Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.
Open accessAbstract
An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.
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If people retain as few details about experiences as suggested by Misra et al. (2018), then remembered past events involve some degree of imagination, such as filling in missing details with internally generated content.
“If people actually retain as few details about their experiences as suggested by the results of a recent study (Misra, Marconi, Peterson, & Kreiman, 2018), then it is not surprising that remembered past events involve some degee of imagination, such as filling in missing details with internallygenerated content including details from related experiences, conceptual information fleshing out aspects”
From Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation. (2020) · cites this paper as Rubin & Umanath, 2015
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References 254 · Cited by 379
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Baddeley A 2012 Reflections of autobiographical memory Berntsen D Rubin DC Understanding autobiographical memory: Theories and approaches 70 87 Cambridge Cambridge University Press
- Freud S 1915 Repression Baines CM Strachey J The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud XIV Strachey J London Hogarth Press 1957
- Kanwisher N Dilks D in press The functional organization of the ventral visual pathway in humans Chalupa L Werner J The New Visual Neurosciences Cambridge, MA MIT Press
- Lord AB 1960 The singer of tales Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press
- Mandler JM 1979 Categorical and schematic organization in memory Puff CR Memory Organization and Structure 259 296 New York Academic Press
- Authors
- Rubin, D. C., & Umanath, S.
- Affiliations
- Duke University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2015-01
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- PMC
- PMC4295926
- OpenAlex
- W2105162193
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 254
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 47 · 2023: 51 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 2
- FWCI
- 11.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- DukeSpace (Duke University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH066079)
- Danish National Research Foundation (DNRF93)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
- Keywords
- event memory, scene construction, reliving, episodic memory, semantic memory, hippocampus, ventral stream, autobiographical memory, memory encoding
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Hippocampus, Humans, Memory, Memory Disorders
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