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Cited by 368Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsVisual perception and processing mechanisms

The Border Between Seeing and Thinking

Open access
Block, Ned·2023
DOI 10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001
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Abstract

This book argues that there is a joint in nature between seeing and thinking, perception, and cognition. Perception is constitutively iconic, nonconceptual, and nonpropositional, whereas cognition does not have these properties constitutively. The book does not appeal to “intuitions,” as is common in philosophy, but to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology. The book argues that cognition affects perception, i.e., that perception is cognitively penetrable, but that this does not impugn the joint in nature. A key part of the argument is that we perceive not only low-level properties like colors, shapes, and textures but also high-level properties such as faces and causation. Along the way, the book explains the difference between perception and perceptual memory, the differences between format and content, and whether perception is probabilistic despite our lack of awareness of probabilistic properties. The book argues for perceptual categories that are not concepts, that perception need not be singular, that perceptual attribution and perceptual discrimination are equally fundamental, and that basic features of the mind known as “core cognition” are not a third category in between perception and cognition. The chapter on consciousness leverages these results to argue against some of the most widely accepted theories of consciousness. Although only one chapter is about consciousness, much of the rest of the book repurposes work on consciousnes…

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939 of 939 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • It is consistent with computational functionalism that consciousness may depend on performing operations on states with specific representational formats, such as analogue representation.

    “Furthermore, it is consistent with computational functionalism that consciousness may depend on performing operations on states with specific representational formats, such as analogue representation (Block 2023).”

    From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Block 2023

  • IIT, RPT, and PP/NREP have primarily focused on phenomenal consciousness (PC), irrespective of cognitive functions and whether it can be reported or not.

    “By contrast, integrated information theory (IIT), recurrent processing theory (RPT), and predictive processing (PP)/NREP have primarily focused on ''PC,'' 19 (i.e., what ''it is like'' to experience something 18 ), irrespective of cognitive functions and whether it can be reported or not.50,51”

    From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [51]

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Authors
Block, N.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
Corresponding author
Block, Ned
ORCID
Block, Ned
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
Published
2023-02-16
DOI
10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001
OpenAlex
W4360620943
Cited by
367
References
952
Citations by year
2026: 132 · 2025: 109 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 4
FWCI
106.56
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
perception, cognition, non-conceptual content, perceptual memory, perceptual categories, perceptual discrimination, theory of consciousness, face perception, causal perception, neuroscience of perception

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