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Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
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(see record 2018-15704-001). The copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC-BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is "© 2017 The Author(s)" and the omitted disclaimer is found in the erratum. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutilitarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people's attitudes toward instrumental harm-that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale-the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale-to dissociate individual differences in the 'negative' (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and 'positive' (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).
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“There is no consensus amongst laypeople about how such moral dilemmas should be resolved (154, 155), nor is there normative agreement amongst philosophers on how they should be resolved and why.”
From The impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making (2024) · cites this paper as [155]
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“For the following simulated and empirical demonstrations, we will use the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS; Kahane et al., 2018) from their paper.”
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“We refer interested readers to Kahane et al. (2018) for more details on the OUS.”
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“Second, attitudes toward traditional dilemmas were linked to participants’ abstract attitudes toward instrumental harm (in line with Kahane et al., 2015, 2018), whereas attitudes toward dilemmas involving critical care were also tied to participants’ tendency toward impartial beneficence.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBègue, L., & Vezirian, K. (2021) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672211039413 · Cited by 27
“We used the Instrumental Harm subscale of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (Kahane et al., 2017), which consists of four items measuring willingness to cause harm to bring about a greater good (e.”
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Optimality bias in moral judgment
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“Philosophers and psychologists have disagreed over the role of utilitarian criteria for moral judgment and behavior (maximizing the happiness of individuals) versus deontic criteria (following a set of rules), with psychologists uncovering a number of moderating factors, including emotion, moral character, and egoism…”
BackgroundPolitical Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model
Luke, D. M., & Gawronski, B. (2021) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167220987990 · Cited by 26
“Körner et al. (2020) examined associations between the three CNI model parameters and the two dimensions of utilitarianism as captured by the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS; Kahane et al., 2018).”
BackgroundMethodIndividual differences in moral judgment predict attitudes towards mandatory vaccinations
Clarkson, E. M., & Jasper, J. D. (2021) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2021.111391 · Cited by 26
Longtermist Education Interventions Increase Concern for and Action to Protect Future Generations
Syropoulos, S., Law, K. F., & Young, L. (2024) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/19485506241228465 · Cited by 22
“…obstacles to effective altruism often stem from hesitations to act prosocially beyond social boundaries (e.g., Berman et al., 2018; Everett, 2018; Kahane et al., 2018; Law et al., 2022; McManus et al.,2020, 2021), longtermism presents a parallel challenge, demanding prosociality across temporal…”
BackgroundThe impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy makingPreprint
Capraro, V., Lentsch, A., Acemoğlu, D., Akgün, S., Akhmedova, A., Bilancini, E., Bonnefon, J., Brañas‐Garza, P., Butera, L., Douglas, K. M., et al. (2023) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/6fd2y · Cited by 47
Cosmopolitan morality trades off in-group for the world, separating benefits and protection
Bai, X., Gauri, V., & Fiske, S. T. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2100991118 · Cited by 23
“Utilitarianism measures (22) propose multiple dimensions in moral judgments but are not group-based.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialVirtues for Real-World Utilitarians
Schubert, S., & Caviola, L. (2023) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003301424-11 · Cited by 21
Explaining the Complex Effect of Construal Level on Moral and Political Attitudes
Alper, S. (2020) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721419896362 · Cited by 21
“Abstractness might strengthen the effect of core values, but the importance of core values in making moral and political judgments would not be the same for everyone with an abstract mind-set, as individuals differ in their level of utilitarianism (Kahane et al., 2018).”
BackgroundOn the uneasy alliance between moral bioenhancement and utilitarianism
Kudlek, K. (2021) · Bioethics · doi:10.1111/bioe.12974 · Cited by 21
Who gives? Characteristics of those who have taken the Giving What We Can pledge
Wilks, M., McCurdy, J., & Bloom, P. (2023) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12842 · Cited by 20
Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons
Chituc, V., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. P. (2020) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1719395 · Cited by 22
“While other recent work has called into question towhat extent this pattern of responses to sacrificial dilemmas actually represents consequentialist and deontological concerns (for examples of this critique, see Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Kahane et al., 2017; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015) or, rather…”
BackgroundMoral responses to the COVID-19 crisis
Navajas, J., Heduan, F. Á., Garbulsky, G., Tagliazucchi, E., Dan Ariely, C., & Sigman, M. (2021) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.210096 · Cited by 24
“Previous research has shown that, while instrumental harm correlates with psychopathic tendencies, impartial beneficence is associated with higher empathic concern [22].”
