CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 434Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryEthics in Business and Education

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 143 of the 144 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology

Open access
Kahane, Guy, Everett, Jim A. C., Earp, Brian D., Caviola, Lucius, Faber, Nadira S., Crockett, Molly J., Savulescu, Julian·2018·Psychological Review
DOI 10.1037/rev0000093PMC PMC5900580
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

(see record 2018-15704-001). The copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC-BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is "© 2017 The Author(s)" and the omitted disclaimer is found in the erratum. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutilitarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people's attitudes toward instrumental harm-that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale-the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale-to dissociate individual differences in the 'negative' (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and 'positive' (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/rev0000093

Cites

143 of 143 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Figure 1 Scores on the OUS as a function of the expert’s self-described ethical view.
Figure 1 Scores on the OUS as a function of the expert’s self-described ethical view.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 144 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Anscombe G. E. M. (1981). Ethics, religion and politics: Collected philosophical papers (Vol. III). Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.
  2. Gorsuch R. L. (1983). Factor analysis (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
  3. Gray J. (2015, 5 21). How & how not to be good. The New York Review of Books. Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/how-and-how-not-to-be-good/
  4. Kline R. (2005). Principles and practice of structural equation modelling. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
  5. Parfit D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
  6. Rawls J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press.
  7. Ross W. D. (2002). The right and the good. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
  8. Singer P. (1993). Practical ethics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 401–433 of 433

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Everett, Jim A. C.
ORCID
Venue
Psychological Review
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
2018-03
Volume
125
Issue
2
Pages
131-164
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
DOI
10.1037/rev0000093
PMC
PMC5900580
OpenAlex
W2779777831
Cited by
434
References
144
Citations by year
2026: 48 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 74 · 2022: 60 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 11
FWCI
13.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Update notices
correction (2018-04-16)
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education
  • Wellcome Trust
  • Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities (WT203132/Z/16/Z)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
utilitarianism, instrumental harm, impartial beneficence, moral psychology, moral philosophers, empathic concern, subclinical psychopathy, religiosity, trolley problem, altruism
MeSH terms
Decision Making, Empathy, Humans, Morals, Psychological Theory, Ethical Theory

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review