Evolution of cooperation between individuals
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In this scenario (occasional failure), a population consisting only of conditional and unconditional altruists is not subject to random drift, but selection leads to a well defined, stable mix of the two types.
“In this scenario, a population consisting only of conditional and unconditional altruists is not subject to random drift, but selection leads to a well defined, stable mix of the two types.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [50]
If the frequency of undiscriminating co-operators exceeds a certain threshold, defectors can invade and take over.
“If their frequency exceeds a certain threshold, defectors can invade and take over.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [50]
In a population consisting entirely of discriminators, undiscriminating co-operators fare just as well and thus spread by neutral drift.
“In a population consisting entirely of discriminators, undiscriminating co-operators fare just as well and thus spread by neutral drift.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [50]
If players occasionally fail to cooperate although their strategy prescribes it, the situation is altered significantly.
“The situation is altered in a significant way if players occasionally fail to cooperate although their strategy prescribes it 39,49-52 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [50]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Altruistic punishment in humans
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Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762 · see citing works
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371 · see citing works
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673 · see citing works
A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2003) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00154-1 · Cited by 388 · see citing works
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.008 · Cited by 305 · see citing works
Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. (2002) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2002.1964 · Cited by 285 · see citing works
Atkinson, Q. D., & Bourrat, P. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.07.008 · Cited by 225 · see citing works
From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits
Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L. (2003) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2002.2225 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L.
- Affiliations
- Tel Aviv University (IL)
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 1999-07
- Volume
- 400
- Issue
- 6741
- Pages
- 226-227
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1628362912
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 5
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, indirect reciprocity, image scoring, evolutionarily stable strategy, cyclic dynamics, altruism
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Models, Genetic, Phenotype
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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