InfluentialJohnson, S. G. B. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.31234/osf.io/r85jv · Cited by 18
Classifying public policies with Moral Foundations Theory
Wendell, D. G., & Tatalovich, R. (2020) · Policy Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11077-020-09399-8 · Cited by 20
Larsen, E. M., Ospina, L. H., Cuesta‐Diaz, A., Vian-Lains, A., Nitzburg, G. C., Mulaimovic, S., Latifoglu, A., Clari, R., & Burdick, K. E. (2018) · Journal of Affective Disorders · doi:10.1016/j.jad.2018.10.002 · Cited by 22
“Some have expressed skepticism of the degree to which decision-making in standard sacrificial moral dilemmas may be generalized to real-world situations and thus provide useful practical insight (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014; Bostyn, Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018; Kahane et al., 2018).”
BackgroundBiałek, M., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2019) · Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development · doi:10.1080/01434632.2018.1547072 · Cited by 23
“save oneself and few others is a valid example of impartial concern for other people which constitutes one dimension of utilitarianism (Kahane et al. 2018).”
BackgroundEverett, J. A. C., Faber, N. S., Savulescu, J., & Crockett, M. J. (2017) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/a2kx6 · Cited by 20
Ewelt‐Knauer, C., Schwering, A. C., & Winkelmann, S. (2020) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04647-6 · Cited by 19
Goldstein-Greenwood, J., Conway, P. J., Summerville, A. L., & Johnson, B. N. (2020) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167219897662 · Cited by 20
Negative perceptions of outsourcing to artificial intelligence
Claessens, S., Veitch, P., & Everett, J. A. C. (2025) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2025.108894 · Cited by 19
Anger and Sadness as Moral Signals
Plaks, J. E., Robinson, J. S., & Forbes, R. C. (2021) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/19485506211025909 · Cited by 19
“We use the terms Don’t Sacrifice and Sacrifice due to criticisms regarding the appropriateness of using the terms “Utilitarian” and “Deontological” to characterize laypeople’s judgment (e.g., Kahane et al., 2018).”
MethodMoral foundations, values, and judgments in extraordinary altruists
Amormino, P., Ploe, M. L., & Marsh, A. A. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-26418-1 · Cited by 20
Law, K. F., Syropoulos, S., & Young, L. (2023) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su152416732 · Cited by 18
Reduced utilitarian willingness to violate personal rights during the COVID-19 pandemic
Antoniou, R., Romero-Kornblum, H., Young, J. C., You, M. Y., Kramer, J. H., & Chiong, W. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0259110 · Cited by 19
“This observed dissociation provides indirect support for psychological accounts that distinguish utilitarian willingness to harm from utilitarian impartial concern [12, 14].”
BackgroundPsychopathic Traits and Utilitarian Moral Judgment Revisited
Paruzel‐Czachura, M., & Farny, Z. (2023) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672231169105 · Cited by 22
“According to the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology (Everett & Kahane, 2020; Kahane et al., 2018), utilitarianism has two dimensions that are conceptually and psychologically distinct.”
InfluentialSocial dominance orientation: The motivational basis of intergroup inequality
Ho, A. K., Kteily, N., Sheehy-Skeffington, J. A., & Thomsen, L. (2025) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2025.04.003 · Cited by 19
Capraro, V. (2019) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/432yw · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Everett, Jim A. C.
- ORCID
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2018-03
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 131-164
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- PMC
- PMC5900580
- OpenAlex
- W2779777831
- Cited by
- 434
- References
- 144
- Citations by year
- 2026: 48 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 74 · 2022: 60 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 11
- FWCI
- 13.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- correction (2018-04-16)
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education
- Wellcome Trust
- Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities (WT203132/Z/16/Z)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Keywords
- utilitarianism, instrumental harm, impartial beneficence, moral psychology, moral philosophers, empathic concern, subclinical psychopathy, religiosity, trolley problem, altruism
- MeSH terms
- Decision Making, Empathy, Humans, Morals, Psychological Theory, Ethical Theory
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