Algorithmic discrimination causes less moral outrage than human discrimination
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 98 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
hypothesis in the context of gender discrimination in hiring practices across diverse participant groups (online samples, a quasi-representative sample, and a sample of tech workers). We find that people are less morally outraged by algorithmic (vs. human) discrimination and are less likely to hold the organization responsible. The algorithmic outrage deficit is driven by the reduced attribution of prejudicial motivation to algorithms. Just as algorithms dampen outrage, they also dampen praise-companies enjoy less of a reputational boost when their algorithms (vs. employees) reduce gender inequality. Our studies also reveal a downstream consequence of algorithmic outrage deficit-people are less likely to find the company legally liable when the discrimination was caused by an algorithm (vs. a human). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these results, including the potential weakening of collective action to address systemic discrimination. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
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“These tools can inadvertently perpetuate harmful digital experiences.175”
From Digital Ecosystems, Children, and Adolescents: Technical Report (2026) · cites this paper as [175]
In the citing paper
“People seem to be outraged more at humans who discriminate than AIs who discriminate [9]”
From The AI Double Standard: Humans Judge All AIs for the Actions of One (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
Citations
Cites
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Longoni, C., Bonezzi, A., & Morewedge, C. K. (2019) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1093/jcr/ucz013 · Cited by 2,015 · cited 2×
“algorithm impartiality – algorithms have a reductionist approach to human nature that lacks empathy and emotion which are seen as necessary for some decisions (Bigman & Gray, 2018; Longoni et al., 2019; Newman et al., 2020).”
BackgroundThe mind in the machine: Anthropomorphism increases trust in an autonomous vehicle
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Self-citationDisease Prediction by Machine Learning Over Big Data From Healthcare Communities
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bigman, Y. E., Wilson, D., Arnestad, M. N., Waytz, A., & Gray, K.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- BI Norwegian Business School (NO)
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2023-01
- Volume
- 152
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 4-27
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W4283644487
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 98
- Citations by year
- 2026: 44 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 27
- FWCI
- 42.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (SMA 1714298)
- Charles Koch Foundation
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- algorithmic discrimination, moral outrage, gender discrimination, hiring practices, organizational responsibility, corporate reputation, legal liability, collective action, institutional discrimination, technology professionals
- MeSH terms
- Social Group, Humans, Morals, Motivation, Social Perception, Sexism
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- The paper
- Bigman, Y. E., Wilson, D., Arnestad, M. N., Waytz, A., & Gray, K. (2023). Algorithmic discrimination causes less moral outrage than human discrimination. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001250
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.