The Bayesian sampler: Generic Bayesian inference causes incoherence in human probability judgments.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Human probability judgments are systematically biased, in apparent tension with Bayesian models of cognition. But perhaps the brain does not represent probabilities explicitly, but approximates probabilistic calculations through a process of sampling, as used in computational probabilistic models in statistics. Naïve probability estimates can be obtained by calculating the relative frequency of an event within a sample, but these estimates tend to be extreme when the sample size is small. We propose instead that people use a generic prior to improve the accuracy of their probability estimates based on samples, and we call this model the Bayesian sampler. The Bayesian sampler trades off the coherence of probabilistic judgments for improved accuracy, and provides a single framework for explaining phenomena associated with diverse biases and heuristics such as conservatism and the conjunction fallacy. The approach turns out to provide a rational reinterpretation of "noise" in an important recent model of probability judgment, the probability theory plus noise model (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a, 2017; Costello & Watts, 2019; Costello, Watts, & Fisher, 2018), making equivalent average predictions for simple events, conjunctions, and disjunctions. The Bayesian sampler does, however, make distinct predictions for conditional probabilities and distributions of probability estimates. We show in 2 new experiments that this model better captures these mean judgments both qualitatively and quantitatively; which model best fits individual distributions of responses depends on the assumed size of the cognitive sample. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
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Cites
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“Human probability judgments appear to be systematically biased, apparently suggesting that human probabilistic reasoning is not based on normative Bayesian principles, but instead on heuristic approximations of various kinds (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).”
BackgroundExtensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
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“Such methods are routinely used to approximate probabilistic calculations in Bayesian machine learning (Craiu & Rosenthal, 2014; Ghahramani, 2015; Neal, 2011), artificial intelligence (Frey, Dayan, & Hinton, 1997), and cognitive science (Chater & Manning, 2006; Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Tenenbaum,…”
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Cited by
Pothos, E. M., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2022) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-033020-123501 · Cited by 223
A theory of learning to infer.
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2020) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000178 · Cited by 70
Wiest, M. C. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf011 · Cited by 34
“…et al. 2009, Conte et al. 2009b, a, Blutner et al. 2013, Pothos and Busemeyer 2013a, b; Wang et al. 2014, Bruza et al. 2015, Busemeyer et al. 2017, Zhu et al. 2020, Pothos and Busemeyer 2022) that are often accounted for by multiple ad hoc heuristics under the classical framework (Gigerenzer and…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhu, J.-Q., Sanborn, A. N., & Chater, N.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2020-10
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 719-748
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W3011898673
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 7.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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