Cited by 4,037Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic SkillsLeadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies

Heuristic decision making

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Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gaissmaier, Wolfgang·2011·Annual Review of Psychology

Abstract

As reflected in the amount of controversy, few areas in psychology have undergone such dramatic conceptual changes in the past decade as the emerging science of heuristics. Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes, conscious or unconscious, that ignore part of the information. Because using heuristics saves effort, the classical view has been that heuristic decisions imply greater errors than do “rational” decisions as defined by logic or statistical models. However, for many decisions, the assumptions of rational models are not met, and it is an empirical rather than an a priori issue how well cognitive heuristics function in an uncertain world. To answer both the descriptive question (“Which heuristics do people use in which situations?”) and the prescriptive question (“When should people rely on a given heuristic rather than a complex strategy to make better judgments?”), formal models are indispensable. We review research that tests formal models of heuristic inference, including in business organizations, health care, and legal institutions. This research indicates that (a) individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way, and (b) ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all information, for instance for low predictability and small samples. The big future challenge is to develop a systematic theory of the building blocks of heuristics as well as the core capacities and environmental structures these exploit.

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  • Biased reasoning can result in quite acceptable outcomes in natural or everyday situations, especially when the time cost of reasoning is taken into account.

    “Biased reasoning can result in quite acceptable outcomes in natural or everyday situations, especially when the time cost of reasoning is taken into account (Simon, 1955; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011).”

    From Human- versus Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011

  • Human intuitions rely on rules of thumb that are not arbitrary and often exhibit high validity.

    “Rather than estimating conditional probabilities over unobserved variables, as machine learning models do, humans typically rely on rules of thumb when forming beliefs and making decisions (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011;Selbst and Barocas 2018).These rules are not arbitrary; they often exhibit high validity, having emerged through repeated experience and pattern recognition (Gigerenzer 2023).”

    From Explainable AI Isn't Enough! Rethinking Algorithmic Contestability (2026) · cites this paper as Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011

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Authors
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W.
Affiliations
Max Planck Institute for Human Development (DE)
Venue
Annual Review of Psychology
Published
2011-01-10
Volume
62
Issue
1
Pages
451-482
ISSN
  • 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-2085
OpenAlex
W2096016260
Cited by
4,037
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 376 · 2025: 354 · 2024: 353 · 2023: 338 · 2022: 331 · 2021: 294 · 2020: 311 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 253 · 2017: 225 · 2016: 203 · 2015: 182 · 2014: 193 · 2013: 135 · 2012: 104
FWCI
6.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies
Keywords
heuristics, heuristic decision making, judgment under uncertainty, adaptive heuristics, information weighting, organizational decision-making, healthcare decision-making, legal decision-making
MeSH terms
Decision Making, Humans, Judgment, Models, Psychological, Problem Solving, Social Perception

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